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ABSTRACT 
My motivation for my research stems from my practice as an abstract painter whose 
interests centre on form, pictorial space, surface quality and beauty in painting. For a 
long time I have been interested in the need for both freedom and restraint in the 
production of painting. 
In my practice I use an unusual material, containing translucent silicon polymers, 
because it provides a beautiful surface quality for my work. This is difficult to use; it 
cannot be applied with brushes, and so I developed a simple semi-autonomous 
machine for producing an image on canvas. The machine enabled me to paint with 
silicon polymers, to achieve a beautiful surface, but it imposed very severe restraints 
on the form of the images. This difficulty compelled me to consider the problem of 
the conflict between autonomy and freedom at a practical level and that in turn led to 
a reflection on the nature of this problem at the intellectual and emotional level. This 
thesis is, in large part, my response to this conflict. 
I begin my enquiry with a critical discussion of Greenberg's essay Modernist Painting 
in terms of the Kantian authority that he claims for it. I then turn to a critique of that 
Kantian authority itself. Common to both Greenberg and Kant is systematic 
argumentation in terms of wholly autonomous entities that makes a resolution of the 
conflict between freedom and necessity very difficult. In the second half of the thesis 
I use the concepts and empirical observations of affective neuroscience (which does 
not deal in autonomous entities) to develop my own theory of the beautiful and to use 
it as a critical tool in relation to both Kantian aesthetics and my own painting practice. 
for Margaret 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
My motivation to write this thesis arose from difficulties that I experienced within my 
painting practice. I had chosen to work with material made from polymerised silicon 
esters that had been developed for industrial rather than artistic purposes. I chose 
this material for painting because of the beauty of its surface, a quality that I had 
discovered by accident when I was using the material to make a kinetic sculpture. 
The nature of the material, particularly its rapid setting time and unsuitability for being 
applied to canvas with brushes, meant that I needed to develop a machine, which 
would apply it to the entire canvas within a few minutes. 
The machine consisted of an aluminium tray with a series of holes drilled in its base 
at regular intervals, suspended by wires from a wheeled gantry. The tray was filled 
with the coloured silicon material and set in motion like a pendulum. As the material 
poured out of the holes, the whole contrivance was pulled rapidly over the canvas, 
the tray oscillating at right angles to the direction of motion. The result was a series 
of identical wave patterns on the canvas. By repeating the process, but with the 
canvas itself rotated through ninety degrees I was able to form a regular pattern 
something like the classic modernist graph or grid to which Krauss (1981) refers. 
Unlike Krauss's famous grid, mine was made up of waveforms rather than straight 
lines. 
I was delighted with the results because my grid of wave patterns was not pictorially 
flat like the modernist grid but appeared both three-dimensional and two-dimensional 
at the same time, depending on the viewers changing spatial perception. This 
spatial ambiguity related to my long-standing preoccupation with pictorial space; it 
emphasised the active role of the beholding subject in perception and thus 
challenged modernism from a post-modernist position. At the same time the 
composition of the painting was evidently modernist. 
My initial pleasure in all of this quickly waned as I realised that I had come face to 
face with the modernist dilemma: the conflicting demands of the requirement for both 
repetition and innovation in painting practice. I had some control over the 
wavelength and amplitude of the waveforms produced through varying the speed of 
the machine over the canvas and the frequency of the oscillating drip bar. Apart from 
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that, the machine controlled me because all it would produce was either straight lines 
or waveforms. The machine was semi-autonomous but so was I. On the one hand 
the nature of the material had forced me to give up much of my own freedom as an 
artist; on the other, relinquishing part of that freedom was necessary if I wanted to 
use the material at all. Moreover, this situation had arisen as a result of my desire for 
beauty in painting; perhaps the relation between desire for beauty and freedom was 
more complex than I had previously realised. 
I considered designing a new machine that allowed me more freedom, but on 
reflection I decided that what was needed was to internalise the function of restraint 
within myself. That raised the question of deciding and prioritising those aspects of 
painting that were of most value to me, what really mattered to me as an artist at the 
visual, conceptual and emotional level. I realised that I already knew the answer, it 
was beauty: the feeling of sheer joy in simply seeing certain objects in nature or in 
art. I abandoned my machine and, for a while, my painting practice too. I read about 
other people's ideas of beauty, particularly those of Immanuel Kant, whose 
questions, values and motivations seemed very similar to my own. I had not read 
Kant before and found his work wonderful and difficult, like beauty itself, like the 
feelings that we have and which we call beauty. Although I ultimately disagree with 
many of his detailed conclusions, I retain a great admiration for his methodology and 
motivation. He remains very influential in this thesis. 
In my reading of Kant I came to recognise the similarity between the problems of 
reconciling my artistic freedom with the restraints imposed on my work by using a 
largely autonomous painting machine, and the problems experienced by Kant in 
constructing a systematic philosophy based on the autonomous categories of 
quantity, quality, modality and relation. The consequences of Kant's choice of 
discrete and autonomous categories as the basis for his work are discussed in detail 
as this thesis develops. Here, I simply want to draw attention to the parallel between 
Kants attempt to reconcile the phenomenal subject, based on arguments of 
necessity in his First Critique, with the noumenal subject that is wholly morally 
autonomous (free) of his Second Critique, and my own attempt to relate the 
necessities of modernism and the freedom of post-modernism in my own painting 
practice. 
In his Third Critique Kant attempts to bring the phenomenal and noumenal together 
in the human through his theory of beauty. Likewise in this thesis I try to do 
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something broadly similar in terms of both theory and painting practice through my 
development of a theory of beauty that both supports and contests that of Kant. I 
choose a different ground, one based on contemporary neuroscience, to Kant's 
chosen appeal to the supersensible substrate of humanity and phenomena to explore 
and partially resolve the conflict between necessity and freedom. The arguments 
deployed by Kant and by me are technical. In this thesis I give brief explanations of 
technical terms, whether philosophical or scientific, as they arise. 
I decided to start my investigation with a study of Clement Greenberg's (1960) essay 
Modemist Painting. That essay epitomises the late modernist attitude to artists and 
the beholders of their work: it largely ignores them. It is a great essay in its felicity of 
expression, power of argument, and visual acuity. Its great achievement is to push 
the modernist aesthetic to its limit. Its ultimate failure is, I suggest, to remain there, 
because, by definition, a limit is the point of failure. I believed Modernist Painting to 
evidence both the best and the worst of modernism as a cultural, political and 
economic paradigm. It seemed a good place to start. 
The methodoloQV and structure of the written element of the thesis 
Chapter Two is a critique of Clement Greenberg's seminal essay, Modernist Painting, 
written in 1960. In that work Greenberg cites Kant as the authority for what he claims 
to be his self-critical conditions for the autonomy and quality of painting in 
modernism. He also claims that painting must remain aesthetic. Many of the 
established criticisms of Greenberg have focused on Greenberg's implied claim that 
his conditions for painting are consistent with Kantian aesthetics; that is to say, they 
have critiqued Modernist Painting from the standpoint of Kant's Third Critique or from 
a critical appraisal of modernism in general. 
For example, Rosalind Krauss (1981) criticises Greenberg through her general 
resistance to the modernist suppression of cultural and gender differences. Krauss 
challenges modernism's claim to supposedly value-free foundational premises. She 
exposes modernism's claim to a utopian and apolitical freedom as leading to 
something more like a dystopian tyranny of repression and exclusion of the cultural, 
historical and gendered specificities of the individual person. She regards the 
certainties of modernism, its supposed philosophical and disciplinary rigour, as a 
masquerade covering what she calls its failure of engagement with art as being to do 
with humanity in its diverse actuality. Krauss identifies this failure of engagement of 
modernist painting with the opacity of its flat painted surfaces to representation, to 
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narrative, to anything that is to do with the human and lies outside the flat pictorial 
field. This flatness of both the substrate of painting and pictorial space is the 
foundational, the originary principle upon which Greenberg's conditions for the 
autonomy and singularity of painting in modernism rest. 
Krauss identifies this modernist origin of perceived flatness as the privileged term of 
painting, and representation as the suppressed one. She then goes on to argue that 
this supposed origin of singularity and autonomy is no more than a reified signifier 
that is itself contingent on multiple representations in painting of both flatness and 
non-flatness of pictorial space. Krauss has been very influential on my own way of 
thinking in relation to modernism and I am much indebted to her work. Her claim that 
the modernist origin is not singular but is itself contingent on the multiple 
representations of space throughout the history of painting situates her work 
alongside that of Michael Fried. 
Although Fried (1966) supports Greenberg's emphasis on the flatness of the material 
substrate in modernist painting, part of his project is to elevate the producer and 
beholder of painting to a position of at least equal importance to that of the object that 
is the painting. Fried sees the history of painting as an internal dialectic between 
successive styles rather than a response to the socio-political and economic issues 
within society at large. Fried (1967) draws attention, however, to the need for 
producing artists to recognise their situatedness in art discourse in as objective terms 
as they are able to achieve, and it is that insistence that leads him to his 
preoccupation with ensuring an anti-theatrical aspect within painting practice. 
However, the ongoing historical debate in painting that focuses on theatricality is 
ultimately about the relationship that pertains between the artwork, its producer and 
its beholder. Since two of these three constituents of the relationship are people, 
individuals with their own culturally and historically constituted convictions, it is 
difficult to see, I suggest, how objectivity can be achieved in this situation. There is, I 
claim, an ongoing tension, a dissonance, in Fried's writing between his desire to 
reconcile modernist painting to the objective nature of its substrate and the subjective 
nature of its history, its producers and its beholders. Fried appears to believe that 
the nature of the substrate, its flatness, is given by the object alone and is not 
constituted at all by the beholding subject. That autonomous conception of subject 
and object is, I claim, a large part of the difficulty within his work; it also parallels his 
conception of different art practices as found or discovered entities (rather than 
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socially constructed discourses) autonomous from each other and art in general as 
an autonomous domain from that of ordinary objects. 
At issue in all of this is the conflict between sameness and the other, between, in 
contemporary language, ipseity and alterity, and between freedom and necessity. 
Fried is very relevant to this thesis because these are also my preoccupations. That 
relevance is not confined to the practical level of my painting but extends to my 
critique of Kant in Chapter Three. 
Fried (1966, p18-27) is able to resolve the aporetic aspect of his critical writing on 
painting only by insisting that painting carries conviction through "shape as such". 
These concepts have often been criticised, as being ill defined, overly metaphysical 
or even quasi-religious. It is interesting to note here that one might level these 
accusations (as, in broad terms, I do) at the Kantian idea of the transcendental 
subject. The value of Fried's work was to shift the criticality of painting away from the 
Greenbergian obsession with the empirical nature of its substrate and include within 
it an equally significant role for the producing and beholding subjects. Flatness and 
non-flatness of pictorial space became a matter for negotiation rather than 
prescription. 
Thierry de Duve (1999) situates his discussion of Greenberg's work within his stated 
overall project, which is to undertake an archaeological exploration of art in modernity 
in much the same way as Michel Foucault undertook his exploration of the global 
episteme of the classical age. A consequence of that positioning of his project, is de 
Duve's contention that Greenberg's essay Modernist Painting reflects the author's 
own taste, a taste that has evolved under the same pressures as modernist painting 
practice itself. I agree with that view, but would put it more forcibly because 
Greenberg puts forward his conditions for the autonomy and quality of painting as a 
neutral account of the history of painting. There is, I claim, no such thing as a 
neutral, in the sense of ideologically free, account of the history of painting or 
anything else. The claim for the neutrality of history is itself ideologically situated in 
modernism. The point that I am making here is that Greenberg's conditions for 
painting do not simply reflect his own taste; they are determined by it. What is more, 
they result in a negation, a complete arrest, of the history of painting to which he 
refers. 
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A central argument of de Duve is that there is no such thing as modernism at large. 
What he means by this is that modernism is about constructing disciplinary 
boundaries specific to each discipline within art, thus ensuring the complete 
separation, the autonomy, of each within the generic practice that we call art. I would 
add to that, the remark that what is common or generic to art is what is shared 
between and amongst its separate disciplines; if we isolate each discipline from that 
we end up with disciplines but not art disciplines. De Duve is concerned to maintain 
the flatness of painting in modernism as a valuable trait rather than a prescriptive 
condition for painting to be painting within modernist terms. At the same time he 
wants to maintain painting as an aesthetic experience. I whole-heartedly support that 
project. The method that de Duve employs to achieve his goal is to resort to a 
modified form of the Kantian resolution of the antinomy of taste. The conflict is 
between the Kantian thesis that the judgement of taste is not based upon concepts, 
for if it were, it would be open to dispute (decision by means of proofs) and the 
antithesis, which is that the judgement of taste is based on concepts. 
De Duve replaces the words "judgement of taste" by the word "art° in the antinomy 
above but in other respects his resolution of the antinomy proceeds along the same 
lines as Kant (1790, prop 56,57, Bernard edition, p230-235). The thesis becomes 
"the judgement of taste (now art) is not based on determinate concepts", and the 
antithesis becomes "the judgement of taste (now art) is based on an indeterminate 
one (viz, of the supersensible substrate of phenomena and humanity). " I have 
several problems with de Duve's modified Kantian resolution of the antinomy. Firstly 
the supersensible substrate of phenomena cannot properly be isolated from that of 
humanity as de Duve does (without comment on this separation). That is because 
the latter is a constituent, in Kantian terms, of the former. Secondly, the 
Greenbergian thesis, that is his conditions for painting in modernism, evidently is a 
determinate and not an indeterminate concept because it is an analytic identity. For 
the same reason the Kantian antithesis, which is indeterminate, cannot encompass 
Greenberg's conditions. Thirdly the Kantian resolution of the antinomy is only 
achieved through his use of the transcendental subject that is indispensable to the 
supersensible substrate. Although I share de Duve's ambition to retain what is of 
value in the Greenbergian conditions for painting as an historical trait, I do have 
reservations about the argument that he uses. As I discuss later, there are problems 
with the invariant and culturally homogenous nature of Kant's transcendental subject 
that lead me to reject it as the ground to unify the phenomenal and the noumenal in 
the human through my own theory of beauty. 
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I have given a very brief review of the work of those who I consider to be the most 
important critics of Greenberg (and by implication, some aspects of Kant too) 
because I want to situate my own criticism within the established critical tradition. I 
also want to show how my project in this thesis differs from the established critiques 
of Greenberg. 
In my critique of Greenberg's work, I examine Modernist Painting mainly from the 
point of view of Kant's First Critique. Greenberg implicitly appeals to the self-critical 
methodology of the Critique of Pure Reason to legitimate his conditions for the 
disciplinary autonomy of painting in modernism. I want to critique Greenberg 
immanently, and it is his concern for the autonomy of painting from other art practices 
that defines his project in Modernist Painting. In Chapter Two, therefore, I examine 
the spatial arguments that Greenberg puts forward in that essay and compare them 
to the Kantian pure a priori intuitions of space and time that are so crucial to his self- 
critical methodology. I also explore the relation between Greenberg's use of analogy 
and that of Kant. More importantly, I examine the claim implicit in Modernist Painting: 
that to establish the self-identity of painting is to establish its self-criticality and 
autonomy. I draw attention to incompatibilities between Greenberg's ideas and 
Kantian methodology in all of these areas. My concern in Chapter Two is not to 
reject Greenberg's emphasis on the importance of flat pictorial space but to re- 
establish it as a trait in the evolution of painting that still has value, rather than as a 
prescriptive condition for the inclusion of artworks on canvas or board within the 
discourse of painting. 
Throughout Chapter Two I accept, without question, the authority of Kant in order to 
construct a critique of Greenberg within the legitimating paradigm to which he 
appeals for validation of his own ideas. In Chapter Three, however, I critically 
examine that Kantian authority. To do that I consider the methodology and content of 
Kant's critical trilogy as a whole because to relate the reflective judgement of taste 
and his taxonomy of beauty developed in the Third Critique to the critical 
methodology and determinate judgements of the First Critique, it is necessary to refer 
to the moral philosophy of his Second Critique. That, however, is not my only reason 
for including his moral theory in my discussion. More importantly, although I 
comment on the difficulties and aporiai within Kant's work, I want to keep his claim for 
beauty as an analogical symbol of morality within my own theory of beauty that I 
develop in this thesis; I want the estimation of beauty to remain a matter for reasoned 
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discussion and consensual agreement. I do not want it to be a private report on 
sensation or desire, to be merely a means to the fulfilment of self-interest as opposed 
to the interests of society. In short, I want a limited form of Kantian autonomy that 
does not collapse into individual self-interest and the domination of nature over 
freedom. To avoid that, I still need beauty to retain a moral moment within itself, for 
otherwise beauty cannot be distinguished from individual corporeal desire. 
In this chapter, the conflict between necessity and freedom that motivated me to write 
this thesis emerges with full force at the intellectual, social, and emotional and 
aesthetic levels. This is not the place to discuss the details of the arguments that I 
make in Chapter Three. Here, I only wish to say that I am unable to resolve this 
conflict to my own satisfaction within the systematic philosophy and methodology of 
Kant that is based on his autonomous categories. The problem is, I claim, based on 
the central role of autonomy in Kant's work. For that reason I need to look elsewhere 
for a discursive practice that will allow me to retain Kant's emphasis on form as 
opposed to content and on the ethical aspect of beauty that flows from the shared 
reflective form of his moral and aesthetical judgements. At the same time I need a 
discursive practice that is not based on relations between wholly autonomous entities 
such as the Kantian faculties of mind and categories. Yet I require a discourse that is 
capable of providing something like Kant's universality and sensus communis for the 
social construction of the beautiful. 
In Chapter Four I make a fundamental move from the propositional philosophy of 
modernism to the pragmatic practices of contemporary neuroscience in order to find 
a discursive practice upon which I can ground my ideas about beauty. My appeal to 
neuroscience also marks a turn from modernist to postmodemist critique in my 
thesis. Yet I claim that my appeal to contemporary science for legitimation of the 
methodology of my critique of beauty is analogous to Kant's appeal to the science of 
his day as the authority for his critical methodology in his First Critique. Just as Kant 
sought to limit the speculations of metaphysics by knowledge obtained in experience 
of the phenomenal world, so I want to limit philosophical introspection about our 
feelings of pleasure in relation to particular objects that we call beautiful by the 
specificities of our biology, especially that of our embodied brains as described by 
neuroscience. The analogy that I make here to Kant's methodological appeal to 
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Copernican cosmology' is important to me because I want to stress that my move 
here is a methodological and not an ontological one and I want it to be critical in the 
same sense that Kant uses that term. I do not, however, regard the role of 
neuroscience within this thesis in merely negative terms of limitation; I believe that it 
also has a very positive and enabling role in affording us new opportunities for our 
creative imagination. 
Chapter Four examines issues of commensurability between the discourses of 
philosophy and science. It does not claim that the brain is the mind but only that it 
may be useful to suppose some correlation between the activities of mind and 
embodied brain. In this respect, and to a degree, my thesis echoes Spinozan 
philosophy. 
For Spinoza, it is the dynamical relation between mind, body and world rather than 
causality between them that is important, together with the persistence in time of a 
unitary self. These preoccupations are echoed some three centuries later in the 
reflexive dynamical operation between mind, body and world described by 
contemporary neuroscience. In particular, neuroscience relies upon the biological 
idea of homeostasis as a means to survival that is very similar to the Spinozan idea 
of the persistence of the unitary self. 
An important function of this chapter is to review the narrative that neuroscience 
provides of brain structure. Neuroscience is interested in understanding the organs 
of the brain in the traditional sense of observing which part of the brain performs what 
general function. Crucially however, it does not regard the organs of the brain as 
discrete entities that function autonomously. It is much more interested in the 
dynamical functional operations between the different parts of the brain, which are 
recursive and reflexive in their form. In anticipation that many of the readers of my 
thesis will not be specialists in neuroscience, I have sought to limit the sometimes 
very technical arguments of neuroscience as far as is consistent with required 
I Before Copernicus, people had assumed that the celestial bodies revolved around the earth. 
Copernicus proposed, as a purely methodological move, that they only appear to do so because the 
earth, rather than the celestial bodies, is revolving. That supposition marked a fundamental shift in our 
understanding of cosmology - and much else besides - from one considered in terms of active objects to 
one thought of in terms of active experiencing subjects. Kant adopted Copernican methodology and 
developed from it his own revolution in epistemology and self-critical methodology. Kant explains our 
knowledge of apparently independently constituted objects of experience in terms of our (subjective) 
mode of cognition. The notion of the reality of objects as independent from us is replaced by the idea of 
objects as they appear to us. See Appendix Two of Chapter Two for a more detailed explanation of 
Kant's "Copernican Revolution". 
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accuracy and rigour. Like any other discourse, neuroscience contains theoretical 
models that differ, to varying degree, in the particulars of their conclusions. In 
Chapter Four I review both the cognitivist-passivist and the positivist-pragmatic 
theories of perception. These models are not mutually exclusive and both are useful. 
I make it clear that I consider the positivist-pragmatist model to be the more useful of 
the two for this thesis. 
Chapter Five uses the basic neuroscientific information and theory provided by the 
previous chapter but re-focuses the discussion onto affective neuroscience. It 
concentrates on the biological role of pleasure and displeasure as both the 
motivation and reward for intentional actions that enhance the well being of the 
subject. 
This chapter discusses the supposition of neuroscience that our basic emotions and 
our feelings of pleasure and displeasure evolved in our brains as the means of 
ensuring our survival in the constantly changing conditions within our bodies and in 
the world beyond them. I use that idea as the ultimate ground for my theory of 
embodied beauty. Beauty, as the subjective feeling of pleasure predicated by us 
onto mental or physical objects thus becomes crucially important to our well-being 
and survival. It is the common pathway in which all motivations for intentional action, 
including conflicting motivations for different possible actions, are resolved and 
converge. This theory is discussed at length and in detail because of its central role 
in my thesis as the explanation of how it is that we take pleasure in some objects and 
ideas and not in others. The difficulty remains of why we take pleasure in stimuli that 
have no direct physiological link to survival and well-being. We may reasonably 
presume that the pleasure that we take in art objects such as, for example, abstract 
paintings, did not evolve but is culturally learned. Pleasure is, in neuroscientific 
terms, the stimulus and reward for all actions including mental ones. We therefore 
obtain pleasure from the process of re-predication as such; our embodied feelings of 
pleasure remain the same but it is pleasurable for us to releam new stimuli on which 
to predicate them. Learning, particularly social learning, is pleasurable in itself not 
only for humans but also for many other vertebrates. 
The idea of pleasure as the common currency of all intentional action is important in 
Chapter Five because it enables me to construct an economic theory of beauty as 
indispensable to the organisation of all our physical and mental activities. This 
commonality of pleasure and displeasure provides the basis for my claim for the 
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inter-subjectivity of beauty that is essential to link it to both cognitive and moral 
(Kantian) judgements; it provides something like Kant's sensus communis for beauty. 
The legitimation for that claim is that the observations of neuroscience provide the 
evidence for it. Neurological studies have shown that the affects of pleasure and 
displeasure are indispensable to the basic dynamical operations and functions of the 
normal brain and are common to all of us. That does not mean that we all think and 
feel in exactly the same way, but that we have the capacity to do so if we 
consensually choose to. The analogy to Kantian judgements is clear. Unlike Kant, 
neuroscience has no need of a transcendental subject or the supersensible substrate 
of humanity and phenomena to provide universality and inter-subjective consensual 
agreement for its theories about a unified thinking and feeling subject. 
Chapter Five both supports and contests Kantian aesthetics. It broadly supports 
Kant's universal claim for his different judgements but it strongly contests his claim 
for their autonomy. The evidence of recent investigations of affective neuroscience 
clearly show that pleasure and desire are linked together, that any absolute 
distinction between them is semantic rather than scientific. Neuroscience also 
clearly shows that the information upon which reason operates is always and already 
emotionally mediated; and that reason in turn mediates the gestalt processes by 
which complex emotions and feelings are constructed. 
In Chapter Five I draw attention to the extremely complex recursive and reflexive 
dynamical operations of the brain, which are not reducible to the traditional 
philosophical concepts of linear or circular causality. I show how these observed 
brain dynamics render the idea of the autonomous nature of faculties of mind, 
judgements, and the domain of beauty untenable within the paradigm of 
neuroscience. 
Chapter Six, the concluding one, summarises the implications of my neuroscientific 
critique of Kantian aesthetics. The major implication is that beauty is no longer 
entirely disinterested and apart from reference to objects. That conclusion, together 
with the irrelevance of the Kantian supersensible substrate to neuroscience, renders 
redundant arguments in aesthetics that revolve around the Kantian antinomy of taste. 
The implications of that for Kant's Analytic and Deduction of the Beautiful are 
unpacked here, as are the implications for his reflective aesthetic judgement of taste. 
My aim here is not to demolish Kantian aesthetics but to begin to re-inscribe it with a 
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limited objective moment through reference to the observed reflexive and recursive 
form of the operations of the brain. Form is the crucial concept here; it both contests 
and supports Kantian aesthetics. It is just as important to neuroscience, if not more 
so, than it is to Kant. As Kant moves through his critical trilogy his use of form 
changes in parallel with the judgements that he develops in each critique. By the end 
of his Third Critique the reflective form of aesthetic judgement hints at the future 
possibility, in a system of thought that does not rely on autonomous categories, of the 
reflexive and recursive forms of thinking that are now common in neuroscience and 
other discursive practices. The reflexive form of neuroscience links it to the 
contemporary philosophical interest in ipseity and alterity, to the post-modern 
fascination with the fold. 
In Chapter Six I return to a discussion of my own practice as a painter in the light of 
the matters discussed in my thesis. I explain my use of very simple images to allude 
to the very complex subjective play of perception in relation to our experience of 
pictorial space. I hope that my perceptual play with our construction of space in 
painting may encourage us to reflect on the complex dynamical relations between 
our own thoughts, values and feelings. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
GREENBERG AND KANT'S CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 
What, then, are space and time? Are they real existences? Are they only 
determinations or relations of things, yet such as would belong to things even 
if they were not intuited? Or are space and time such that they belong only to 
the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of our mind, 
apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever? 
Immanuel Kant (1781/87) 
The Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic (CPR, A23/B37-8) 
lt was the stressing, however, of the ineluctable flatness of the support that 
remained most fundamental in the processes by which pictorial art criticised 
and defined itself under modernism. Flatness alone was unique and 
exclusive to that art. The enclosing shape of the support was a limiting 
condition, or norm, that was shared with the art of the theatre; colour was a 
norm or means shared with sculpture as well as the theatre. Flatness, two- 
dimensionality, was the only condition that painting shared with no other art, 
and so painting oriented itself to flatness as it did to nothing else. 
Clement Greenberg (1960/65) 
Modernist Painting 
In this chapter I discuss Clement Greenberg's essay Modernist Painting2 in which he 
sets out his critical project. I have chosen to critique this essay because it has been 
so influential in the development of a late modernist criticality of painting, particularly 
formalist painting. As such it is directly relevant to my own formalist painting practice. 
Greenberg appeals to Kantian philosophical and methodological authority to support 
the ideas he expresses in Modernist Painting. He does not explicitly state that his 
appeal is to Kant's First Critique, but the arguments that he deploys in his essay 
make it clear that Kant's First Critique is the focus of his attention. 
2 There are two versions of this essay, the first published in 1960 and the second in 1965. The later 
essay is a slight revision of the original version with some additional text. The two essays are very 
similar. I quote from both because the later version reflects Greenberg's considered position and was 
published at a time when his influence was at its peak. 
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There are several advantages to critiquing Modernist Painting principally in reference 
to Kant's First Critique. Firstly, Greenberg is entitled to be criticised within terms that 
he appeals to rather than in terms that apparently did not interest him. Secondly, 
criticism of Greenberg from the standpoint of Kant's Third Critique is by now a well- 
trodden path. Criticism of Modernist Painting within the terms of Kant's First Critique 
has not received so much attention. 
Because I came to Kant's First Critique by way of his Third Critique, I had to look at 
the Second Critique to make sense of the relationship between Kant's other two 
Critiques. My attempt to relate all three Critiques to each other within immanently 
Kantian terms and my reference to neo-Kantian re-inscriptions of Kantian aesthetics, 
particularly my reading of Theodor Adorno, significantly changes my position in 
relation to Kant and his work; a change that is important for the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
This shift of positioning in my relation to Kant has been important for me. It has 
enabled me to see that the creative play between concept and imagination in Kant's 
writing, avoiding as it does a collapse into pre-Kantian idealism or empiricism, is a 
process that has clear parallels in the production of visual art. The production and 
reception of art requires, for Kant, a balance between concept, to which form is 
proximate, and intuitions given in sensation, which stimulate imagination and elicit 
affective response. It is characteristic of Kantian philosophy and of art that both 
avoid total closure around either concept or sensation; both avoid the subsumption of 
the intellectual and the sensual by their dichotomous partner. 
In this chapter my use of Kant is more restricted; I confine myself to a criticism of 
Greenberg's Modernist Painting in terms that are almost always limited to Kant's First 
Critique. The exception is a brief excursion into Kants moral philosophy because I 
consider it so relevant to Greenberg's preoccupation with autonomy. No reference to 
Kant's Third critique is made in this chapter, though such reference is made in 
following chapters. My general conclusion in this chapter is that, ultimately, 
Greenberg does not manage to maintain a balance between the a priori (conceptual) 
and the a posteriori (empirical) aspects of his argumentation, but instead collapses 
into a methodological and philosophical position that is too close to pre-critical 
empiricism for him to adequately sustain his appeal to Kantian authority 
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Greenberg's conditions for painting in modernism 
Greenberg develops his conditions for the autonomy of painting in order to establish 
criteria for the achievement of quality in modernist painting. He regards the 
limitations imposed by the medium of each particular art practice as crucial to the 
achievement of quality in the productions of that practice. For Greenberg then, each 
art form establishes its unique and proper area of competence in terms of what is 
unique to the nature of its medium. If modernist painting is to achieve this 
competence, Greenberg argues, it must share nothing with any other art form; in 
particular it must share nothing with sculpture. As Greenberg (1960, para. 1 1) writes, 
Three-dimensionality is the province of sculpture, and for the sake of its own 
autonomy painting has had above all to divest itself of everything it might 
share with sculpture. 
Autonomy, then, is an explicit and central concern for Greenberg, who also insists 
that painting be self-critical. In Modernist Painting his conditions for both the 
autonomy and the self-criticality of painting are the same: the fidelity of practice, in its 
representations, to the nature of its material medium. 
The central enquiry of this chapter is to examine, not the disciplinary success of 
Greenberg's work, but the form of his argumentation in terms of its compatibility with 
Kantian thought at the methodological and the philosophical level. There are, I claim, 
problems with Modernist Painting at both of these levels, and I am interested in them 
because they may be a useful point of departure for new considerations in painting. 
They may allow an opening out of the Greenbergian discipline of painting rather than 
a closure of it around a point of certainty or refutation. 
I now want to state my own critical position in relation to Modernist Painting. I am 
critiquing that essay from the point of view of the authority that Greenberg claims for 
it: the self-critical philosophy and methodology of Kant. There are two reasons for 
my choice of that position. Firstly, I feel that Greenberg is entitled to be critiqued 
within his own terms of reference. Secondly, I want my criticism of Modernist Painting 
to be immanent to both Greenberg and the Kantian authority that he claims for his 
essay. In this chapter, therefore, I accept uncritically Kantian methodological and 
philosophical authority. 
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Kant's work, however, is open to more than one established exegesis, as Gardner 
(1999, Ch. 2) points out. Broadly speaking, the analytic tradition (P F Strawson3) 
emphasises the transcendental arguments of Kant and is therefore indispensable to 
establishing the compatibility of his three Critiques. Strawson sees the value of 
Kant's work as flowing from his transcendental arguments, and he regards as 
relatively unimportant the analogy of Kant's epistemic reversal to the Copernican 
revolution (see Appendix Two). 
The idealist tradition (Dieter Henrich4) is more concerned with Kant's Copernican 
revolution and hence his solution of the Critical Problem in terms that do not rely on 
transcendental argumentation. I shall make use of both these interpretations of 
Kant's work because they are complementary within the context of this chapter of my 
thesis. 
At the beginning of Modernist Painting, Greenberg makes clear that what is to follow 
is based on what he describes as the self-critical tendency of Immanuel Kant. For 
Greenberg (1960, para. 1), Kant is "the first real modernist". He especially admires 
Kant's use of critique to re-configure the boundaries of logical discourse in order to 
make logic more secure within its own, albeit reduced, remit. For example, 
Greenberg (1965, para. 2) remarks that, 
Kant used logic to establish the limits of logic, and while he withdrew much 
from its old jurisdiction, logic was left in all the more secure possession of 
what remained to it. 
He clearly intends to do for painting what Kant did (as interpreted by Greenberg) for 
philosophy. Greenberg's project is to apply Kantian procedures of logic to painting in 
order to establish, on disciplinary grounds, the conditions for the autonomy of 
3 "There are limits to what we can conceive of, or make intelligible to ourselves, as a possible general 
structure of experience. The investigation of these limits, the investigation of a set of ideas which forms 
the limiting framework of all our thought about the world and experience of the world, is, evidently, an 
important and interesting philosophical undertaking. No philosopher has made a more strenuous 
attempt on it than Kant. " (P F Strawson, quoted in Gardner, 1999, p31) 
4. Such an account (of the constitution of the world) requires reference to the operations of the mind, 
without which the world in question would not be disclosed to us and could not possibly adapt its shape. 
In this way Kant explained nature and the world of nature by means of rules that guide the synthetic 
activities we must exert on what is given to us in sensation. 
But the source from which the world originates is equally dependent on that world. Initially it might seem 
that the principle by which we are capable of accounting for a world remains independent of what it 
accounts for. Close investigation, however, discovers that, unless it executes the activities from which a 
world originated, the principle itself would be incomprehensible. This kind of investigation is distinctive 
to the method of Kant's epistemology that he calls transcendental. " (Dieter Henrich, quoted in Gardner, 
1999, p31-32) 
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painting from other art practices and from non-art objects. His concern is to secure 
the purity of painting as a discursive discipline. 
Greenberg's appeal to Kant can authoritatively legitimate his work provided that the 
appeal can be sustained at the philosophical level, or at the level of Kant's self-critical 
methodology, and not simply at the common sense (contingent) level of Kant's 
project. Put another way, suppose we imagine that Greenberg's essay had 
contained no explicit reference to Kant. Would a reader who had read Kant's First 
Critique, conclude that Modernist Painting was analogous, as Greenberg (1965, 
para. 15) claims that it is, to Kant's self-critical work in its structure of argumentation in 
general and in its epistemological stance in particular? In other words does 
Greenberg enquire, prior to asking what is given in experience by the object that is 
the painting (and by the depicted objects within the painting), into the constitutive role 
of the Kantian subject in the experience? This chapter tries to answer these 
questions. 
Greenberg's analogous claim to Kantian authority 
Greenberg's appeal (1965, para. 16) to Kantian self-criticality is implicit throughout 
Modernist Painting and is made explicitly and in analogical terms when he writes 
that, 
Kantian self-criticism finds its perfect expression in science rather than in 
philosophy, and when this kind of self-criticism was applied to art the latter 
was brought closer to scientific method than ever before.... That visual art 
should confine itself exclusively to what is given in visual experience, and 
make no reference to anything in other osiers of experience, is a notion 
whose only justification lies, notionally, in scientific method.... Analogously, 
modernist painting asks that a literary theme be translated into strictly optical, 
two-dimensional terms before becoming the subject of art. 
Greenberg is claiming here his conditions for painting in modernism derive 
analogically from art's proximity to scientific method, which in turn is the perfect 
expression of Kantian self-criticism. Additionally, he is claiming that the practical 
implications of this analogical requirement are that painting is "strictly optical, and 
pictorial space is two-dimensional. I want to examine these claims in detail, but first 
want to examine the analogical relationship that Greenberg claims to exist between 
his conditions for painting and Kantian self-criticism. 
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The whole question of the analogical relationship of Greenberg's critical conditions 
for modernist painting to Kantian critical philosophy is a difficult one. As Caygill 
(1995, p63-67) points out, Kant is generally unenthusiastic about the employment of 
analogy other than to relate the sensible to the supersensible. Kant does not 
consider it legitimate to use analogy as if it gave us knowledge of objects in general, 
though analogy is permitted as an aid to self-understanding in our relation to objects 
such as God. Kant also claims that cognition by analogy, 
... 
does not signify (as is commonly understood) an imperfect similarity of two 
similar things but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar 
things. 
(Kant, 1783, Prolegomena, quoted by Caygill, 1995, p66) 
This definition of analogy is counter-intuitive. In everyday usage we think of an 
analogy5 as an imperfect relationship between two similar things. 
It is difficult to immediately reach a conclusive global view of the analogical relation 
between Kant's First Critique and Greenberg's essay Modernist Painting. Therefore, 
in trying to examine the analogical relationship between Greenberg's essay 
Modernist Painting and Kant's self-critical philosophy, I believe that I need to ask 
quite specific questions such as, 
"Is the relation of pictorial space in painting to the objects that are paintings for 
Greenberg perfectly similar to the relation of space in the world to the objects that are 
the reale world for Kant? " 
I claim the answer to this question is that it is not. The reasons for this conclusion 
are discussed in detail later in this chapter, and so I only want to point out here that 
pictorial space for Greenberg is given a posteriori by the objects depicted within the 
painting', whereas for Kant, space is given by the pure a priori intuitions of the 
subject and is not derived through experience of real objects in the world, or of 
5 In referring to analogy in the Kantian context I am referring to Kant's concept of analogy in general 
rather than in terms of what he calls the analogies of experience. These latter analogies are principles 
that govern the objective use of the categories of relation, particularly as to how things appear to be 
related in time. 
61 am using the word real here in the sense of existent but not absolutely existent, see Appendix One 
for the Kantian technical terms used here. 
7 Greenberg later qualifies objects in painting as recognisable objects and representations of objects. 
He does not explicitly distinguish between a thing being three-dimensional because that is the way it is 
"in itself" and being so because (as Kant claims) that is the way humans apprehend the thing in its 
immediate presentation to them (intuition). He appears to believe that objects or relations between them 
determine our perception of space rather than that such objects are always and already qualified for us 
by our spatio-temporal encoding of them. 
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relations between them. For Kant, our experience of objects in the world (see 
appendix one) depends on the judgement of sensibility, which is synthetic a priori; in 
addition to the pure a priori intuitions of space, empirical intuitions of sensation from 
the object are required. 
Returning now to the question that I asked above, we see that the relation between 
the antecedent terms is a posteriori to a posteriori whereas the relationship of the 
consequent terms is pure a priori to synthetic a priori. Because the relationship 
between antecedent and between consequent terms is not perfectly similar, I believe 
that the analogy does not hold in Kantian terms. There is however, another, different 
conclusion to be drawn from examining this false analogy. Both the (Greenbergian) 
antecedent terms are the same; they are both given a posteriori. The consequent 
(Kantian) terms are subtly different. They are both a priori but one of them, the real 
objects in the world, is synthetic a priori, that is to say the term is valid for the world of 
objects because it contains an objective as well as a subjective moment. The 
Kantian half of the analogy is self-critical because it does not refer to a relation of 
sameness, ipseity, between its terms. Rather, that relation is in terms of sameness 
and otherness (alterity). This is important because Kantian self-criticality cannot be 
had in a relation based only in sameness, but only in a relation that encompasses 
ipseity and alterity together. A priori principles must look beyond themselves to a 
posteriori experience that contains within itself objective as well as subjective 
constituents, if it is to be Kantianly self-critical. Kant makes that abundantly clear in 
the opening paragraphs of his Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
... and it is my 
task to answer the question how far reason can go, without the 
material presented and the aid furnished by experience. 
(Kant 1781 AXiii) 
I therefore maintain that Greenberg's claim that his conditions for painting in 
modernism are analogically related to Kants methodology is unsustainable, and so is 
his claim to Kantian self-criticality. 
Had we considered the question that I ask above in terms of the everyday (non- 
Kantian) meaning of analogy, that two things are more or less the same, broadly 
similar, in their relation, we might have reached a very different conclusion. For Kant, 
however, analogy is not a vague form of similarity but a precisely defined tool of 
logic. If Greenberg is to analogously claim Kantian authority for his work in general, I 
think it is reasonable to expect him to use the term analogy in the same sense that 
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Kant does. That may seem a harsh requirement, but I justify it on the grounds that it 
is to the precise, limiting argumentation of Kantian methodology that Greenberg 
makes his appeal for the authority of his own work. 
Before leaving this discussion of Kantian analogy between the work of Greenberg 
and Kant's First Critique, there is another question that I want to consider: "Is the 
limitation of painting by reference to its material substrate a critical move for 
Greenberg in a perfectly similar way to the limitation of reason by reference to 
experience is a critical move for Kant? " I have, in a sense, answered that question 
already, but there is another aspect to it, which, I claim, arises from Greenberg's 
fundamental misinterpretation of the Kantian project in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
As I have remarked before, at the beginning of Modernist Painting, Greenberg (1965, 
para. 2) writes, 
Kant used logic to establish the limits of logic.. . so that logic was 
left in all the 
more secure possession of what remained to it. 
That is not an accurate description of the Kantian critical project because Kant (1781, 
CPR. 1`` edition, Preface, para. 10) makes it very dear that he is using experience 
and the nature of knowledge itself to limit reason. 
... it is my task to answer the question how far reason can go, without 
the 
material presented and the aid fumished by experience... the aims set before 
us are not arbitrarily proposed, but are imposed on us by the nature of 
knowledge itself, this being the subject matter of our critical enquiry. 
A few paragraphs later Kant goes on to state that, 
.... the question is, what and how much can reason and understanding, apart 
from experience, know? And not, how is the faculty of thought possible? 
The criticism that I am making of Greenberg's interpretation here is important 
because Kant completely rejected the traditional view that logic could limit logic (as 
he put it, that reason could limit reason). He saw that assumption as the cause of all 
the confusion and endless disputation in metaphysics and as the source of 
dogmatism. Kant (1787, Bxvii, p16) did not see the structure of experience as merely 
a set of logically connected truths, but claimed that, 
Experience is itself a species of knowledge that involves understanding. 
According to Kant, neither sensation nor concept are individually sufficient for 
knowledge but together are both necessary and sufficient for knowledge; sense 
experience provides the content and concept provides the form. The manner in 
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which sensory experience and form are combined is what Kant calls a synthetic a 
priori judgement. e 
I have spent some time describing why I have challenged and reconfigured 
Greenberg's claim that Kant uses "logic to limit logic" because there is nothing to be 
gained by Greenberg from an analogical claim between his own project and Kant's 
project that is based on what Kant did not claim. 
Returning now to the analogy made above, we might ask, "Is the limitation of painting 
by reference to its material substrate a critical move for Greenberg in a perfectly 
similar way to the limitation of reason by reference to experience is a critical move for 
Kant? " 
This analogy might well hold if experience, like reason, was reducible to a sequence 
of logically connected statements but for Kant, as we have just seen, it is not. The 
antecedent part of the analogy contains two terms that are empirical objects, given in 
sensation for Greenberg. The consequent part relates an a priori term, reason, to 
experience that in addition to an a priori ground (space and time) also has an a 
posteriori ground and thus is synthetic a priori. 
Once again, the relationship between the antecedent and consequent terms is not 
perfectly similar but is significantly dissimilar and the analogy fails in Kantian terms. 
The problem has arisen, not so much because there is anything wrong with the terms 
used, but because the relation between terms has not been examined in regard to 
the grounds or principles that inform those terms and hence the relations between 
them. The relation of the antecedent terms is analytic; as such it is not, for Kant, a 
critical relation (by definition an analytic term is one of ipseity alone). The relation of 
the consequent terms is critical in the Kantian sense because the first term, reason, 
is related to, and limited by, the second term, experience, which is a synthetic and 
reflexive term. Experience is not in an analytic relation to reason; were it so, it could 
not limit reason. Once again Greenberg's terms evidence ipseity alone and Kant's 
encompass ipseity and alterity. 
8 See Appendix One for Chapter Two for a discussion of such judgments and of the judgment of 
sensibility. 
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Greenberg's claim to Kantian Methodology 
There are I believe, significant problems in the claim that Greenberg's work is 
analogous to Kant's not only at the philosophical level but at the methodological level 
too. I believe an explanation of these analogical difficulties is to be found in Kant's 
statement of the Critical Problem, when in writing to his friend Marcus Hertz in 1772 
he stated that, 
I asked myself. - What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call 
°representation" to the object? 
Kant suggests that we should conduct our enquiry into the problem as if the object 
conforms to our cognition and not as if our cognition conforms to the object (see 
appendix 2). My underlining here is to emphasise the strictly methodological and 
hence metaphysically/ontologically independent nature of Kant's argument at this 
early stage of his First Critique. Kant goes on to develop the substantive claim later 
and commits us philosophically, rather than methodologically, to a transcendentally 
idealist conception of objects. Previous pre-critical knowledge assumed that "our 
knowledge must conform to objects" but Kant (1787) now asks that we "must make 
trial and "suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge" (CPR, Preface. 
Bxvi). 
The use of the term "make trial" is interesting here. It emphasises the experimental 
nature of the enterprise; Kant is not making any substantive claim as to what is. The 
term also refers to trial in the juridical sense. The enquiry is to be de jure rather than 
de facto. This is a matter of experimental procedures that make, as yet, no 
philosophical claims and so is methodological. As Gardner (1999, p45) points out, 
The philosophical method which runs alongside transcendental 
idealism bears no resemblance to the rationalist's inspection of clear 
and distinct ideas or of the principle of sufficient reason, or to the 
empiricist's anatomy (a reference to Locke's (1689) Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. ) of sense experience-it consists in the 
identification of what Kant calls "conditions of possibility", or 
transcendental conditions that must be fulfilled prior to the subject 
being epistemically related to the object (Gardner, 1999 p45). 
Kant makes no attempt to philosophically prove these transcendental arguments at 
this stage. Kant's statement of the critical problem is the basis on which his self 
critical methodology is built; as such it is indispensable to the Kantian system of 
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thought. There is, I claim, nothing in Greenberg's arguments in Modernist Painting 
that correlates to Kant's critical move in referring representations of objects to 
subjective grounds. Greenberg does not investigate his assumption that the 
experience of pictorial space is given in sensation from the objects, or from relations 
between objects, depicted in painting. There is no Greenbergian equivalent to Kant's 
celebrated critical question to his friend Marcus Hertz. 
Greenberg's idea of self-criticality as self- identification and autonomy in painting 
Greenberg (1965, para. 5) writes that, 
It quickly emerged that the unique and proper area of competence of each art 
coincided with all that was unique to the nature of its medium. The task of 
self-criticism became to eliminate from the effects of each art ... every effect 
that might conceivably be borrowed from ... any other art. 
Thereby each art 
would be rendered "pure" and in its purity find the guarantee of its quality as 
well as of its independence. "Purity" meant self-definition, and the enterprise 
of self-criticism in the arts became one of self-definition with a vengeance. 
Greenberg is interested in the self-critical methodology of Kant's argumentation 
above all else and the central project of Greenberg's essay is to apply that 
methodology to the discursive practices of art, particularly to painting. I am 
interested in the extent to which Greenberg succeeds in that ambition which, I 
suggest, depends on the degree to which his procedures emulate those of Kant. 
Reflecting on the quotation from Greenberg immediately above, it appears that 
Greenberg equates the concepts of self-definition, purity and the autonomy of each 
particular art practice from other such practices with Kantian self-criticality. I question 
the legitimacy of that identification for the reasons that I give below. For Greenberg 
then, the autonomy of each art practice is to be found in its purity and that purity in 
turn is identified with the unique nature of the medium of each practice; Greenberg 
distinguishes between the different art media in terms of our spatial experience of 
them as if that experience was given entirely by the empirical nature of the objects 
that we behold. Autonomy for Greenberg is, I claim, a notion that is to be discovered 
a posteriori from objects. 
I want to compare Kant's use of the term autonomy with that of Greenberg; does 
Greenberg mean the same thing by autonomy as Kant does? This question matters 
because the notion of autonomy is crucial for Greenberg's claim to Kantian self- 
criticality as the legitimating ground for his conditions for painting in modernism. 
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Kant uses the word autonomy in two senses. Firstly, his entire project is constructed 
in terms of autonomous categories and of judgements that correlate to those 
categories and are thus autonomous from each other. Kant inherited that tradition of 
philosophical argumentation from Aristotle, for whom categories were different ways 
of making judgements and of talking about being. That tradition persisted in Kant's 
time largely because scholars were thoroughly familiar with it and because of the 
enormous authority in philosophical discourse accorded to Aristotle. In his First 
Critique Kant radically reconfigured the Aristotelian categories, reducing their number 
to fours and, unlike Aristotle, he gave a deduction for the necessity of each of them. 
Kant's re-interpretation and reduction of the categories had the advantage of 
providing a simpler yet more secure logical basis for philosophical argument that was 
still commensurate with the established thought of his immediate predecessors. It 
had the disadvantage, as will become apparent later in this thesis, that his arguments 
and judgements still relied on the notion of autonomous categories. There are two 
broad implications in all of this for Greenberg: Kantian categories are not objective 
properties but remain distinct subjective ways of experiencing objects, and space and 
time are no longer categories at all, but are universal and wholly subjective 
operations of mind. 10 Given that, it is very difficult to see how Greenberg's notion of 
autonomy as being "all that was unique to the nature of its (the art object's) medium" 
is compatible, or even commensurate, with the categorical meaning of autonomy for 
Kant. 
Greenberg relies very heavily on the spatial dimensionality of the medium of painting 
and of sculpture to construct autonomous disciplinary practices for both. In 
Modernist Painting, the concept of spatial dimensionality defines the terms of his 
arguments. Yet, as we have seen, such spatio-temporal terms are no longer 
categories for Kant. Therefore the argument that Greenberg makes in terms of 
autonomy as grounded in spatial considerations cannot refer to the autonomy 
between Kant's categories. It must rely instead on the idea that the spatial nature of 
sculpture is somehow entirely different from that of painting, an idea that 
distinguishes sculpture from painting in terms of their objective nature and, since 
there is no reference to the role of an experiencing subject, only in terms of their 
objective nature. I return to this question of spatial representations in more detail at 
9 The remaining categories were Quantity, Quality, Modality (broadly form) and Relation. 
10 Space and time, for Kant, are the formal a priori structures of our power of cognition, and are not in 
any way derived from objects, or relations between objects, a posteriori. 
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the end of this chapter, but at this stage want only to say that I believe that 
Greenberg assumed that space is a property of objects in themselves or in their 
relation to each other. 
Greenberg is entitled to hold any view of the nature of space that he chooses, 
including an empiricist one. The problem, as I see it, is that such a view makes it 
extremely difficult for him to establish his theory of painting in terms that are self- 
critical in Kantian terms, as distinct from the simple analytic identity that is self- 
definition; a distinction mentioned before in the context of Greenberg's claim that 
Kant used "logic to limit the remit of logic". 
I am not making the same point now as I did previously, when I stated that Kant did 
not claim that he used logic to limit its own remit. Rather, I want to make the point 
that the claim of self-definition - which Greenberg certainly sustains here in 
empiricist terms - is not, in itself, the same as a claim for self-criticality. This is not 
because the claim contains empiricist terms but because it contains no other (in this 
case subjective) terms that allow a claim to establish a reflexive self-critical relation to 
itself. To sustain a claim to Kantian self-criticality, a claim must contain a 
heteronomous moment to that which it claims to be self-critical; it must contain 
alterity as well as ipseity. Thus Kant, realising he could not limit reason and make it 
self-critical in terms that were purely rational, sought to refer reason to something 
that was not only reason. Though recognising that reason contained a rational 
moment, he limited it by (only partially subjective) Kantian experience, which has an 
objective moment too. 
I am not criticising Greenberg for his choice of an empirical ground for his arguments 
for paintings' self-definition, but I am criticising him for conflating self-definition with 
Kantian self-criticality. It is not so much that I think that he ought to start from an a 
priori ground for the self-criticality of painting, but that he should recognise that he 
can't do without one if he proceeds from a posteriori grounds, as he does, and at the 
same time, claim Kantian self-criticality for his argument. 
I now want to see if Greenberg might be using the term autonomy in the second of 
the ways that Kant does: as the idea of moral freedom. 
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Greenbergian autonomy and Kant's moral theory 
So far I have criticised Greenberg's notion of autonomy between different art 
practices but a similar argument also applies to Greenberg's claim to establish the 
autonomy of art objects in general from non-art objects, for art as an autonomous 
domain. In both cases, the idea of autonomy as an objective term is problematic for 
the claim to Kantian authority as legitimation of the ideas expressed in Modernist 
Painting. Ultimately these problems derive from the inconsistency between 
Greenberg's notion of autonomy as an objective property and the subjective nature of 
Kant's categories and of his subjective conditions, space and time, for the possibility 
of our epistemic relation to objects of any sort. So far then, we have only considered 
Greenbergian and Kantian autonomy in terms of our phenomenal relation to objects. 
Although Kant considers humans as phenomenal objects he also considers us as 
noumena, as ends in ourselves and not simply as means to an end. This aspect of 
humanity is the basis for Kant's moral philosophy, set out in his Second Critique. 
The notion of autonomy as transcendental freedom is indispensable to Kant's moral 
philosophy. This freedom is both freedom from an externally given authority and 
freedom to legislate our own maxims, our own rules of action in the world, decided 
rationally and apart from objective determination. The project of Kant's moral 
philosophy is not the question of what can we know about the world, " but the 
question of how we ought to be, how we ought to act, in the world. 
It might be argued that painting is an action in the world that involves reasoned 
decisions and that Greenberg's conditions for painting are, analogously, moral 
arguments in Kantian terms, about how painting ought to be; that Greenberg is 
constructing an analogical moral theory of painting and is thus using the term 
autonomy as Kant uses it in the second part of his critical trilogy. This argument is 
somewhat outside the strict remit of this chapter, in that it refers to Kant's Second 
Critique and not his First Critique. Nevertheless, I think that the argument deserves 
serious consideration and ought to be addressed in a chapter that focuses on 
Greenberg. The argument goes along the following lines. Painting is, analogically, 
the Kantian moral subject. The empirical experience (what is given in sensation 
alone) becomes the objective ground, and the disciplinary necessities of painting 
defining itself as separate from other arts and non-art objects become (again 
analogically) the principle that tells us what paintings ought to be, what they ought to 
look like. Together these elements make up the "analogously moral system" 
11 This is basically the subject matter of his First Critique. 
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described in Modernist Painting. Thus Greenberg can claim Kantian moral autonomy 
for his ideas in an analogically meaningful way. 
My objection to this argument is that the "disciplinary necessities", on which it relies, 
are not grounded in a priori reason, as are Kant's moral maxims. Rather the ground 
of these "necessities" is indistinguishable from the "empirical experience" that they 
are supposed to supplement, to rationally validate. The argument is like a synthetic a 
priori one in which the a priori principle turns out to rely on the a posteriori experience 
of the world that it is supposed to rationally legitimate. Necessities, be they 
disciplinary or not, must be a priori to experience, and to what is given in empirical 
sensation. Unless this is so, the whole exercise collapses into an identity between 
painting, rules for the self-definition of the discipline of painting - to which painting is 
to be an instrumental exemplar - and empirical intuitions, which are the a posteriori 
ground for those same rules. If there is an a priori element, it is no more than the 
analytic relationship of identity between the elements that make up this moral 
system; and these analytic relationships are objectively determined. The argument is 
instrumentally constructed to exemplify what painting already objectively is, not what 
it rationally, and apart from objective reference, ought to be. The argument does not 
have the reflective form of the Kantian moral (or the aesthetical) judgement. 
There is another reason why the above moral system is not, analogously, a Kantian 
moral system. It is that the Greenbergian system issues rigid rules, or laws, for the 
proper modernist moral action in the world that is painting; that alone precludes 
Greenbergian modernist painting from being art in the Kantian sense, because for 
Kant there is no rule for the production of art save for the free ingenium of the 
producing artist. Moreover, these rules, which are grounded in empirical conditions, 
are instrumentally directed to achieve a disciplinary end that can only be fulfilled and 
recognised in empirical terms. Kant's moral system is based on a very strong notion 
of human freedom, which seeks to establish, 
The reality of transcendental freedom, according to which the human will is a 
capacity for spontaneous activity, or a kind of causal power, which is 
independent of determination by empirical conditions. 
(Gregor, 1997, Introduction, page x. ) 
I cannot see how the Greenbergian moral system for painting outlined above is 
compatible with, or analogous to, the Kantian notion of transcendental freedom that 
is indispensable to both his idea of the moral action and to his aesthetical judgement 
of taste that stands as an analogical symbol of the moral. Greenberg's conditions for 
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painting's autonomy and quality describe the events taking place in modernist 
painting at that time as causally determined by the material substrate of paintings, he 
sees paintings only as phenomenal objects, as one might view inanimate objects in 
nature. He is entitled to do that, but unless he is also prepared to view paintings as 
noumena, as things in themselves, without antecedent conditions from which they 
follow of necessity, it precludes even the possibility of transcendentally free causality 
and hence a claim to moral autonomy in the Kantian sense. For Kant, the moral law 
is a principal for autonomy, and for Kant moral principles are to be abstracted from 
their matter (such as interests based on desires that ultimately refer to empirical 
conditions), so that all that remains is their form, and it is this form, as a maxim free 
of matter, that alone determines the will. It follows that an agent able to act from 
reasons that are based only on the legislative form of a maxim, is a free and hence 
autonomous agent and can act independently of empirical conditions. The Kantian 
moral law requires that the agent act from the principle that expresses the nature of 
practical reason, free from all external authority. For Kant, such a way of acting is 
autonomy. For Greenberg, there is no painter as free agent because the objective 
nature of substrate of painting becomes both the "objective principle" and the 
external (to the pictorial image within the painting) authority. 
Indispensable to Kantian autonomy is the transcendentally free subject, a subject 
free to act independently of empirical conditions as an antecedent cause or a 
predetermined end12 for action in the world. Greenberg elevates the flatness of the 
stretched up canvas to a position of such importance that it becomes an antecedent 
cause for a predetermined end, which is the flatness of the image on the canvas. 
Because Greenberg appears to regard spatiality as given in sensation by objects or 
by the relations between objects, flatness, which is a spatial concept, becomes 
objectively determined, and this effectively precludes the subject having a role in the 
system and acting independently of empirical conditions to provide the form of an a 
priori principle that is needed to bring the system into compatibility with the Kantian 
moral system. 
The foregoing includes a very brief outline of Kant's moral philosophy, a subject that I 
shall return to in Chapter Three. It is included briefly here because it is the crucial 
point at which my philosophical and my artistic positions come together. As an artist, 
12 This freedom of moral judgment from a predetermined end is shared with the Kantian judgement of 
taste, and is discussed more fully in the next chapter in the context of beauty having the form of 
purposiveness but being apart from purpose. 
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especially as a painter, the motivation for my criticism of Greenberg is my antipathy 
to the degree of constraint that Greenberg's conditions for proper modernist painting 
place on my practice, if, and only if, I accept them as ineluctable conclusions of 
reason. I recognise the importance of restraint in painting and the importance of 
painting's acknowledgment of, rather than determination by, the constraint that 
results from the nature of its own material substrate. To be an autonomous painter, 
to make paintings that are not merely exemplars of a particular disciplinary position, 
is important to me because although I accept that painters should inform themselves 
about other discourses, I believe that painting is a visual modality in its own right 
rather than philosophy by other means. At the same time, rationality is also 
important to me, and with qualifications, I admire and accept Kant's contribution to 
our understanding of the scope and limits of reason. It is of great importance to me, 
therefore, to examine and understand the tight linkage that Greenberg claims 
between his conditions for painting and Kants procedures of argumentation and 
philosophical position. 
My purpose in this chapter is to neither defend nor contest Kantian authority, but only 
to consider whether Greenberg's claim for it in Modernist Painting is sustainable. I 
recognise that autonomy is problematic for Kant too; it creates serious difficulties for 
the unity of his critical trilogy, and his efforts to resolve those problems have a 
significant influence on his theory of beauty. 13 However, the fact that the notion of 
autonomy proves problematic for both Greenberg and Kant does not imply that they 
both mean the same thing when they use the term, or even that they have different 
but compatible conceptions of it. I claim that Greenberg's use of the term autonomy 
is incompatible with Kant's usage of the term in the contexts of both his First and 
Second Critiques. 
The problematic aspects of autonomy, together with possible means of resolving 
them, are a theme that runs throughout this thesis. For that reason I want to 
consider the difficulties that Greenberg encounters with autonomy in some detail in 
this chapter. As I have already mentioned, Greenberg appears to associate very 
closely the idea of autonomy with the ideas of self-criticality and self-definition. My 
criticism of Greenberg is that his association of these terms is too close and gives the 
impression that self-definition and autonomy are sufficient for a claim to Kantian self- 
criticality. I suggest that this is not so for the following reasons. 
131 discuss this matter in detail in the next chapter. 
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It is extremely difficult, even impossible, to be critical in the Kantian sense without 
accepting the implications of the reversal of epistemic relations between subject and 
object at the methodological level and, at the philosophical level, without accepting 
Kant's transcendental argumentation as well, which ultimately requires the positing of 
the transcendental subject. However, self-criticality may be had quite independently 
of a transcendental subject. 14 Given Greenberg's empiricist positioning, it is not 
surprising, perhaps, that he is disinclined to make any appeal to Kant's 
transcendental subject. Had he been prepared, in Modernist Painting, to make some 
sort of explicit reference to the role that the active Kantian subject plays in the world 
as we experience it, his appeal to Kantian self-criticality would have been easier to 
sustain at a purely methodological level. 
Greenberg has chosen a difficult path to follow in Modernist Painting. Without any 
appeal to Kant's transcendental subject or to the active subject of his epistemic 
revolution, there are simply no Kantian subjective grounds left for him. Without such 
grounds, without the reflexive relationship between subject and object in human 
experience, Greenberg's theory has only the empirical intuitions of sensation to 
consider. These do not suffice for Kantian self-criticality. Neither do they suffice for 
Kantian epistemology, which in the absence of a transcendental subject is 
indispensable for any meaningful appeal to Kantian methodology. 
The mutual dependence of intuitions and concepts is an absolutely fundamental 
proposition of Kant's epistemology. Yet this mutual dependence does not imply the 
assimilation of intuitions and concepts to one another, as does rationalism, which 
reduces the distinction between intellectual and sensory representations to the point 
where these terms become synonymous. Neither does this mutual dependence of 
intuitions and concept support empiricism that seeks to derive the material of thought 
from sensory data. Greenberg's approach to these issues is very close to empiricism 
indeed. This ensures that Greenberg is, in philosophical terms, Mcritical. 
Paradoxically, this has resulted from Greenberg's preoccupation with autonomy, 
because he has made the object completely autonomous from the subject, a move 
that makes it very difficult to sustain his claim to be proximate to Kant's critical 
philosophy and methodology, given that Kant makes the subject constitutive of 
objects, thus establishing the subject as the origin of experience. 
14 As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the idealist (Henrich) tradition of Kant exegesis 
considers Kant's solution to the Critical Problem in terms of his Copernican epistemic revolution (that 
does not rely in any way on a posited transcendental subject) to suffice for this purpose. 
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Greenberg's project is directed to establishing a visual autonomy for painting and 
visuality is clearly something to do with a beholding subject. This beholding subject 
needs to be assigned a role in visual experience. Kant assigns the subject a very 
active role in all experience, going so far as to make the subject a condition for the 
very possibility of experience of the world. Greenberg, as an empiricist, gives the 
subject a very passive role, because for empiricists objects are the origin of 
experience. Although Greenberg must surely recognise that visuality requires a 
subject, it is very hard for him to actually find a specific and active function for the 
subject in his argumentation, given his empiricist stance. This would not be so acute 
a problem had he not appealed to Kant for legitimation of his arguments; had he 
appealed to pre-critical philosophy, for example, or refrained from philosophical 
appeal altogether, it would not be a problem at all. As it is, the passive role of 
Greenberg's subject weakens his claim that his conditions for autonomy and quality 
in painting provide the authority of Kantian self-criticality for his ideas expressed in 
Modernist Painting. 
It is interesting to see how Greenberg's preoccupation with autonomy has come 
about. In Modernist Painting Greenberg reworks the theme developed twenty years 
previously in his essay (Greenberg, 1940) entitled Towards a Newer Laocoon. In 
that essay, Greenberg also sought to distinguish between the different art practices 
in modernism and establish conditions for quality in production within each practice, 
by reference to the medium specific to each practice. In the context of painting, he 
describes the evolution of an increasingly shallow pictorial space as painting in 
modernism evolved. In this early essay, Greenberg did not claim any particular 
philosophical authority for his views, but the tone of his remarks, particularly in his 
defence of abstract painting is, to a limited extent, Hegelian. He claims that the 
tendency of modernist painting to adopt an increasingly shallow pictorial space is 
both inexorable and progressive in historical terms. Twenty years later, in Modernist 
Painting, he replaces history as the ground for his arguments by the authority of 
Kantian self-critical methodology and philosophy. Kantian authority is used to push 
the arguments made in Towards a Newer Laocoon to their logical conclusion in 
Modernist Painting. The flatness of pictorial space is no longer seen merely as a 
useful aid to achieve an increase of autonomy and quality in modernist painting but 
as the determining condition for a painting to be modernist at all. The change is from 
recommendation to prescription, thus proscribing for artists, in their productions, the 
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enjoyment of autonomy as freedom developed by Kant in his Second and Third 
Critiques. 
Greenberg's requirement that modernist pictorial space be two-dimensional 
I now want to examine in detail Clement Greenberg's conditions for the autonomy 
and quality of painting, which are grounded in his privileging of two-dimensional, or 
flat, pictorial space. This, Greenberg claims, is the necessary condition for painting to 
achieve its independence from sculpture and achieve its place in modernity. Pictorial 
space is crucial to Greenberg's arguments. Space is also crucial to Kant's 
development of the judgement of sensibility that explains how objects are possible for 
us as experiencing subjects. The universal and formal structures of mind, space and 
time, which are necessary (that is to say a priori in Kantian terms) for any experience 
and knowledge of the object, play an indispensable role in the First Critique's 
Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic and to the development of Kant's 
transcendental idealism. Given the importance of space to both Greenberg's 
conditions for modernist painting and to the development of Kant's critical philosophy, 
it is worthwhile to examine what both Kant and Greenberg conceive space to be. 
I recognise that Greenberg is interested in pictorial space and Kant is interested in 
space in the real world in general, though not, it should be stressed, in an absolutely 
existent real world. Both Greenberg and Kant are interested in representations of 
space; Greenberg is interested in pictorial representations. Kant has a more general 
interest in representations, because he claims that we have no access to a world that 
is apart from our representations of that world. Kant claims that our representations 
require formal structures in us rather than in the world, and we represent these 
formal structures within ourselves as space and time. An interesting question is, 
therefore, "Do they both mean the same thing, or at least something very similar, 
when they write in terms of representations? 
This is a complex and difficult question that I want to postpone until I have examined 
what they both have to say about the nature of space in relation to objects and the 
experiencing subject. My enquiry presupposes that Kant's universal formal 
structures of mind, his pure a priori intuitions of space and time that enable us to 
experience objects at all, perform the same function in the same way for paintings 
and the objects depicted within paintings, as they do for the rest of the world. There 
are two reasons for my making this assumption: firstly it seems improbable to me that 
we have different formal structures of mind for objects in paintings and objects in the 
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world at large. Secondly, Kant (1787, p50) would seem to lend support to this view 
in his Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space when he writes that, 
Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outward 
experience... Consequently, the representation of space cannot be borrowed 
from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but, on the 
contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said 
antecedent representation. 
(CPR, A23/ B37) 
I accept that Greenberg is writing of experience of space in paintings, but Kant is also 
talking about experience, albeit in the world in general; my point is that all Kantian 
experience is contingent on the unitary, universal and subjective nature of space. 
The question therefore arises as to whether Greenberg's notion of pictorial space can 
be accommodated within the Kantian notion of space. At first sight it might appear 
that both authorities, since they use the term representation, understand space in the 
same way. The problem remains that these representations refer to very different 
origins: in Greenberg's case to objects and in Kant's case to subjects. If, in visual 
experience, we cannot distinguish between these two originary sources, either one of 
which might be the explanation of the representations that we make to ourselves, 
does it matter that there are two possible origins of our experience? Is this all just to 
do with philosophical sophistication that is irrelevant to the visual experience of 
painting? In an important sense it is. It doesn't matter, in itself, that Greenberg 
assumes space to be determined by objects, in themselves, or in their relations. 
These sorts of beliefs do not influence, let alone determine, our immediate response 
to painting. 
There is, however, another sense in which the origins of these representations matter 
a great deal. The subject as the origin of experience is crucial to Kant's entire critical 
project, for reasons that I have already touched upon and will examine in more detail 
below. It is important to emphasise that although Kant makes the subject the 
necessary condition for all experience, he does not claim it as a sufficient one. 
Empirical intuitions, given in sensation are the sufficient Kantian conditions for an 
experience of the world, an experience that is disordered and is not our experience of 
the world, which is an ordered experience. Kant claims we cannot experience a 
world other than the world that we experience and that empirical intuitions together 
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with our pure a priori intuitions of space and time together enable us15 to experience 
the world as we do. The point that I am making here is that Kant's theory of 
experience, and epistemology too, is not purely idealistic or rational. It contains an 
empirical moment through its recognition that empirical intuitions are needed for our 
experience of the world as we experience it. The world, for Kant, is not produced by 
our thought alone. This significant empirical and phenomenal aspect of Kantian 
thought allows Greenberg the possibility of inclusion in the Kantian system of 
experience, provided there is a subjective moment within the Greenbergian system of 
experience of painting that is heteronomous to the predominantly empiricist 
positioning of his project. What is needed from Greenberg is a subjective limit to his 
empiricism that is analogous to Kant's objective limit on his idealism. 
In Modernist Painting Greenberg (1965, para 8) writes, 
It was the stressing, however, of the ineluctable flatness of the support that 
remained most fundamental in the processes by which pictorial art criticised 
and defined itself under modernism. Flatness alone was unique and 
exclusive to that art. The enclosing shape of the support was a limiting 
condition, or norm, that was shared with the art of the theatre; colour was a 
norm or means shared with sculpture as well as the theatre. Flatness, two- 
dimensionality, was the only condition that painting shared with no other art, 
and so painting oriented itself to flatness as it did to nothing else. 
In this quotation, Greenberg makes it dear that flatness, the two-dimensionality of the 
support of painting is the ground from which his whole argument will proceed 
because it is the flatness of the substrate of painting that is the only aspect of 
painting that is wholly autonomous from all other art practices. At this stage, 
Greenberg is not talking about representations of flatness, the objects depicted within 
painting, pictorial space as such or the experience of painting by the beholding 
subject. He is simply grounding the argument in empirical terms for disciplinary 
reasons as he is entitled to do. 
Two paragraphs after the quotation given above, Greenberg (1965) makes it clear 
that the ideas expressed in Modernist Painting are concerned with representations of 
"recognisable' objects. 
It is not in principle that modernist painting in its latest phase has abandoned 
the representation of recognisable objects. What it has abandoned in 
Is Kant claims, additionally, that both empirical intuitions and our pure a priori ones are both necessary 
and sufficient for us to experience objects in the world as we do. 
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principle is the representation of the kind of space that recognisable, three- 
dimensional objects can inhabit. 
The question immediately arises as to the sense in which Greenberg is using the 
term representation. It may be that he is referring to objective or subjective 
representations of recognisable objects. Given the general empirical stance of 
Greenberg, one might reasonably assume that he is talking about objective 
representations, but this remains an assumption. Against that assumption is the fact 
that Greenberg is talking about "recognisable" entities, which might be a reference to 
an experiencing subject who is providing the function (including the formal, subjective 
a priori intuitions of space and time) of recognition; this might be an implicit reference 
to the subjective construction of space. This point of view is also an assumption. 
Moreover, even if we accept that in his use of the term representation, Greenberg is 
referring to an experiencing subject, that does not necessarily mean that he is 
referring to the Kantian subject's pure a priori intuitions of space and time. In 
Modernist Painting Greenberg appears to hold the view that space is absolutely 
existent, ready, as it were, to receive recognisable objects placed in it, and to also 
believe that the manifold multiplicity of space is determined by objects or relations 
between objects placed in it. Leaving aside the inconsistency of these two notions of 
space, it remains that neither view of space is consistent with Kant's view that space 
is the representation we make to ourselves of the purely formal ability that we have 
which relates the perceiving subject to its objects, and which is quite apart from 
concept and sensation. Kant's notion of space and time is fundamental to his theory 
of how we relate to objects in experience, to perception and to conscious 
representations. Given that Greenberg's idea of space differs so significantly from 
that of Kant, it is difficult to accept that he is using representation in a spatial context 
in the same way that Kant uses that term. Faced with two contradictory 
assumptions, all we can say is that Greenberg is ambiguous in his use of the term 
representation in this passage of Modernist Painting, a passage that has important 
implications for painters in their productions. This is because Greenberg's 
prescriptive conditions for painting rely upon spatial arguments and, if his 
understanding of space differs significantly from that of Kant, the authority he claims 
for those arguments is weakened, allowing painters more freedom in their 
productions. 
However, Kant is also often ambiguous in the use of the word "representation". As 
Caygill (1995, p356) remarks, 
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Although representation is crucial to Kant's account of knowledge and 
experience, there is little explicit discussion of what is being represented by 
whom (or what and in what way. 
The underlining is mine to emphasise the difficulty of deciding whether a 
representation causes its object or is caused by its object. This, in turn, refers to the 
question of whether the subject is active or passive in relation to its object. Despite 
this general difficulty of Kant's use of representation, I believe that in talking about 
the representations of space and time, there is no ambiguity in Kant's use of the 
term. He is quite clear that the formal principles of intuitions, space and time, are 
not adjectival characteristics of knowledge (Caygill, 1995, p264-265) but are a faculty 
of knowledge through which the mind directly apprehends the concrete singularity of 
things and does not subsume them as instances of abstract and general concepts. 
Yet he also claims that space and time are formal pure a priori principles. This 
presents a paradox because intuitions of space and time as formal principles that 
make possible and precede our experience of objects, which then affect our 
sensibility, is inconsistent with Kant's claim that intuitions (including the special 
intuitions of space and time) are given through the senses and are only possible 
through something affecting those senses. This is tantamount to claiming that 
intuitions are conditioned by, as well as conditions for, objects in our experience. 
The spatio-temporal nature of our relation to our objects of experience is a complex 
and problematic one not only for Greenberg, but for Kant too. 
We are, I suggest, left with a situation in which we cannot reach a simple and 
singular conclusion about the relationship, in regard to spatial representations, 
between Kant and Greenberg. We have no option but to continue to reflect on the 
ambiguities that we discover in both and in the relation between them. Such 
ambiguities are not simply a disadvantage; they encourage us to continue to reflect 
on matters rather than to close the discussion around a point of certainty. 
Even if this ambiguity about Greenberg's use of the term representation were to be 
resolved, I suggest that problems would remain in Greenberg's claim to Kantian 
authority, particularly in his claim to Kantian self-criticality. It is still a problem that 
Greenberg appears to believe that sensation from the object suffices for our 
experience of it, in contrast to Kant's claim that it is the subject who, in addition to 
what is given in sensation by the object, both enables and orders experience of the 
object. This particular difficulty effectively precludes Greenberg, in the absence of 
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any appeal to the transcendental subject, using Kant's epistemic reversal to sustain 
an appeal to Kantian self-criticality. However, the ambiguities that appear in both 
Greenberg's and Kant's use of the term representation in a spatial context are of 
interest, I claim, because they have the potential to provide a basis for re-establishing 
Greenberg, to a degree, within a (probably re-inscribed) Kantian system of thought. 
In the next chapter I criticise Kant's reliance on the idea of autonomy in his 
systematic philosophy and methodology. That critique only reconciles Greenberg to 
Kantian thought insofar as they both suffer similar difficulties in their work through 
their use of the concept of autonomy. In later chapters, which refer to contemporary 
neuroscience for their authority, the notion of autonomy appears increasingly 
irrelevant within a paradigm that refers to the dynamics of perception in neurological 
terms. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KANT'S AESTHETICS AND HIS CRITICAL TRILOGY 
In the previous chapter I examined Clement Greenberg's claim that his conditions for 
the autonomy and quality of modernist painting found their authority and legitimation 
in terms of Kant's self-critical philosophy and methodology. In that chapter I did not 
critically examine the authority of Kant to which Greenberg made his appeal; I took 
the work of Kant as the Gold Standard against which the work of Greenberg was to 
be judged. I had two reasons for doing that. Firstly, I felt that Greenberg was entitled 
to a critique of his work in terms of the authority that he actually claimed and not in 
other terms. Secondly, I was aware that, in a very real sense, Kant's work has been 
a Gold Standard, inasmuch that it has dominated aesthetic theory in modernism, for 
a very long time. As Caygill (1995, Introduction) writes, "The influence of Kant's 
philosophy has been, and continues to be, so profound and widespread as to have 
become imperceptible" This is not to suggest that aesthetics, as a discursive 
practice, has remained unchanged since Kant; it evidently has not. But it is to 
acknowledge that much of aesthetic discourse since Kant has been to interpret, 
oppose or re-inscribe his work. Because I used Kant as the standard for my critique 
of Clement Greenberg, I think that I should show good cause why I should not 
continue to accept Kantian authority in aesthetics for the rest of this thesis. That is 
an important part of the purpose of this chapter. 
If I have demonstrated anything in Chapter Two, it is only that certain important 
particularities of Greenberg's arguments in Modernist Painting are incompatible with 
or even contradictory to Kantian philosophy and methodology. More generally, I 
have suggested in that chapter that the conflict between Greenbergian empiricism 
and Kantian idealism, (even though the latter's idealism is limited in a way that 
Greenberg's empiricist positioning is not), amounts almost to an incommensurability 
between the work of these authors. None of this implies that Greenberg is wrong or 
that Kant is right in their aesthetic judgements. Any such conclusion would be a 
disservice not only to Greenberg but also to Kant. To elevate Kant to the position of 
an unquestionable authority is to embalm his work in a mausoleum of certainty and it 
deserves a better fate than that. 
In this chapter, therefore, I discuss some of the difficulties that arise within and 
between Kants three Critiques. All three Critiques are relevant to any attempt to 
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apply a re-inscribed Kantian aesthetic to painting today because they together 
constitute a complex systematic philosophy and because of their degree of 
interdependence upon each other in terms of certain crucial relationships such as 
those between concept and intuition and between autonomy, freedom and morality. 
Perhaps it is surprising to claim that a two hundred year old philosophical system is 
relevant to contemporary painting, yet I think that the claim can be sustained for the 
following reasons. Kant's First Critique establishes his self-critical philosophy and 
methodology together with his epistemology that describes how the world of 
appearances is possible for us in cognition of objects. Kant's self-criticality, 
developed in his First Critique, has been of major importance for the development of 
late modernist painting, as discussed in the previous chapter. Despite the 
reservations that I have expressed about Clement Greenberg's Kant exegesis, I 
recognise the value of his emphasis on the importance of self-criticality in painting in 
terms that are based in considerations of the dimensionality of pictorial space. The 
influence of Greenbergian modernism is still evident in much of painting today; and it 
needs to be, if for no other reason than that post-modernist practice needs to 
maintain a modernist moment within itself to occupy a meaningful place in the history 
of the discursive practice of painting. Additionally, there is the wider social 
consideration that our contemporary social, political and economic institutions remain 
largely modernist in their constitutions and operations. It has been the historic role of 
painting to both evidence and contest the values and institutions of the society in 
which it is produced. Contemporary painting ought, I believe, to continue to 
discharge such a role, and one way of doing so is to both evidence and contest late 
modernism's socio-economic repressions by alluding to them in the specificities of its 
own practice. 
Kant's Second Critique moves on from the phenomenal considerations of its 
predecessor in order to address the world of objects conceived as noumena. For 
Kant, we humans are not just phenomenal objects of experience in the world. We 
are not simply the consequences of antecedent causes and ourselves the 
antecedent cause of some future phenomenal event; that is to say, we are not means 
to an end, we are ends in ourselves; both part of nature and apart from it. Kant's 
First Critique is primarily about necessity and his Second Critique is about freedom. 
He needs both critiques to describe our humanity. I strongly hold the view that, 
because art is made by humans for humans and is often about what it is to be 
human, art needs a moral (noumenal) moment as well as a phenomenal one. I 
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believe this because I believe that art is not just entertainment any more than 
humans are. That is not to claim that art has no entertainment value, but it is to claim 
that art has something in excess1e of entertainment; art is more than the titillation of 
desire, though a painting, for example, that is an effective stimulus for desire may still 
be art. Kant's definition of beauty as the feeling of pleasure in us that we predicate 
on an external object is deceptively simple. If taken in isolation, such a claim could 
be construed as stating that anything, in nature or in art, is beautiful so long as we 
experience pleasure in beholding it. In the Analytic of Beauty in the Third Critique 
Kant constructs a complicated set of qualifications around the simple statement that 
beauty is a feeling of pleasure in us predicated on an object. I comment on these 
qualifications a little later in this chapter but for now I simply want to briefly explore 
Kant's possible motives for what may seem to be his unnecessarily complicated and 
difficult treatment of beauty in his Third Critique. 
I accept that Kant's theory of beauty is partly motivated by purely disciplinary 
considerations to unite his critical trilogy and, in that sense, he positions beauty in an 
instrumental role to his wider philosophical interests. Yet there is another reason that 
I claim for Kant's insistence on the disinterested nature of beauty and the peculiar 
nature of the aesthetic judgement's lack of purpose (end) yet having purposiveness 
(finality). I believe that this reason is that he wants beauty and the aesthetic 
judgement to undermine the currency of simple individual self-interest. It is this 
reason, additional to purely a disciplinary requirement, which motivates Kant to 
analogously claim that beauty is a symbol of the moral. Kant was aware of the 
social problems that had arisen from the Enlightenment's rejection of an externally 
given moral authority, whether from God or his agencies in the form of the monarchy 
and the episcopacy. Something was needed in its place and Kant's philosophical 
project was intended to provide such an authority, internally based on the 
transcendental freedom of the subject, through practical reason. Kant faced the 
problem of reconciling the demands of this rational freedom with the necessities of 
nature. Successive generations of philosophers have objected to what they have 
considered to be the authoritarian aspects of Kant's rational conception of freedom 
and many have argued that the Kantian project ultimately failed to resolve these 
issues. 
1° I return to this point in later chapters where I discuss the role of excess as exaggeration in the context 
of the neuroscientific explanation of how it is we take pleasure in art objects that have no purpose that 
relates to our biological survival mechanisms yet, in stimulating pleasure in us, operate as if they did. 
That, in turn, relates to the Kantian claim that beauty is purposive without purpose. 
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The problem of reconciling freedom and necessity has not vanished with modernism, 
even accepting (which I do not) that modernism itself has vanished. In the 
contemporary world we still face the problems of reconciling our personal freedom as 
individuals with our need for a meaningful society and the restraints that such a 
structure imposes. Kant's great philosophical project may have been judged to be 
deeply aporetic and problematic but in examining these aspects of his work we find 
insights into the difficulties of our own projects, both social and artistic. 
In Chapter Two of this thesis I expressed my reservations about Greenberg's claim 
that painting finds its autonomous domain solely in terms of its relation to its material 
substrate. Though I make specific criticisms of Kant's work in this chapter, I want to 
keep the connection he makes between beauty and morality because of my 
discontent with a different claim: that art finds its autonomous domain merely in 
entertainment. 
In later chapters I look for a narrative of beauty that is more positively constructed 
than Kant's and which will, I hope, retain and strengthen Kant's linkage of beauty to 
the moral as well as maintaining beauty's connection with objects of cognition. 
Kant's philosophical positioning in relation to his theory of beauty 
In his Introduction to the Third Critique (section III), Kant describes the function of the 
Critique of Judgement as being a means of connecting the two parts of philosophy in 
a whole. He goes on to state that, 
For all the faculties of the soul, or capacities, are reducible to three: the 
faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, and the faculty of 
desire ......... Now between the faculties of knowledge and desire stands the 
feeling of pleasure, just as judgement is intermediate between understanding 
and reason. 
Thus the aesthetic judgement and the nature of beauty are to form a bridge between 
understanding and reason and between knowledge and desire respectively; that is to 
say, they are to form a unifying bridge between the subject matter and methodology 
of his First and Second Critiques. I want to stress here the huge interest Kant has in 
attempting the Third Critique as the crowning unifying synthesis of his critical project; 
so much is at stake and one can admire his ambition and courage. In doing so, 
however, I think it is also very useful to keep in mind the disciplinary interests that 
both constrain and strongly influence the results of his enquiry; his insistence on the 
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disinterested nature of beauty, for example, is far from disinterested. Kant's 
positioning is, I believe, ultimately responsible for what many have considered to be 
an overly formal and predominantly negatively constituted theory of beauty that is 
capable of accommodating a very wide range of interpretations. The Third Critique 
folds back upon, and is itself enfolded by, its own textual antecedents. That is not 
unusual in itself, but because the Kantian critical project is so wide-ranging in its 
scope and so resolutely systematic in its methodology, I suggest that the degree to 
which Kant's earlier work influences his Critique of Judgement is somewhat 
exceptional and is a disadvantage as well as a strength. 
Before discussing the consequences that result from Kant's disciplinary positioning, I 
shall very briefly outline the contents of Kant's Analytic of the Beautiful and his 
development of the aesthetic judgement of taste. " My synopsis is based upon the 
succinct and elegant account of these matters given in Burnham (1999), and the 
translation of Kant's The Critique of Judgement by Meredith (1952). 
The aesthetic judgement and beauty are intimately connected for Kant. By the term 
aesthetic judgement Kant means any judgement of the type that can be expressed in 
the following sentence. "When I look at or listen to that object or event, I am pleased 
by the mere experience of it, and say that it is beautiful or sublime. "18 The Kantian 
aesthetic judgement differs from previous pre-critical philosophical usage of the term 
aesthetic that judge art in terms of the perfection and clarity in helping us know 
something about an object. Because the Kantian aesthetic judgement is reflective 
and not determinate19 and therefore not conceptual, it does not contribute to 
knowledge. 
The term judgement of taste, in Kantian terms, means that something pleases us or 
is liked and is therefore judged beautiful. Taste is simply our ability to judge natural 
or art objects as beautiful. The meaning of pleasure for Kant is equally 
17 I shall return to these matters in much more detail at the end of this thesis where I examine them in 
the light of Chapters Four and Five that develop a biologically based theory of beauty using ideas drawn 
from contemporary neuroscience. 
18 In this thesis I confine myself to discussions of the beautiful and exclude considerations of the 
sublime. 
19 The distinction between these judgments has been discussed in the previous chapter. In the context 
of this chapter the importance of the aesthetic judgement is that it does work of Its own accord, within 
itself" rather than relying on some externally determinate concept. Kant attempts to demonstrate that 
reflective judgements rely upon - but are significantly different from -a priori grounds in the subject that 
are closely related to the grounds for both theoretical and practical reason. 
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straightforward (Burnham, 1999, p43); it simply means "the feeling of an 
enhancement of life" Kant does not give what might be called a traditional deduction 
to legitimate the existence of aesthetic judgements but argues we are justified in 
assuming a transcendental necessity for them and points to what appear to be 
people's aesthetic responses as phenomena that require explanation. The aesthetic 
judgement is what furnishes such explanation. 
So far, the relation between beauty, pleasure and the aesthetic judgement is simple. 
Complications arise through Kant's concern that the aesthetic judgement is properly 
used; that is to say, that subjective, intellectual or moral interests or objective 
properties of the object that is judged beautiful are not mistaken for a response to the 
mere experience of the thing in itself as beautiful. Kant provides us with four 
Moments20 in the Analytic of the Beautiful the purpose of which are to ensure that the 
judgement of taste is properly applied. These moments are listed below. 
First Moment 
In the first moment Kant stresses that, 
The delight which determines the judgement of taste is independent of all 
interest. (prop. 2) 
By the term interest Kant means that the subject desires the object in some way. 
Specifically, Kant excludes the "agreeable" from the judgement of taste - by 
agreeable he means "that which the senses find pleasing in sensation" In this 
context Kant uses the word sensation to refer to the subjective "sensation" of, for 
example, eating honey (Burnham 1999, p52). One reason for Kant's objection to 
such a pleasure being considered as aesthetic is that not everyone likes honey; the 
judgement is not a universal one. 21 But Kant has another argument quite apart from 
universality and that is that a desire for honey as a pleasure that arises from 
sensation, presupposes that both honey and I actually exist and can only be 
achieved by my action in relation to an object (honey) that is outside of me. Even if I 
only imagine the pleasure of eating honey, I can only imagine it in terms of me 
possessing and eating the honey. The pleasure is only conceivable in terms of the 
gratification of my desire and not in terms of the "mere appearance" of the thing in 
itself. 
20 These moments correspond with Kant's four categories of quality, quantity, relation and modality, in 
that order. 
21 Kant is anticipating the second moment's requirement for the universality of aesthetic judgment here. 
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Very similar considerations apply to Kant's exclusion of "the good" from aesthetic 
judgements. The thought of a moral deed is only pleasing if imagined as a possible 
object of the will. To will something and take a delight in its existence, as we ought to 
do with the good, is to desire it and is an interest in it. 
Delight in the good is coupled with interest. (prop. 4) 
To consider something good is to have a concept of what the thing is for and concept 
is not needed to see beauty in a thing. 
The first moment of Kant's Analytic has important implications for art and its practice 
because Kant does not want us, in estimating beauty, to have regard to sensations 
(content) that lie within form, but only to form itself. By form, Kant means simply the 
spatio-temporal structure of an object. Though Kant acknowledges that pure colour, 
for example, can be beautiful, he sees its role as secondary to that of form, and 
cautions that it may obscure form. As Burnham (p52,1999) remarks, 
Kant is the ancestor of formalist theories of art. 
Second Moment 
This moment addresses Kant's claim for the universality of aesthetic judgements. 
Returning to the example of honey once more, the statement "I like honey" appears 
to be an aesthetic judgement; it is equivalent to claiming a feeling of pleasure in 
relation to eating honey. But for Kant, feeling is a phvate22 matter. Also, if I say that I 
like honey, I do not expect that everyone must agree with me and like honey too. But 
if I say, "Honey is sweet" I do expect everyone to agree with me because I regard it 
as an objective fact that honey contains sugar. Judgements that are aesthetic are 
somewhat like the statements "Honey is sweet" or "Honey contains sugar" because 
the statement that an object is beautiful is more like an objective statement of fact 
than the private report on sensation that describes a feeling of pleasure in me when I 
see something beautiful. However, Kant does not claim that beauty actually is a 
property of objects but only that we talk about beauty as if 23 it were an objective 
property. Strictly speaking the second moment talks not of universality but of 
universality without a concept. This qualification ensures that the aesthetic 
22 Interestingly, Kant's claim that feelings are essentially private is the same as the view taken by 
contemporary neuroscience, discussed in the next chapter, which claims that feelings take place in 
solipsistic isolation. 
23 This qualification, that we behave as if beauty was actually a property of objects, is characteristic of 
Kantian methodology; we have seen it in operation in the previous chapter in the context of Kant's 
epistemic "Copernican revolution". 
52 
judgement is always singular and cannot be extended, via concept, to include an 
entire class of objects of a certain type. 
Kant claims that the aesthetic judgement, 
.. demands the agreement of others. (prop. 7) 
This is a strong statement, not merely the expectation or solicitation of other people's 
agreement. Kant recognises that, in fact, all people do not agree in their aesthetic 
judgements, but attributes this to mistaken individual judgements. This point of view 
arises because the aesthetic judgement, so Kant claims, operates in such a way as 
to assert the existence of a correct estimation of beauty, just as if it were objective. 
The claim of universality is very dependent on the as if claim for objectivity that also 
sustains the claim for communicability of aesthetic judgements even though feelings 
are private. 
Third Moment 
This moment is about the form of purposiveness (finality) as distinct from purpose 
(the end to which actions are directed). The latter is an object the cause of which is a 
concept of it; for example a cup of tea results from my concept and my actions to 
realise the concept of a cup of tea. Switching on the kettle is purposive in that it is 
not the end purpose but part of a chain of events coordinated by my purpose. Kant 
claims that the aesthetic judgement is apart from concept and as such it cannot 
include the concept of the object's purpose. He also claims that, despite its lack of a 
determinate purpose, the judgement of the object is purposive; it appears as if it had 
a purpose or as if it belonged to the chain of events involved in realising a purpose. 
Burnham (p64,1999) gives the example of walking through a jungle and finding an 
old typewriter. I recognise the object as a man-made machine that has been 
constructed for the purpose of typing on paper; I know its determinate objective 
purpose and that the object is final and has purposiveness. I walk on and find an 
elaborately carved wooden stick that I do not recognise. I realise that the stick is not 
a natural object and a part of its surroundings - just as I did with the typewriter - but 
this time, I do not know its purpose, what it has been made for. I understand the 
internal purpose of the stick, because I know how to carve one just like it, 24 but I do 
not know why the object has been produced; I do not know its external purpose. I 
24 The internal purpose of an object is about the actions taken to bring the object into being so as to 
achieve the concept of its perfection; it is about how the object is achieved. The external purpose of an 
object is the "why" of the object; it is about the purpose the object is to serve. 
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know the object to be purposive because it appears to have been made as if for a 
purpose, yet I know not what that purpose is. I attribute this lack of knowledge to my 
ignorance because I believe that an external purpose is capable of being found for 
the stick. 
For Kant the lack of external purpose for the beautiful qua beautiful25 is essential 
rather than accidental or optional. This is especially relevant to art objects. People, 
especially artists, know about the internal purposes of the art object but Kant claims 
in the second moment that the internal purpose is not sufficient for the artwork to be 
judged beautiful. Additionally, in the third moment, Kant claims that fine art qua 
beautiful does not have external purposes either; art, in so far as it is art for Kant, is 
not made for any objective purpose; the beautiful ought to be pure 28 of any 
dependent concepts. 
It is important to note that in discussing the connection between purposiveness and 
pleasure Kant insists that the aesthetic judgement consists' of feeling. It is the 
attainment of feeling that does all the work in the aesthetic judgement and nothing is 
added to that work by the predication of feeling onto an object. 
Fourth Moment 
In this moment Kant examines the grounds for the aesthetic judgement rather than 
the details of the operation of the judgement itself. He claims that an inter-subjective 
"common sense" may be presupposed as this common ground for all four moments 
of the beautiful. His use of the term "common sense" (Gemeinsinn) is not what we 
mean in every day usage; it is not the sort of pragmatic, intelligent decisions that we 
attribute to people we call sensible, meaning that they possess wisdom, balance etc. 
in reaching decisions. Neither does it imply that such decisions are commonly held 
because they are self-evident. Judgements of these types all rely on understanding 
based on concepts and cannot apply to the beautiful that is a feeling of pleasure 
apart from all concepts. 
25 The beautiful object considered merely as beautiful, without any regard to possible external purpose. 
26 Pure and impure judgments of taste, free and dependent beauties, together with the idea and ideal of 
beauty are not dealt with here, because I discuss them later in this chapter. 
27 That is to say, the feeling is not a constitutive part of the judgment; it is the aesthetic judgment. 
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By common sense, Kant means something rather like the sense organs: for example, 
that which we have in common, the sense of sight in general, rather than an 
individual's specific ability and quality of seeing. A sense is a particular mode of 
becoming aware of something and by common sense Kant means our mode of 
becoming aware of the beautiful by means of the feeling in certain states of mind that 
we call aesthetic pleasure. 
Kant goes on to claim necessity for this meaning of common sense and the aesthetic 
judgement. In Kantian terms, necessity implies an a priori principle that is subjective 
and not derived from experience. The claim to necessity is not about the judgement 
itself but about the conditions for its possibility. In the previous chapter I discussed in 
detail the Kantian conditions for the possibility of objects in experience: the conditions 
for cognition that turn out to be, for Kant, the pure a priori intuitions of space and 
time. The formal similarity between the conditions for the aesthetic judgement that 
Kant is developing here and the conditions for cognition that he established in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic of the First Critique is clear. 28 
Along with the claim to necessity goes the connotation of universality. Necessity is 
(p56, Burnham, 1999) a "modal" concept; it is about the manner or form in which we 
make judgements and not about the particular content of a judgement. Burnham 
gives the example that two apples and two apples add up to four apples, and this is 
true independently of what kind of things are being added, provided there is concept 
available under which all four things can be subsumed - and it doesn't matter what 
this concept is. Necessity is that which can be proved from first principles (in this 
example from mathematical principles) to be the case. If something can be proved to 
be the case it has a claim on universality of agreement because, in an important 
sense, that is what proving something means. If we are all to agree on something 
then that something must be communicable. Most necessary judgements involve 
concepts but the aesthetic judgement, by definition, cannot. That is a problem for 
Kant and he deals with it in his usual way: by claiming that it behaves as if it were 
following a universal rule that we are unable to state. He also claims that the 
aesthetic judgement is always singular and "exemplary". 
25 This similarity, though useful at this point of his argument, leads to very significant problems in 
distinguishing beautiful objects from objects in general, and in sustaining the autonomy of reflective from 
determinate judgements. I discuss the proximity of the aesthetic judgement to that of cognition later in 
this chapter. 
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These qualifications imply the following functions of the aesthetic judgement: 
I Its universality is as if it were a description of an actual object. 
2 Its necessity is as if it were conditioned by an a priori principle. 
3 Its exemplary and singular nature prevents us from extending a particular 
judgement to other objects. 
The judgement of taste is necessary only in the conditional sense that it is a 
subjective a priori principle of the faculty of taste. And it is just this faculty that Kant 
calls common sense: the universal rule that we were unable to state above. To put 
this in another way, we can say that everything that happens in a judgement of taste 
does so in exactly the same way as if there was a determining principle that 
functioned in the reflective judgement, as does a concept of understanding in a 
determinate judgement. The problem remains that after this ingenious, though 
somewhat complex, argument we are still unable to say what this principle is. What 
does emerge from all this, however, is that just as the products of understanding are 
not the same for everyone so neither are their aesthetic judgements; what is 
universal about aesthetic judgements is our capacity to make them. As Kant writes 
in the fourth moment, aesthetic judgement will be, 
valid for everyone who is so constituted to judge by the understanding and 
the senses in combination (in other words, for all human beings). (prop. 9) 
We can certainly communicate our determinate judgements of understanding but it- 
not so evident that we can communicate our feelings as effectively. Moreover, Kant 
has already assigned to feeling a private character, as we saw in at the beginning of 
the discussion of the second moment. The question remains as to how the private 
aspect of feelings can be reconciled to their communicability. Kant does not mean, 
by the term communicability of feeling, (in the aesthetic judgement), that we all have 
knowledge of how others feel and think because we all think and feel the same way, 
but that others could think and feel, in principle, as we do; we share a common field 
of possibility of feelings just as we share a common field for the possibility of objects 
in cognition. This universal commonality of the possibility for experiencing feelings 
and objects could arise either because of sharing a real world with its real properties 
and laws that are the same for us all, or because we all have the same faculties 
which transcendentally constitute the world of objects and the world of our internal 
feelings for us in experience. 
In Chapter Two and its appendices I discussed how Kant claimed that we may, in 
every day affairs, assume that we cognise a real world of real objects, provided that 
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we bear in mind the contingency of such an assumption on the transcendental 
ground that supports it. In other words, the determinate and communicable 
objectivity of the world arises, for us, because of our universal transcendental 
theoretical cognition that provides its ground. But there is no determinate and 
communicable objectivity in the Kantian aesthetic judgement or the feelings of 
pleasure that Kant links to it. It is difficult to see how the aesthetic judgement and 
beauty relate to cognition in a way that guarantees their transcendental constitution - 
and hence universality and communicability - without any objectivity. The (Kantian) 
conditions for cognition are, after all, the conditions for objectivity. Kant rejects any 
appeal to psychological explanations of the universality of the aesthetic judgement 
that is not, for him, a matter of common behaviour of people but is built into, an 
intrinsic property of, the aesthetic judgement itself. 
From an individually subjective, i. e. private, point of view Kant's idea of common 
sense explains the ability to feel pleasure in the beautiful. Kant claims that this ability 
could only lay claim to necessity if it contained within itself a (hidden) a priori 
principle. The public and inter-subjective aspect of common sense, universal 
communicability, is ultimately grounded in the transcendental subject that is common 
to every person's faculties and is provided by cognition. Kant attempts to reconcile 
these private and public demands on the aesthetic judgement of beauty by claiming 
that the judgement brings the cognitive faculties into "agreement" or "harmony" in 
general. At the same time, he insists that this "agreement is reached without the 
aesthetic judgement agreeing to any principles or concepts of reason or to any 
particular spatio-temporal presentation of sensibility - any particular thing. Kant 
attempts to show that the private feelings, based on "harmony" and public universal 
communicability, based on exemplary necessity are all aspects of the same thing: 
commonsense. Kant suggests that common sense is, in turn based on the faculties 
of cognition that are the ground in us for any experience at all, aesthetic or otherwise. 
The fourth moment claims that a beautiful presentation is purposive for cognition in 
general, that is to say it satisfies cognition, not in respect to any particular concept of 
purpose, but in respect of the general function of objective thought. Kant claims that 
it "quickens" or "enlivens" our cognitive faculties and we take pleasure in that 
quickening. As Kant writes, 
We linger in our contemplation of the beautiful, because this contemplation 
reinforces and reproduces itself. (prop. 12) 
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I agree with this statement about the power of beauty to stimulate and prolong the 
general function of objective thought; beautiful objects are interesting and we 
experience pleasure in thinking about them. The problem is to demonstrate that the 
judgement of taste (based on Kantian common sense that is subjective and a priori) 
is, a priori, connected to the representation of an object. This demonstration or proof 
cannot be achieved for several reasons. 
Firstly, if the connection could be demonstrated, beauty would be conceptually 
mediated, via the representation of the object, by the conceptual nature of cognition. 
Secondly, the connection between the presentation and the feeling of pleasure would 
be a causal one. If the demonstration were a priori then the cause and effect relation 
would have to be a priori too but such causal a priori determinations are too general 
as rules of understanding and are empty of specific content. If, on the other hand the 
presentation was singular and specific - as it must be if it is to be judged beautiful - 
then it could only be given empirically or a posteriori. Thirdly, though Kant sets up a 
chain of causal relations: presentation of the beautiful object "causes" a feeling of 
pleasure in the subject; this then "causes" the subject to linger in contemplation of the 
beautiful object and the cognitive faculties are thus "caused" to be quickened and the 
whole process of feeling pleasure is described as "life enhancing", these separate 
distinguishable elements are all part of the same metaphor (Burnham 1999, p72) to 
the extent that any of them are metaphors for each other. Put simply, the aspects of 
the experience of the beautiful, pleasure, lingering contemplation, quickening and the 
enhancement of life are not separate entities but are equivalent descriptions 
(metaphors) of the same mental state. This is not a strictly causal argument because 
cause and effect, within the argument, turn out to be the same thing. 
Kant recognises that the connection between the presentation of a beautiful object 
and the aesthetic feeling of pleasure cannot be demonstrated a priori and this 
implies, in terms of theoretical reason (i. e. from a cognitive point of view) that the 
aesthetic judgement is not necessary but merely contingent. That is to say the link 
between cognition and the aesthetic judgement is an assumption. It could be 
otherwise. The link might be of a different nature or there might not be a link at all. 
Yet from the standpoint of reflective judgement itself, the necessity of a link between 
the feeling of pleasure and the presentation of a beautiful object to our cognitive 
faculties in general is given as an a priori principle. There is a significant difficulty in 
reconciling these two points of view. Kant's claim, in the third moment of the 
Analytic, that the beautiful object of the aesthetic judgement is seen as being 
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(subjectively) purposive without any definite purpose is designed to help this 
reconciliation because it attempts to explain how the beautiful might conform to the 
cognitive faculties in general without being subsumed under a particular (objective) 
concept of cognition such as purpose. 
After a lengthy discussion of the sublime, Kant returns to the subject matter of the 
beautiful and the aesthetic judgement and gives his Deduction of Aesthetic 
Judgement. The purpose of this deduction is to return in more detail to the problems 
of commonsense and harmony sketched out above. As we have already seen, 
Kant's claim for the aesthetic judgement is that it brings our cognitive faculties into a 
state of agreement and harmony that gives us pleasure. Kant also claims that 
commonsense as the universal communicability of the aesthetic judgement is also 
based on our cognitive faculties that are the ground in us for any experience at all. In 
his Deduction, Kant attempts a demonstration of these claims. 
My purpose in this chapter is primarily to discuss Kant's claims about the nature of 
the beautiful and the aesthetic judgement of taste rather than the way he sets out to 
philosophically prove those claims. Many of the difficulties of his ideas about beauty 
and the aesthetic judgement have already emerged in the above discussion of the 
Analytic of the Beautiful and of the Aesthetic Judgement and I do not believe that his 
Deduction substantially relieves or exacerbates those problems. Additionally a full 
discussion of his Deduction would be very lengthy. For these reasons, I shall only 
give a very brief discussion of its implications for the contents of his Analytic. 
The idea of a universal common sense is crucial to sustain Kant's claims for the 
aesthetic judgement because it is the subjective a priori condition for the judgement. 
In section 21 of the Critique of Judgement Kant starts by justifying the 
communicability of cognition (either entirely theoretical or empirical) on the grounds 
that it is virtually equivalent to objectivity. He then proceeds to the mental state of 
such cognitions - the subjective aspect of cognition - namely the proportion between 
understanding and imagination involved in the cognitive judgement, and claims that 
these proportions must be as universally shared as are the objective presentations 
considered in the first step of the argument. 
The third stage is about not only how this proportion or ratio between understanding 
and imagination will vary according to the object being judged, but is also about how 
it will vary with the specificities of a particular judging subject's abilities. That is 
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equivalent to saying that not everyone, in judging the same object, will use the same 
proportion of understanding and cognition in the cognition of a particular object. The 
problem lies with this last statement because it is a psychological claim and is clearly 
not an a priori transcendental - and hence universalicommunicable - claim. 
Despite this variability and lack of universality amongst individual subjective cognitive 
judgements, Kant proceeds to the fourth stage of the argument, which is that there is 
one unique proportion/ratio between understanding and imagination that "quickens" 
and "harmonises" the cognitive faculties. Not surprisingly this unique proportion is 
none other than the proportion necessary for a presentation in cognition to be 
beautiful. This hardly amounts to a deduction of the unique proportion as a priori 
necessary but is, I claim, more like an assumption or assertion for its necessity. 
The fifth step of the argument is that this unique proportion or ratio between 
understanding and imagination is experienced through feeling rather than concept. 
The claim is that it cannot be apprehended through any concept because it is 
something relational between concepts. I find this argument difficult to accept 
because the idea of ratio or proportion is clearly a (mathematical) concept and a 
determinate one at that. If, therefore, the aesthetic judgement arises from this 
optimum ratio between two faculties of cognition then the implication is surely that the 
aesthetic judgement is conceptually based. I agree that we cannot know what this 
ratio is; yet that does not detract from the clear implication that such a ratio exists. 
Kant goes on to claim that although feeling is usually entirely subjective and not 
universal (hence private) in the case of the feeling that arises from this optimal ratio, 
in the case of beauty, it is universal because it is communicable (hence public). Kant 
claims that common sense is the principle that this feeling in the aesthetic judgement 
is universally necessary. I am not convinced by the circularity of this argument 
though I recognise that the situation described by it may be so. I claim that Kant has 
provided an assertion rather than a demonstration for the universal necessity for 
common sense. 
The sixth and final stage is Kant's claim that common sense is necessary for ordinary 
cognition of all objects and hence for knowledge in general, a claim established in his 
First Critique as the ground for the universal communicability for the possibility and 
knowledge of objects. Kant claims that this same common sense is also the basis of 
aesthetic judgements and hence legitimates the claim for universal communicability 
of such judgements. Kant does not justify his claim that aesthetic judgement 
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depends, for its universality, on the common sense that he has demonstrated for the 
cognitive judgement. The possibility remains, therefore, that matters might be the 
other way round: that cognition depends on feelings of pleasure and displeasure for 
its universality, or that both the cognitive and the aesthetic judgements depend on 
some other more fundamental ground for their universality. Affective neuroscience 
tends to support these latter views. 
For that reason it is appropriate, at this point, to briefly look ahead to the subject 
matter of the next two chapters. Affective neuroscience claims that what we all have 
in common is our ability to emote, and that emotions lead to feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure that are indispensable to all intentional actions, including mental actions 
such as cognition and reason. Affective neuroscience thus supports the Kantian 
claim that aesthetic judgement is universal, but regards feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure, rather than cognition, as the common ground for the universality of all 
judgements. These feelings, built upon emotion, are, in terms of affective 
neuroscience, the common ground, the motivation and the reward for all action 
including the mental actions that Kant calls judgements. 
Kant's chain of argument, outlined above, ultimately relies on the idea that aesthetic 
judgement is based on harmony and proportion/ratio between the cognitive faculties. 
But why should it? Why should it have anything to do with the faculties of cognition at 
all? It is conceivable that there exists an entirely different sort of aesthetic common 
sense from the common sense that provides the universal communicability of 
objective knowledge in cognition. I claim that it is also conceivable that, if the 
aesthetic judgement does have something to do with cognition, then cognition is 
parasitic upon the aesthetic judgement (in the sense that it borrows its universality, 
communicability and necessity from our subjective feelings) rather than, as Kant 
asserts, the other way round. 29 That is equivalent to assigning to feeling a kind of 
primacy over reason and very much goes against the grain of Kantian thinking, which 
ultimately always privileges reason, particularly practical reason, over feeling. 
Kent's response to the question of why our aesthetic judgement is related to 
cognitive judgement is in terms of purposiveness. It is reasonable, he claims, to hold 
that purposiveness without purpose, as in the aesthetic judgement, is related to 
purposiveness with purpose in the cognitive judgement. Purposiveness itself is 
29 I discuss that idea in later chapters in terms of the biological neuroscientific narrative of emotions, 
feelings and intentional action. 
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assumed to be much the same for both. Purposiveness in the cognitive sense is 
clearly to do with purpose in the same sense, which is the concept of the cause of an 
object. Therefore, Kant claims, the indeterminate purposiveness of the aesthetic 
judgement must be significantly different from the determinate purposiveness of the 
cognitive judgement, otherwise the aesthetic judgement would not be reflective and 
beauty would not be apart from concept. By this move, Kant justifies his claim that a 
significant difference exists between the two sorts of purposiveness and is to be 
found in the ratio of the faculties of cognition involved in the aesthetic judgement that 
is absent in the ordinary cognitive judgement. This allows him to distinguish the 
aesthetic judgement from the cognitive judgement yet maintain a link between them 
and at the same time supports his claim for a optimum proportion or ratio as the 
distinguishing feature of the aesthetic judgement. 
Such a claim is hard to reconcile with his claim that the reflective aesthetic judgement 
is autonomous from the determinate judgements of cognition. However, that is not 
my main point here. My claim is that Kant's contention that there is a significant 
difference between the cognitive purposiveness and aesthetic purposiveness (and 
hence the two corresponding judgements) is a two-edged sword. Certainly this 
difference could be explained by Kant's ideal ratio/proportion idea of the faculties of 
cognition in aesthetic judgements, but that is not, I claim, a necessary conclusion but 
a contingent one; it is contingent because one could just as well explain the 
difference in purposiveness involved in the two sorts of judgement by claiming that 
both the judgements (like their qualities of purposiveness) are completely different. 
I am not, at this stage, claiming that this is so, but simply that one has to recognise 
that it is a (contingent) possibility and that Kant's conclusion is also a contingent and 
not a necessary one. Kant implies another claim in this argument, which is that 
purposiveness without purpose is also a feature of cognition. That would provide a 
link between cognition and aesthetic judgement and ensure the failure of my 
argument that the two might be completely different. But why should we believe that 
cognition also contains this particular fixed or even variable30 proportion/ ratio? In 
the absence of any demonstration for this that does independent work from the 
claims Kant has already made, we have to accept the contingency and not the 
30 Kant is ambivalent, even self-contradictory as whether this harmonious proportion/ ideal ratio is a 
fixed or a variable one claiming both in different passages. If this ratio is fixed or varies in the same way 
for both cognitive as for aesthetic judgements, how are we to distinguish between the two judgements? 
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necessity of the relation of the aesthetic to the cognitive judgement and this returns 
us to the previous situation in which my objection can stand. I accept that the 
aesthetic judgement is related to the Kantian judgement of sensibility31 because to 
experience objects as beautiful, indeed to have any feelings at all about them, they 
must be possible for us. I am also prepared to accept that the aesthetic judgement 
may be connected to the cognitive one but with the proviso that other explananatory 
narratives are also possible and the connection has not been a priori demonstrated 
and therefore is not a necessary conclusion. I return to this argument later in this 
and other chapters. 
In summary of the discussion so far, we have seen that Kant claims that within the 
aesthetic judgement, beauty in art or nature is referred to purposiveness without 
purpose. 32 In artistic production, Kant claims that there is a purpose involved only in 
so far as the artist has intent to achieve finitude through the completion of the 
artwork. Although the artist may intend the work to be beautiful, that does not, for 
Kant, guarantee that it is so. Kant regards the art- work as self-contained in as much 
as the artist's intent to make it, or to make it beautiful, is insufficient to both detract 
from its purposiveness without purpose and to guarantee that all will agree that it is 
beautiful. 
Purposiveness is the Kantian explanation of the feeling of pleasure in the aesthetic 
judgement. Kant claims that the fulfilment of purpose is pleasurable for us, and that 
in the absence of purpose, purposiveness will suffice in its place to elicit feelings of 
pleasure in the aesthetic judgement - and not just for the aesthetic judgement - but 
also for cognition in general. Because purposiveness will serve as ff it were purpose, 
purposiveness is pleasurable. Kant does not adequately demonstrate the 
universality of that feeling of pleasure as arising from purposiveness, which is 
equivalent to saying that the a priori necessity of a grounding principle for the 
aesthetic judgement is not established. Specifically, what is lacking is the 
demonstration that the aesthetic judgement relies upon the same a priori conditions 
as ordinary cognition of objects. If we assume that the a priori conditions are the 
same for aesthetic judgement as for ordinary cognitive judgements then the former 
must have the same universal communicability as the latter. We may also assume, 
should we wish, the notion of an optimal harmonious proportion or ratio between the 
31 Discussed in detail in the previous chapter. 
32 Alternatively expressed as finitude without end. 
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cognitive faculties of the understanding and the imagination (provided we have no 
other evidence to the contrary) for the most perfect activity of both these cognitive 
faculties in the aesthetic and the cognitive judgements. I claim, however, that both 
Kant's claim for the universal communicability of the aesthetic judgement and for an 
optimal ratio between understanding and imagination, which is the same for both 
aesthetic and cognitive judgements, is an assertion rather than a claim demonstrated 
a priori by his arguments. 
The choice of positioning that Kant has made results, as Bernstein (1992, p193) 
remarks in the context of a commentary on Adorno's aesthetics, in the problem that, 
Transcendental legitimation for aesthetic judgements could only be had if they 
were subsumed under either understanding or reason; but the proximating 
subsumption could only succeed at the cost of undermining aesthetic 
judgement's difference from understanding and practical reason. And, again, 
it is quite integral to the strictly Kantian problematic of aesthetic judgement, 
whereby it is to form a bridge across the abyss separating understanding from 
practical reason, mind from nature, is from ought. 
Bernstein goes on to review the many different attempts that later critics have made 
to re-interpret and develop Kantian aesthetics over the last two hundred years. At 
the heart of much of that work is the unresolved Kantian problem of the autonomy 
and heteronomy of aesthetic reflection in relation to our faculties of cognition and 
desire, or as others have expressed it, the conflict between necessity and freedom. 
Not all of this work is pertinent to my thesis and in the following sections I confine 
myself to those aspects of it relevant to my own position. 
My position in relation to the Kantian reflective aesthetic iudoement 
There are significant differences between my own positioning in relation to the 
questions about the nature of beauty and of judgement and Kant's position on these 
matters. As an artist I am primarily interested in how I and other people respond 
emotionally to paintings and to art in general; I am looking for narratives that consider 
those experiences in visual art that I describe as affective. I am also interested in 
how societies of people react at an emotional level to art. This wider concern 
introduces the requirement that my investigation be conducted within a conceptual 
context that refers at least to general, if not universal, concepts and also to the 
relational aspects of constructing meaning within a social and cultural framework. 
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Because I am not a philosopher I do not have an interest in, as distinct from simply 
being interested in, the grand unifying synthesis of Kant's entire critical project. I am 
concerned with how our individual affective response to a particular artwork occurs 
and how we are able to communicate and modify that response through our social 
relations with others; in how we arrive at a cooperative and communal construction of 
what we mean by the term beautiful. For me, social consensus is an important 
aspect of our estimation of the beautiful because it enlists the power of beauty in 
support of a social system based on universal interests rather than simply self- 
interest. Kant had, I suggest, similar concerns; as we have seen from his Analytic of 
the Beautiful, he was at pains to establish the universal communicability of beauty in 
order to link it to the transcendentally free (Kantianly autonomous) subject provided 
by his moral philosophy. Such a move not only prevents beauty being reduced to the 
means of the private gratification of desire but, and more positively, it aligns beauty 
with the formation of a social consensus for the common good. Beauty thus supports 
a social structure that recognises and fosters the universal good rather than 
individual greed and the subjugation of others. For Kant, I believe, beauty is not just 
instrumental to the disciplinary concerns of his critical philosophy, but has much 
wider social implications. In this thesis I share Kant's motivation for seeking to 
establish the universal communicability of beauty but I shall use different arguments 
to support it in later chapters. At this point, I simply want to indicate that though I 
share Kant's social motivation in linking beauty to morality, my arguments will not be 
determined by considerations of the difficulties that they imply for the unity of Kant's 
critical trilogy as a whole. 
In the above discussion I am not claiming a neutral position for myself because what 
I share with Kant (as well as with everyone else) are my own historical investments. I 
spent the early part of my working life as an academic physicist concerned with the 
astronomical world of appearances in relation to the spatio-temporal aspects of 
atomic physics. The middle part was spent farming so I may claim some experience 
of the conflict between necessity and freedom in relation to nature on both counts: at 
the theoretical and practical levels. Perhaps it is not surprising that I like Kant so 
much. Three members of my immediate family are professional psychologists, two of 
them specialists in neuroscience and the other in the social construction of meaning. 
I have had, therefore, to become interested in such matters, if only to be able to 
participate in conversations at dinner. 
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I mention these details only because they both situate and constrain my work. My 
own positioning, then, explains my desire to keep much of Kantian methodology and 
also to relate our response of pleasure/displeasure to an empirical world that is both 
internal and external in relation to our bodies. Such a world is internal to us in terms 
of the empiricist approach of neuroscience to our minds/brains on the one hand and 
is also explicable in terms of a relational approach (to external objects) of our (non- 
discrete) self on the other. These two approaches both subsume much of the 
distinction between rationalism and empiricism, and the desire to avoid collapse into 
one or the other that is so characteristic of Kant's systematic philosophy, which 
sought to critique (establish the limits of) the then orthodoxies of empiricism and 
idealism. I hope, by employing such means, to move the discussion of beauty away 
from the purely formal and classically modernist conceptions of the late 18th Century 
that rely on logical connections from discrete autonomous categories, and towards a 
more contemporary discourse that is based on recursive relationships that furnish 
several possible narratives of explanation. 33 Much of that discussion must wait until 
later chapters. For now, I want to discuss the relation of Kantian beauty to Kantian 
pure and practical reason. 
The Kantian Aesthetic Judgement in relation to Pure Reason 
The Critique of Judgement, the last of Kant's three Critiques, is of immediate interest 
to artists because a significant part of its subject matter is the philosophy of art, the 
usual understanding of the term aesthetics after the work of Kant. In the first part of 
his Third Critique Kant develops the aesthetic judgement in general and the 
judgement of taste in particular and it is in the latter of these two judgements that he 
lays out before us his theory of beauty. 
To decide on the meaning of the term aesthetic for Kant is not a straightforward task 
because the target of such an enquiry is a moving one. Aesthetic carries a 
somewhat different meaning in the first and second editions of the First Critique and 
33 Kant lived and worked in a largely stable and culturally homogenous society. He could, therefore, 
reasonably entertain the hope of providing a singular narrative of beauty in relation to that static social 
order. In our plural, culturally diverse and rapidly changing society we need narratives that, in their 
construction, evidence just these qualities if they are to have any relevance to the way we live now; one 
truth no longer fits all. For this reason, I want to construct a narrative of beauty that is more clearly 
legitimated by and in turn legitimates our contemporary plural culture and not simply the still 
economically and politically dominant sub-culture (that is also a super culture) of modernism. To do 
that, ideas such as wholly autonomous entities or categories, the discrete essential self, and linear 
causality may have to be replaced by the more open concepts of limited autonomy that includes an 
heteronomous moment, the socially constructed self in relation to others, and the reflexive circular 
causality of seif-organising systems based on system and chaos theory rather than linear logical 
entailments. 
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by the time that Kant wrote the Third Critique, nine years after the first edition of the 
Critique of Pure Reason, the term aesthetic had a very different meaning compared 
to that employed in its earlier usage by Kant. I draw attention to this progressive shift 
in meaning because the meaning of aesthetic in the Critique of Judgement always 
carries within itself the trace of the meaning ascribed to it in the First Critique and this 
creates difficulties of which Kant was fully aware. He was not able to resolve them 
entirely, either, I believe, to his own satisfaction or certainly to the satisfaction of 
those who later commented on his work. 
In the first edition of the CPR Kant writes that, 
The science of all principles of sensibility a priori, I call Transcendental 
Aesthetic. (A21/B35) 
Kant makes it clear in the Preface to his First Critique that the work is to exclude any 
discussion of aesthetics in the sense of a discussion of taste; the work is to be limited 
to the a priori principles of understanding. 
Hence it (the Critique of Pure Reason) makes our cognitive faculties its sole 
concern, to the exclusion of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure and the 
faculty of desire; and among the cognitive faculties it confines its attention to 
understanding and its a priori principles, to the exclusion of judgement and 
reason, (Kant makes it clear later that this reference to reason is to practical 
reason) faculties that also belong to theoretical cognition. 
There is, at this stage therefore, no ambiguity in Kant's use of the term aesthetic. It 
refers solely to usage in connection with the pure a priori intuitions of space and time 
that enable the possibility, for us, of objects in experience and of our forming an 
understanding of the manifold of sensation by subsuming it under concepts. This 
theory of space and time is developed in the Introduction to the Transcendental 
Aesthetic and is an indispensable part of the account of Kantian epistemology given 
in the First Critique. The term aesthetic is firmly tied to understanding and concept 
here. Kant's motivation for doing so was to distance his work from that of Leibniz 
and Wolff who considered time and space to be abstractions from empirical 
sensation a posteriori and sensibility to be confused perceptions of a perfect rational 
order (Caygill 1995, p54). The move by Kant here is, quite legitimately, a disciplinary 
one in philosophy, but I believe it results in serious difficulties that arise later in the 
context of aesthetics as a philosophy of art. 
34 See quotation from Kant at the head of Chapter Two that clearly distances Kant's idea of space and 
time from that of Leibniz. 
67 
As Caygill states, six years after the 1781 publication of his First Critique, Kant 
published the second edition, and three years later published the Critique of 
Judgement. In the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant makes an 
important addition to the meaning of the term aesthetic towards the end of the text 
when he claims that the aesthetic includes the critique of taste (Caygill, 1995, p54). 
The critique of taste focuses on the role of our feelings of pleasure/displeasure in the 
estimation of beauty. With this very significant addition to the meaning of the term 
aesthetic Kant re-enforces the proximity of aesthetics to his doctrine of sensibility and 
the necessary conditions for our cognition of objects that he established in the 
Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic in the first edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason. 
This inclusion of the aesthetical judgement of taste as a meaning of aesthetic that is 
additional to its original meaning as the science of all the a priori principles of 
sensibility has the effect of bringing Kantian aesthetics even closer to the dual 
meaning of aesthetics developed by Wolff' (1728) and Baumgarten 36 (1735) whose 
ambition it was to unite the criticism of beauty with the rules of reason. A linkage 
between beauty and concept is made here which operates against, indeed 
contradicts, the claim that Kant makes three years later in the Critique of Judgement 
that beauty is a feeling in us apart from all concepts. 37 
In the Critique of Judgement Kant makes a fundamental change, rather than a 
gradual development as before, to the meaning of the term aesthetic. Now aesthetic 
is separated from the determinate theoretical judgements, including not only the 
judgement of cognition of the First Critique and its correlate faculty of understanding, 
35 Wolff instituted the dual meaning of the term "aesthetic" as both the science of a priori sensibility and 
the philosophy of art in general and the critique of taste in particular. For Wolff, however, sensibility was 
not more than "confused perception of rational perfection" and, if the aesthetic is identical with that, then 
there is not much room for a philosophy of art. 
36 Baumgarten tried to resolve these Wolffian problems by claiming that knowledge of the sensible and 
the aesthetic had its own worth because it contributed to rational knowledge. The role of art was to 
exemplify rational knowledge through providing a sensible image of perfection. 
37 The claim in the First Critique, that implies a link between beauty and concept was made before Kant, 
in his Third Critique, distinguished between the beautiful and the sublime. In C3 Kant inserts the 
Analytic of the Sublime between the Analytic of the Beautiful and the Deduction of Aesthetic 
Judgements. This seems a strange arrangement but might be explained by the by then pressing need 
to distinguish between aesthetic judgements with conceptual moments (the sublime) and those without 
such moments (the beautiful) because to proceed to a deduction of aesthetic judgments without 
resolving this difference would be more difficult. 
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but is also distinguished from the judgement of practical reason of the Second 
Critique and the correlate faculties of desire. The aesthetic is now to be the 
38 The aesthetic is, in exemplar of a new form of judgement: the reflective judgement. 
other words, now required to form a bridge, to provide a degree of unity, between the 
faculties analysed in the First and Second Critiques. Such a task is inevitably very 
difficult because the judgements of pure and practical reason, and their correlate 
faculties of understanding and desire are already held to be autonomous by Kant. 39 
Aesthetics has, I suggest, become somewhat overburdened by Kant's efforts to 
resolve this problem. I do not want to discuss the reflective judgement in detail just 
yet because I want to examine it in the context of a discussion of Kantian beauty and 
before doing that I want to discuss something of Kant's motivation for defining beauty 
in the overwhelmingly negative and formal way that he does in the Third Critique. 
For the moment, therefore, I want to stay within the remit of the First Critique 
because I believe that it is here that an insistent contradiction first emerges that 
informs the Kantian critique of taste and partly explains much of its otherwise 
incomprehensible negativity and complexity. 
We have already seen that Kant, in the. second edition of the First Critique, brings 
what is soon to become the indeterminate aesthetic judgement of the Third Critique 
into close proximity to the (determinate) judgements of cognition developed in the 
first edition of the First Critique. This occurs in the second edition of the Second 
Critique through the new claim that aesthetic means not only the science of the pure 
a priori principles of sensibility but also the critique of taste. 
Although the judgement of taste is a reflective judgement it is, for Kant, no less 
important than a determinate judgement because it is true or false in a categorical 
way, as are the judgements of pure or practical reason. Kant insists that the 
judgement of taste is valid inter-subjectively, which is to say it is universally valid. 
Kant's claim that such judgements are disinterested, which means that the object of 
the judgement is not conceptually linked (either cognitively or morally) in any way to 
the subjective pleasure felt in the judgement. This disinterestedness preserves the 
38 Determinate judgment already possesses its concept and faces the difficulty of applying it to the 
multiplicity (manifold) of spatio-temporal appearances, while reflective judgment is the search for a 
concept for the judgment through this multiplicity. Reflective judgment obeys a peculiar principle - 
related to feelings of pleasure/displeasure - which enables it to act as a bridge between the theoretical 
judgments of the "faculty of knowing" analysed in Cl and the practical judgments of the "faculty of 
desire" analysed in C2. (Caygill, 1995, p54) 
39 As they must be if they are to be free and to give the laws of their operations to themselves. 
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freedom of the judgement of taste from empirical determination. Kant nevertheless 
believes (Bernstein, 1992, p19) that the connection between the pleasure and the 
representation is a necessary (i. e. a priori) one, which it must be if it is to be 
universally valid for all subjects independently of the empirical properties of the 
objects of the judgement. Kant needs the claim to universality because otherwise the 
judgement of taste would be no more than a "private report on sensation" and the 
Kantian judgement of taste would not differ significantly from what was, by then, the 
established tradition of empiricist psychology. Without the claim to universality, 
beauty could not be distinguished from the agreeable and the good (CJ, second 
Moment, prop. 6 and 7) and the disinterestedness of beauty would be jeopardised. 
As I have indicated earlier in the chapter, I agree with Kant's ambition to establish 
disinterested beauty as universal, setting it apart from the agreeable and the good. It 
is relatively easy to see why Kant wants to distinguish the beautiful from the 
agreeable; if he did not, then beauty would become a private affair for each of us. 
The result would be the trivialisation of beauty; it is of no philosophical interest or 
moral and social moment whether I prefer red wine to white because that is taste in 
the literal and lower sense of the word. The trivialisation of beauty as the gratification 
of private desires is dangerous because of the power of beauty that Kant 
recognises. 40 To reduce beauty to the merely agreeable is to bring it into the service 
of mere self-interest and not to allow it the active role of promoting the public good. 
The relation that Kant claims between beauty and morality is more complex. Kant's 
claim is that, 
Now 1 say that Beauty is the symbol °1 of the morally Good and it is only in 
this respect that... it gives pleasure with a claim for the agreement of every 
one else. (Kant, 1790, prop. 59, Bernard edition, 2000, p250) 
As Burnham (p128,1999) remarks, what is being presented here is an analo 2 
between how judgement reflects on the idea of the morally good and also reflects 
upon the intuition of the beautiful. Kant is discussing the formal relation between the 
aesthetic and moral judgements and not the nature of aesthetics and of morality as 
40 As I do. That is why this thesis is largely about beauty - because I believe it really matters at the 
moral/political level as well as in aesthetics. 
41 By symbol, Kant means the presentation of a rational idea as an intuition. 
42 As discussed in Chapter One, analogy is independent of content; it is a formal relation between 
entities and not about the entities themselves. Kant generally does not regard It as a means to empirical 
knowledge. 
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such. This is important because for Kant both the idea of form and the idea of 
reflection are in us, as part of our subjective resources. Reflection, as Burnham 
emphasises in the passage quoted above, is an ability of our general faculty of 
judgement, which in the absence of a determining concept, throws us back onto our 
own subjective abilities in order to come to decisions about intuitions. Therefore, 
Kant's discussion of the relation between beauty and morality in terms of analogy 
and reflection emphasises subjective meaning at the expense of objective concept. 
As Burnham also points out, reflection is an activity; and actions tend to become 
habitual. That, in turn, implies that aesthetic and moral reflection can lead to 
(analogically related) habits of thought. Thus the aesthetic judgement of taste43 is 
not only related to morality but through culture can actively promote it. This 
conclusion would not have been possible if Kant had only constructed an analogy 
between the two notions of taste and morality; it would, as Burnham points out, 
simply be an intellectual curiosity. Because the analogy is in terms of reflective 
activity (action in the world and the construction of meaning rather than statement of 
fact) then taste becomes an active supporter of morality. 
Kant hammers home the analogy between taste and morality by listing the points of 
formal similarity` in the way that we, as I want to express it, "do beauty and 
morality". I choose to express it in this way because I want to emphasise our 
performative roles of action and thought and not imply any ontological claim about 
what either the moral or the beautiful is. Kant's four points of analogy are: 
1. Reflection (as reflective judgement) on both beauty and the moral 
please us directly and not through consequences or purposes. 
43 Taste now being used in the higher rather than the lower Kantian sense. Kant divides each of the 
faculties of mind into two forms. The "higher" form means either being independent of (or spontaneous 
with respect to) the natural world and our experience of it. The "lower" form means being conditioned by 
the natural world. For example, the higher faculty of feeling (aesthetic feeling, the legislative faculty of 
which is the principle of purposiveness in judgement without purpose) is the pleasure or pain felt, in the 
presence or absence respectively, of the beautiful or the sublime. The lower faculty of feeling is 
corporeal feeling or gratification of accomplishment or satiety, or pain in their absence. It is worth 
noting, at this point, that desire is not, for Kant, part of the faculty of feeling but occupies its own 
separate faculty of mind. The higher form of desire (pure desire, its legislative faculty being practical 
reason) is desire in the exercise of freedom. Its lower form is corporeal desire. Corporeal desire 
belongs to the faculty of desire -as its lower form - and is not, for Kant, the same as the lower form of 
feeling. 
44 Referring once again to Chapter Two, it is useful to remember at this stage that Kantian analogy 
deals in the perfect similarity between two dissimilar things and not the imperfect similarity between 
perfectly similar things. I claim, therefore, that Kant is not claiming that beauty and morality are perfectly 
similar, that they are the same thing. Indeed, there is a strong implication, through his use of analogy 
that they are not. What he is claiming is that the way that we think about them, construct our meaning of 
them and reflect on them is perfectly similar. 
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2. Both reflections are disinterested. 
3. Both involve the idea of free conformity to law. For beauty this 
freedom is the freedom of the imagination inasmuch as it is of the 
same form as the laws of understanding. For morality this freedom is 
of the same form as the freedom of the will, the freedom of exercising 
choice. 
4. Both are founded upon a universal principle that does not involve 
determinate concepts of the understanding. 
The problem remains as to how we can understand even the mere possibility of 
freedom within a universe that is entirely determined as necessary by natural law. 
This is the old problem of the antinomy between freedom and necessity. It is a 
particularly difficult one for Kant because he recognises that we are both phenomena 
and noumena, both subject to the laws of nature because we are, in part, ourselves 
natural and hence subject to the (natural, phenomenological spatio-temporal) laws of 
cause and effect. Yet at the same time we are noumena, ends in ourselves that are 
not means to an end through a chain of cause and effect as natural objects are 
wholly understood to be. I mention this antinomy' very briefly because it is relevant 
to my discussion in later chapters of a narrative of beauty within the terms of 
contemporary (specifically neuroscientific) biology. More important, in the context of 
this chapter, is the way that Kant tries to resolve not only this problem of the 
antinomy of freedom but also the problem of the antinomy of taste: through his 
appeal to the supersensible substrate of humanity and phenomena. 
Kant's appeal to the supersensible substrate, as I discuss in more detail later, is his 
general way of resolving antinomies that cannot be resolved by other means within 
his systematic philosophy. It involves a crucial move away from his usual 
phenomenal approach, how things are possible in experience for us as appearances, 
and towards an ontological claim about how things are in themselves. The 
supersensible substrate is an idea of mind that is a realm of "objects" that cannot be 
experienced in principle yet which are purported to be the ground of all objects of 
experience. Since we cannot experience these supersensible "objects" it follows that 
we can have no (Kantian) epistemic relation to them; they are completely 
unknowable. Because, by definition, they are not phenomena but noumena the 
notions of space and time are simply not relevant to them, and neither, therefore is 
45 Which Kant deals with at length in the Critique of Pure Reason (A444/B472). 
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the notion of causal relations, as we know them, between them. Kant's solution to 
the antinomy of freedom involves positing freedom as a supersensible causality 
(Burnham, p139,1999). The Kantian resolution of the antinomy of taste likewise 
relies upon the idea of the supersensible substrate. 
It is at the point where Kant introduces the idea of mind that is the supersensible 
substrate that, in an important sense, I decide to derogate from complete agreement 
with him. That is not to say that I part company with him; I am very much in 
agreement with most of his argumentation and his motives. Though I recognise the 
philosophical utility, validity and ingenuity of his move to the supersensible, I remain 
unpersuaded of its practical utility in taking an enquiry into the nature of beauty any 
further. There are several reasons for my lack of enthusiasm for the idea of the 
supersensible substrate. I believe acceptance of it effectively arrests further 
epistemic enquiry into the relationship between beauty, pure reason and practical 
reason. As I discuss in a later chapter there are severe enough problems with the 
notion of causality let alone supersensible causality. I accept that the supersensible 
does, at a philosophical level, neatly solve the antinomies referred to above, yet I feel 
a sense of disappointment rather than satisfaction because I feel that potentially 
interesting but different forms of enquiry are short-circuited by Kant's move. 48 I prefer 
to stick with the antinomies for the time being and see what other narrative I might 
construct of beauty in relation to cognition and morality. My desire to do that is an 
important part of my motivation for the rest of this thesis. 
Returning now to the discussion of beauty as the analogical symbol of the moral, 
Kant (1790) summarises his arguments in proposition 60 of his Critique of 
Judgement with the statement that, 
°Now taste is at bottom a faculty for judging of the sensible illustration of 
moral Ideas (by means of a certain analogy involved in our reflection upon 
both of these); and it is from this faculty..., that pleasure is derived as valid for 
mankind in general and not merely for the private feeling of each. Hence it 
appears plain that the true propaedeutic47for the foundation of taste is the 
development of moral ideas and the culture of moral feeling; because it is 
46 I later compare my feelings about Kant's positing of the supersensible substrate to my feelings about 
the opacity of Greenbergian paintings to language and feeling - to borrow a phrase from Rosalind 
Krauss (1981). 
47 Broadly, meaning the required antecedent teaching or instruction for doing something. 
73 
only when sensibility is brought into agreement with this that genuine taste 
can assume a definite invariable form. " (Bernard translation, 2000, p255) 
As we have seen from the four points of analogy between the beautiful and the moral 
listed above, the idea of freedom is crucial for the very possibility of (Kantian) moral 
action. This freedom is both the freedom from empirical conditions, interest and 
purpose and the freedom to produce a self-given universal law. These freedoms are 
not simply the constituents of moral action but are the conditions for their possibility. 
As Burnham (p139,1999) points out, Kant is not merely constructing an analogy 
between the procedures of the aesthetic and the moral judgements, but between the 
conditions that make both judgements even a possibility. Burnham immediately goes 
on to draw the conclusion that, 
"Beauty makes visible, and is judged on the basis of something at least 
closely linked to, the supersensible basis of moralityV. 
I have two problems with this conclusion. Firstly how can the supersensible, that is, 
by definition, an object or assembly of objects that are not the ordinary phenomenal 
objects of Kantian experience but are constituted by noumena, be apprehended 
visually? Vision is about the presentation of objects that cannot be experienced 
other than in spatio-temporal terms. Yet the supersensible is entirely apart from 
spatio-temporality, for if it were not, it would be phenomenal. Certainly, space and 
time for Kant are not given by objects or by relations between objects but lie entirely 
within the subject. That does not altogether overcome the problem because we are 
both phenomena and noumena so that the human subject always contains a 
heteronomous moment in respect to either. Put another way, I cannot literally see or 
mentally visualise the supersensible substrate and that is not, I claim, a defect in me 
but the result of the limitations that I share with all people, in that I am unable to 
experience objects, real or mental, other than in terms of space and time; the 
supersensible is not, I claim, a concept because all concepts are ultimately about real 
objects, not supersensible objects. 
My second objection is that even if it were possible to see, in the beautiful, the 
supersensible basis of morality, it would only be so because we have already 
presupposed the supersensible to be the basis upon which the moral relies; we have 
not demonstrated it to be so. We may, I claim, be able to see a basis for morality, 
but we are not able to see that this basis is the supersensible substrate of humanity 
and phenomena in anything other than a contingent sense; it might be otherwise. 
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Because I am convinced of the contingency of this conclusion I feel encouraged to 
pursue my investigation of beauty beyond this point and look for another narrative 
that relies on finding a different basis for both beauty and morality. If I do find one, it 
will probably also be contingent rather than a priori necessary; but that is not the 
point because it might also be more epistemically productive in that it might at least 
hold out the possibility of specific insights into how it is that certain particularities of 
art works are commonly judged to be beautiful. 
My reservations in this area of discussion are not confined to Burnham's claim about 
the visibility, via beauty, of the supersensible basis of morality. In the quotation from 
Kant given above, he claims that the true propaedeutic (prior study for 
understanding) for beauty is the development of moral ideas and the culture of moral 
feeling. That may be so, but I do not think that it is necessarily so because all that 
has been established (which is not to belittle the value of it) is that, in four respects, 
the basis for the judgements of taste and morality are analogically the same. I 
accept that analogical claim but I do not accept the assumption that the estimation of 
beauty is somehow consequent on the development of moral ideas and moral 
feeling; I do not accept the hierarchical positioning of morality over beauty, implicit in 
this statement, as being either necessarily or self-evidently so, though I do, of course, 
accept that it may be so. It is conceivable that the situation is the other way round, 
that beauty is the propaedeutic of the moral. It is also conceivable that there is, as it 
were, a level playing field upon which both taste and moral judgement play, both 
being supported by some "propaedeutic" that instructs both. Inasmuch as these 
ideas are contingent they are dearly, at this stage, speculative; I suggest, however, 
that in this respect, they are not entirely dissimilar to the statements made by Kant at 
the very end of his Dialectical of the Aesthetic Judgement that I have quoted from 
above. I stress that I agree with Kant's motivation in associating together aesthetic 
and moral judgements but I think that, in assigning a hierarchical structure to that 
association, he is pushing the argument beyond its supports. 
Kant is not making the claim that everyone will make the same estimation of beauty 
and experience the same pleasure in a particular object, but he is claiming that the 
pleasure taken in the formal judgement of taste is universally valid and is inter- 
subjective inasmuch as everyone who makes a properly disinterested judgement of 
the object ought to find it beautiful. Such a claim is an inevitable result from the 
judgement of taste being independent of concept and the particularities of both the 
objective nature of what is being judged and of the subject doing the judging. It is 
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this formal quality of the judgement of taste that makes it autonomous from other 
judgements provided that it is not based on concept. If it were conceptually based it 
would be indistinguishable from the determinate judgements of cognition that 
discover, via concept, understanding. If the judgement of taste were conceptual it 
would also be indistinguishable from the (necessary and universal) pure a priori 
intuitions of the subject (space and time), which provide unity and harmony in diverse 
empirical sensation. In short, a conceptually based judgement of taste would be 
redundant because it would provide nothing that is not already furnished to us by 
cognition. 
A philosophical claim to universal necessity demands a deduction. The judgement of 
taste has to stand or fall on the ground chosen to legitimate this deduction. Clearly 
the interplay between intuition and understanding (which I have described in the 
previous chapter and which is common to all subjects) will provide the universality 
that is required. And this is, in fact, the move that Kant makes to legitimate the 
universality of his aesthetic reflective judgements, including the judgement of taste. 
Kant establishes his deduction for the judgement of taste in terms of the pleasure we 
take from an object being the result only of our estimate of its form. But, as we have 
seen, this pleasure is independent of the object being subsumed under concept or of 
particular empirical sensation from an object. All that is left then is the formal 
capacity in us, which, 
we may presuppose in all men (as a requisite for possible experience 
generally). Kant (1790, prop. 38, Meredith edition p146) 
But these universal capacities that enable experience for us are precisely those that 
are required for the determinate cognitive judgement of objects in general that Kant 
sets out in the early part of his First Critique. 
Commenting on this identity between the necessary conditions for determinate 
cognitive judgements and the conditions sufficient to validate aesthetic reflective 
judgement, Bemstein48 (1992, p20) claims that everything that goes wrong with the 
48 In this chapter I often refer to Bernstein's commentary on Kantian aesthetics because it is apposite, 
succinct and accessible. Many, but not all, of Bernstein's comments do not originate, as he 
acknowledges, from his own work but are grounded in a vast body of Kant exegesis stretching from 
Kant's contemporaries (Jacobi, Heine, Eberhard etc. ) to the major philosophers of late German Idealism 
(Fichte, Schelling and Hegel amongst others). In the late 19"' Century Nietzsche contributed 
significantly to criticism of Kant and critical response to Kant continued throughout the 20"' century. 
have limited myself to referring to the work of Theodor Adorno because it is particularly relevant to my 
thesis. Although I often refer to Bernstein's commentary on Kantian aesthetics I do not always agree 
with it. 
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Kantian deduction of the aesthetic judgement goes wrong at this point because of 
Kant's attempts to, 
underwrite aesthetic reflective judgements in terms of their connection with 
determinate cognitive judgements. 
Bernstein claims that Kant cannot, therefore, distinguish between objects for which 
we may make cognitive judgements and objects for which an aesthetic judgement is 
appropriate. The consequence is that Kant must allow that all objects about which 
determinate cognitive judgements can be made are beautiful, thus collapsing into the 
position taken by Wolff, a position that Kant is trying to avoid. This standard 
objection to Kantian aesthetics is often summarised in the statement that, because 
Kant makes the necessary subjective conditions for the possibility of empirical 
cognition the sufficient conditions for an aesthetic judgement then it follows that all 
objects must be judged beautiful. If this argument can be sustained, a philosophy of 
art that differs in a meaningful way from the Kantian epistemology for objects in 
general becomes impossible (Bernstein, 1992, p2). 
I have some reservations that this standard objection to Kantian aesthetics can be 
adequately sustained in the form that it is put above. I recognise that there is clearly 
a connection that amounts to an identity between the necessary subjective conditions 
for Kant's judgement of cognition and the sufficient conditions for Kantian aesthetic 
judgement. However, I would point out that drawing on only some of the necessary 
conditions for cognitive judgement do not amount to a reference to the cognitive 
judgement simply because they lack sufficiency for such a judgement. An example 
would be a judgement that lacks subsumption under determinate concept, as it would 
have to if it were to be identified with the judgement of taste. But a judgement that 
lacks subsumption under concept is not a cognitive one because it lacks an 
epistemic moment; it is less than cognition. Yet this is exactly the sort of judgement 
that Bernstein is considering when he comments that, 
The force of Kant's deduction turns on the unity of the representation of an 
object present in aesthetic reflection being just the unity present in cognitive 
judgements when the final synthesis under concept is removed. But this is 
implausible since it entails that for every object about which we can make a 
determinate cognitive judgement we can, by abstracting ft m the final 
synthesis of the object under a concept, make a valid aesthetic judgement. If 
Kant is to maintain the fight linkage between aesthetic and cognitive 
judgements, making the necessary subjective conditions for the possibility of 
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empirical cognition provide the sufficient conditions for the general validity of 
aesthetic judgements, then he must allow all objects about which cognitive 
determinate judgements can be made to be beautiful (as did Wolft). 
(Bernstein, 1992, p21) 
Bernstein is identifying the reflective aesthetic judgement with a determinate 
cognitive judgement "abstracted from the final synthesis of the object under concept. " 
But such an abstracted judgement that lacks synthesis under concept is, as I claim 
above, not a cognitive judgement. It is simply Kantian sensibility, and sensibility does 
not, for Kant, amount to cognition because it is not actively epistemic through 
understanding which requires concept, it is merely passive. 
What I am suggesting here is that the identification that Kant's critics have made 
between the judgement of taste and the judgement of cognition is inappropriate 
because what Kant's critics call the sufficient conditions for the judgement of taste 
may be properly identified only with the necessary conditions for sensibility and not 
with the necessary and sufficient conditions for cognition. The necessary conditions 
for sensibility are the pure a priori intuitions of space and time. The advantage of 
linking the judgement of taste to these instead of to cognition is that the very strong 
link between cognition and taste is weakened' and the non-conceptual nature of the 
judgement of taste is already implied, because Kant has already established in his 
First Critique, as discussed in the previous chapter, that the intuitions of space and 
time are not concepts. Additionally, the link of taste to sensibility is not in need of an 
a priori deduction because it is self-evident; objects must be possible for us if we are 
to predicate our feelings on them. A link to cognition does not imply, in itself, that all 
objects of cognition may also be judged beautiful because although sensibility is 
necessary for cognition it is not sufficient for it. 
I claim therefore, that it is the necessary conditions for the aesthetic judgement, 
rather than the sufficient ones, that are shared with the judgement of sensibility but I 
do not want to labour this point here, as I shall return to it briefly in this chapter and it 
will be of considerable importance in the next chapter. 
In his Preface to the Critique of Judgement, Kant strives to clarify his position 
regarding the relationship of the aesthetic judgement to understanding and the 
correlated relationship of our feelings of pleasure or aversion to cognition. 
49 If the link to cognition is overly strong it makes it more difficult to establish beauty in relation to the 
moral because Kantian morality is free from objective determination. 
78 
But now comes (aesthetic) judgement, which in the order of our cognitive 
faculties forms a middle term between understanding and reason. Has it got 
a priori principles? If so are they constitutive or merely regulative, thus 
indicating no special realm? And do they give a rule a priori to the feeling of 
pleasure and displeasure, as the middle term, between the faculties of 
cognition and desire, just as understanding prescribes laws a priori for the 
former and reason for the latter? This is the topic to which the present 
Critique is devoted. 
In this passage, Kant makes it clear that the aesthetic judgement is not reducible to 
understanding or to reason and that pleasure/displeasure is not reducible to the 
faculties of cognition or desire. Yet Kant still considers the aesthetic judgement to be 
"... in the order of our cognitive faculties", as he must if he is to maintain his position 
in the first edition of his First Critique which, he claims makes "... our cognitive 
faculties its sole concern, to the exclusion of the feelings of pleasure or displeasure 
and the faculty of desire... " 
How, if the First Critique excludes considerations of pleasure/displeasure, can its 
purely cognitive considerations be compatible with the new meaning of aesthetic in 
the Third Critique to which feelings of pleasure/displeasure are indispensable? 
Another question arises: how can the claim made in the Third Critique, that the 
aesthetic judgement is a reflective one, be reconciled to the claim made in the First 
Critique that judgement of cognition is a determinate one? The situation might have 
been better if Kant had been content with the link between the aesthetic judgement of 
taste and sensibility, the latter being a constitutive element of cognition only. 
Certainly the link between the First and Third Critiques would have been a weaker 
one but it would also have been a more sustainable one. A weak link to cognition 
would, perhaps, suffice to form a bridge but a link so strong that it amounts to an 
identity not only undermines the autonomy of both the judgements of taste and 
understanding but even worse, from my point of view, it renders beauty superfluous 
because it can do no independent work from objects of cognition in general. There 
are parallels here with the difficulty that Greenberg experienced in claiming both 
necessity and autonomy for his own particular judgement of taste in painting. What 
is common to both is the intractable difficulty in reconciling freedom to necessity. 
The fundamental problem, as I conceive it, in Kantian aesthetics is that of Kant's 
positioning. By this I mean that Kant's investigation of the nature of beauty is 
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conducted within the context of an investigation of judgement itself, the purpose of 
which is to reconcile through the faculty of pleasure/displeasure, the faculties of 
cognition and desire which form the subject matter of the first two parts of Kant's 
critical trilogy respectively. Along with this reconciliation of the faculties of cognition 
and desire goes the attempt to reconcile their correlate judgements of understanding 
and reason. This task would have been made considerably easier if Kant had been 
able to find a single principle from which cognition, feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure and desire together with their respective judgements of pure reason, 
aesthetics, and practical reason, could all be derived. Unfortunately he could not find 
any such principle, and the basic antinomy between necessity and freedom is only 
resolved by Kant through his presupposition of the supersensible substrate. Kant 
exegisists differ in their opinions as to how satisfactory this resolution is. My 
estimation of Kant's resolution is that, although satisfactory at a philosophical level, it 
limits the possibility of further creative development. 50 The problem, for me as an 
artist, is that Kantian aesthetics does not offer much help in constructing or 
interpreting the specific particularities of any individual artwork in relation to beauty. 
This is why I want to move beyond classical Kantian aesthetic theory. At the same 
time I want to keep what I think is of great value in Kant's work: his self-critical 
methodology. 
Faced with the apparently irreconcilable difficulties of all the demands that Kant's 
desire to unify his critical trilogy places on his theory of the nature of beauty I may 
have to abandon Kant's disciplinary methodology. But before resorting to that I 
prefer to investigate what might be called a less ambitious project than Kant's 
synthesis of his three critiques. I want, initially, to see what happens if I replace 
Kant's strong linkage between the judgement of taste and cognition, which I have 
already suggested is problematic, with the weaker connection between beauty and 
Kantian sensibility. 
Returning now to the standard objections' to Kantian aesthetics, Bernstein (1992, 
p21) writes that, 
50 1 also have a feeling of unease/disappointment at this move because it seems to me to indicate a 
rather sudden move towards the sort of metaphysical suppositions that Kant is so critical of in his 
introduction to (and subsequent arguments within) the First Critique. 
51 The standard objection, that all objects of cognition are also objects of the judgment of taste since 
they may be judged to be beautiful, is so called because, as Kant was aware, it was part of his own 
intellectual inheritance from the Leibniz-Wolff-Baumgarten tradition of idealism. The objection was well 
known, and in that sense a standard one even before Kant encountered difficulties with it that he was 
unable to entirely resolve. Many of the later critics of Kant mentioned in the previous footnote drew 
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The force of Kant's deduction turns on the unity of the representation of an 
object present in aesthetic reflection being just the unity of representation 
when the final synthesis under concept is removed. 
The arguments that I have made above can be expressed in a different way, which is 
that once the final synthesis under concept has been removed from the cognitive 
judgement, what we have left to us is not a representation but an intuition. The 
residue cannot be a representation because it is non-conceptual. 
The distinction between representations and intuitions is crucial. Intuitions are about 
how objects are given to us immediately; as Kant puts it, an intuition 
is that through which it (an object) is in immediate ºelatfon to us" (Al 9/B23) 
Intuitions are a phenomenological sense of an object's presence to us, sight as 
opposed to insight. They refer to simply looking at an object, not to thinking about an 
object and subsuming it, under concept, to the general. Intuitions are always 
particular and singular for Kant and he does not use the term to refer to a class or 
category of objects, which share features in common. It is, I believe, worth noting at 
this point that Kant insists that the judgement of taste always refers to a single object 
(A32/B47), which he regards as consistent with the immediacy of its relation to us. It 
is also worth noticing how careful Kant is, in discussing the details of sensibility and 
cognition and of the relation between reflective and determinate judgements, to 
resolve the problem in terms of time as well as in space. 
I am simply proposing a methodological move at this stage: that we behave as if 
Kant had linked the aesthetic judgement of taste to the intuitions of sensibility and not 
to the representations of cognition. The power in us that enables such intuitions is 
what Kant calls sensibility and is passive. It is contingent on the subject being 
affected by sensation. It is not, therefore, a matter of necessity for objects to be 
given to us as intuitions, because such intuitions are a posteriori to affect and 
sensation. It is important to distinguish here between intuitions of sensibility and the 
intuitions of experience, which are the pure a priori intuitions of space and time 
discussed in the previous chapter. Sensibility is neither a priori (hence necessary) 
nor is it epistemic for Kant. 
further attention to the problem. The result has been that a very considerable weight of philosophical 
authority has accrued to the objection. 
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In contrast, concepts that relate to objects are in a mediate relation to those objects. 
Although once an object has been given to us by intuition it can subsequently be 
thought about under concepts, even when the object is not presently in relation to us, 
what allows it to be given to us in the first instance, is not, for Kant, concept, but is 
intuition (see Al 9/1333); Kant does not support the (rationalist) view that we can think 
objects into actuality. Neither does he support the empiricist concept that thought 
can be derived from sensation alone. The fundamental position adopted by Kant 
(A230) in relation to intuition and understanding is that the former is sensible and the 
latter is discursive. These two cognitive functions are mutually irreducible to each 
other and both are necessary to an epistemic relation between objects and us, such 
as occurs, for example, in cognitive judgements. Intuitions alone do not bring about 
cognition. 
... through mere intuition nothing at all is thought ... affection of sensibility alone 
does not amount to a relation of such representation to any object. 
(A253/B309) 
Before proceeding to the next section of this chapter, I want to summarise my 
present position to the relationship that Kant has established between beauty and 
cognition. I do not consider the strength of that link to have been particularly useful 
in providing adequate explanation of the power and importance of beauty in art. 
Rather I believe that beauty has been fractured and reduced to an instrumental role 
by Kant's arguments that are primarily motivated by disciplinary, philosophical 
considerations. 
For these reasons I want to refer beauty to sensation and not to cognition. The 
implications of such a move are considerable and are examined in detail in the next 
chapter. For now, I simply point out that the result of my proposal to refer beauty to 
sensation, to what is given to us by an object in intuition, has, at least, the possibility 
of some explanation as to why we find some objects beautiful and others not. Put 
another way, I want to shift the focus of enquiry away from the higher legislative 
faculties of mind (theoretical cognition, practical reason and aesthetic feeling) and 
towards the lower non-legislative forms of these faculties: subjective associations, 
corporeal feelings and corporeal desires. Such a move is a shift of emphasis 
towards the empirical particularities of objects, and I claim that such a move is 
needed if we are to make any headway in understanding how we respond in terms of 
feelings of pleasure towards particular objects of experience. On the other hand, 
such explanations also have the possibility of collapse into brute empiricism unless 
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we can find something in us, indispensable for the feelings of pleasure that we have 
from beauty, which is a priori to the specific sensation from an object that we see at a 
particular time. Whatever that something is, it must be more than the pure a priori 
intuitions of space and time because these intuitions are common to all objects, 
beautiful or otherwise, as conditions of their possibility for us. Additionally, that 
something needs to be capable of providing to us a degree of freedom from the 
domination of nature as necessity. This freedom is extremely important because it is 
the ultimate ground of our ability to function as human beings that are noumena as 
well as phenomena, who are moral, social and cultural beings. It is indispensable to 
what is required for us to be artists. 
Kant fully recognises this compelling need for a moment of freedom in his treatment 
of beauty. To find it, he turns to the transcendentally free moral subject of his 
Second Critique. Such a move would, if adequately legitimated, not only provide the 
required moment of freedom for beauty but also be of great assistance in unifying his 
critical trilogy. Much as I support Kant's motives in trying to establish a specific link 
between the beautiful and the moral, I do not believe that he does so. Because the 
link he has established between pure reason and beauty is such a proximate one, a 
strong link between practical reason and beauty is required as a counterbalance. 
Unfortunately the link that Kant does find is a very weak one and, as it relies on the 
positing of the supersensible substrate (the legitimating ground for both 
understanding and reason); it is not a specific one. Moreover, I believe that in his 
effort to link the beautiful to the moral he leaves the former in an even more reduced 
and fractured condition than before. 
For these reasons, I believe that Kant's attempt to reconcile necessity and freedom 
through beauty in the Critique of Judgement is inadequate for my own investigation 
of the beautiful. Consequently, I move away from the Kantian position in the next 
chapter through abandoning any appeal to the supersensible substrate and replacing 
it by an appeal to a sensible substrate in us: those neurological structures of 
mind/brain that I believe to be inter-subjective. I do not discuss that move in detail 
here, but mention it for two reasons. Firstly, I feel that I should make my own 
positioning, my own agenda, transparent before my discussion of Kantian reason in 
relation to beauty that I give below. Secondly, I recognise the authority that adheres 
to Kant's theory of beauty and I need to show good reason why I should question 
some of his arguments and seek a different unifying ground for a narrative of my own 
for beauty. That is the purpose of the next section of this chapter. 
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The Kantian Aesthetic Judgement in relation to Practical Reason 
As discussed in the previous section of this chapter, Kant's attempt to link aesthetic 
judgements to the faculty of knowledge results in an unsatisfactory situation which 
implies that all objects of cognition may be judged to be beautiful. Such a conclusion 
is inevitable if the sufficient conditions for the aesthetic judgement are identified with 
the necessary conditions for general epistemological experience. Kant tries to avoid 
this situation by claiming that there is some optimal ratio between understanding and 
imagination that is required for cognition of objects generally and for such cognition 
to be communicable to others. The basic problem with this argument is that if this 
optimal ratio is necessary for cognition it is also a sufficient condition for the aesthetic 
judgement so we find ourselves again in the position in which all objects may be 
judged to be beautiful. If, on the other hand, this argument is taken together with 
Kant's claim that the relative proportions between our powers of cognition are 
different for individual objects we can claim that some objects are beautiful and some 
are not. This is because not all objects will give rise to the optimal ratio between 
understanding and imagination that is required for feelings of pleasure in us. 
The problem is that Kant does not make clear if it is the subject or the object, or 
some combination of both, that determines this optimal ratio. The situation becomes 
very complicated and unsatisfactory. The introduction of the idea of an optimal ratio 
for cognition not only implies that some objects are more beautiful than others but 
also that such objects are in some way more knowable than others. Bernstein 
(1992, p22) points out that such a conclusion is extremely counter-intuitive. I am not 
entirely convinced by his claim because I believe that we pay more attention to those 
objects, in both nature and art, which we find to be beautiful. 52 In consequence, our 
epistemic relation to such objects is prolonged and more likely to be enriched as a 
result. 
I am not claiming that we need to understand an object before we find it beautiful or 
that prolonged study of any object will necessarily convince us of its beauty. I do not 
agree with Kant's claim that there is some optimal ratio between understanding and 
52 Kant claims that we linger in our reflection on the beautiful and in the process of this lingering it 
seems reasonable that we also think about what we are experiencing thus increasing the chance of our 
knowing more about the object of this experience. However, my principal reason for raising this point 
here is that it is very relevant to the biological basis of feelings of pleasure that I concentrate on in later 
chapters. These theories assign to emotions (as the grounds of feelings of pleasure) a crucial role in 
motivating all our intentional actions. These intentional actions include mental ones. Broadly, 
neuroscience regards feelings of pleasure/displeasure as crucial to all human behaviour. 
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imagination that makes certain objects both more knowable and more beautiful for 
us. Yet I do believe that the feeling of pleasure that we call beauty in the 
contemplation of an object enhances our curiosity about it and motivates us to 
approach it both physically and mentally. The relation between beauty and 
knowledge is discussed in the following chapters. 
Although Kant's argument in terms of an optimal ratio between understanding and 
the imagination (which latter carries with it a general connotation to freedom for Kant) 
goes some way to mitigating the severity of the standard objection to his judgement 
of taste, it comes nowhere near to grounding a claim for a link between beauty and 
moral freedom. 
The fundamental difficulty facing Kant in this discussion is that he lacks any ground 
for aesthetic judgement that is independent from epistemology. The result is that 
beauty becomes identified, rather than partially constituted by, the conditions for 
cognition. Kant rejects a move towards empirical psychology to explain why we find 
some objects of cognition more beautiful than others. Such a rejection is entirely 
understandable given not only the empirical methods available to psychology at that 
time but also, and perhaps more importantly for Kant, his ambition to unite his critical 
trilogy as a whole. That unifying aim required him to look to his Second Critique to 
provide a ground, autonomous from epistemology, for aesthetic reflection and the 
pleasure that results from it. 
Kant links the beautiful to his moral philosophy in the Dialectic of Aesthetic 
Judgement (C3, prop. 59) where he writes that, 
Now, I say, the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good, and it is only in 
this light (a point of view natural to everyone, and one which everyone exacts 
from others as a duty) does it give us pleasure with the attendant claim to the 
agreement of everyone else, whereupon the mind becomes conscious of a 
certain ennoblement and elevation above mere pleasure from impressions of 
sense and also appraises the worth of others on the score of a like maxim of 
their judgement. 
And a little later in the same passage, Kant writes that the aesthetic judgement, 
... finds a reference in itself to something in the Subject itself and outside it, 
and which is not nature, nor yet freedom, but is connected to the ground of 
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the latter, i. e. the supersensible -a something in which the theoretical faculty 
gets bound up into unity with the practical in an intimate and obscure manner. 
Kant then goes on to summarise the analogical relationship between the beautiful 
and the moral in terms of the immediate, disinterested, free, and universal form of the 
regulative moral and the reflective aesthetic judgements, being careful to point out 
respects in which they differ. He concludes this part of the Dialectic of Aesthetic 
Judgement by writing that, 
Even common understanding is wont to pay regard to this analogy; and we 
frequently apply to beautiful objects of nature or of art names that seem to 
rely on the basis of a moral estimate. We call buildings or trees majestic, or 
plains laughing and gay; even colours are called innocent, modest, soft. 
Taste makes, as it were, the transition from the charm of sense to habitual 
moral interest possible without too violent a leap, for it represents the 
imagination, even in freedom, as amenable to a final determination for 
understanding, and teaches us to find, even in sensuous objects, a free 
delight apart from any charm of sense. 
(Kant, 1790, The Critique of Judgement, Meredith edition, p223-225) 
The first part of this quotation refers to the symbolic nature of beauty for the moral. 
Kant has just previously made clear that what he means by a symbol is an intuition 
that contains an indirect presentation of a concept with the aid of an analogy for 
which recourse is had even to empirical intuitions. This recourse is surprising to me, 
given Kant's insistence in his First Critique, discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis, 
that analogy is not to be employed in respect of our relation to empirical objects. 
interpret it as a measure of his anxiety to link the beautiful to the moral as strongly as 
possible. More importantly, Kant is not only claiming universality of agreement in the 
estimation of beauty here but also that we may exact such agreement from others as 
a duty. This introduces the idea of moral value into the judgement of taste and of 
appraising the worth of other people in terms of their taste. 
The second part of the quotation refers back to the supersensible substrate of 
humanity and phenomena developed earlier in the Critique of Judgement and which 
is indispensable both to Kants resolution of the antinomy of taste and as a ground for 
the transcendentally free subject of Kants moral philosophy. The analogy between 
the beautiful and the moral is further re-enforced here. 
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In the last part of the quotation, Kant makes an argument in socially constructed 
terms; the appeal to truth-value is in terms of social and linguistic usage. The last 
sentence of the quotation is particularly interesting to me because it summarises 
Kant's project in his last Critique: the reconciliation of necessity and freedom through 
the formal structure of his judgement of taste that is designed so that it may 
accommodate certain essential features of both pure and practical Kantian reason, 
thus establishing a unifying bridge between them. 
There is not space here to discuss the details of Kant's attempt to reconcile the first 
two parts of his critical trilogy through the third part and the constraints that such an 
enterprise places on his aesthetic theory. 53 As discussed in Chapter Two of this 
thesis, Kant's First Critique is concerned to limit metaphysical speculation through 
limiting the remit of the products of pure reason to knowledge reached only through a 
reason that is supported by (Kantian) experience. Kantian experience in turn 
depends on the basis of Kant's transcendental idealism which holds that space and 
time are not independent of the human mind but are formal structures of our 
cognition that make objects possible for us in experience as we experience them, 
and not otherwise. No claim is made that it is possible to know objects as they are, 
as things in themselves. Pure reason can only give rise, therefore, to a 
phenomenological experience and knowledge of the world. For Kant, knowledge is 
the act of bringing together or synthesising intuitions (which are singular 
representations from the world that present material to the mind) with concepts 
(general representations that have their origin in us) in a judgement that both unifies 
and brings into consciousness what we call cognition or synthetic knowledge of the 
world. It follows, therefore, that synthetic (Kantian) knowledge that always requires 
intuitions from the world cannot provide knowledge of things in themselves 
(noumena) because intuitions are always spatio-temporal. 
Kantian epistemology, which is always phenomenological, presents severe problems 
for the traditional (i. e. pre-Kantian) claim of metaphysics to be able to furnish us with 
facts about noumena such as God and the existence of an immortal soul, because 
such knowledge lies beyond, is transcendent to, the limits of our spatio-temporal 
experience. Conversely, the a priori deductive arguments of traditional metaphysics 
53 An excellent yet brief synopsis of Kant's freedom of the will in relation to the epistemology of the First 
Critique that relies on necessary subjective conditions for the categories of cognition is given in Andrew 
Reath's Introduction to The Critique of Practical Reason by Kant (2001). 
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cannot provide us with synthetic knowledge because such metaphysical knowledge 
is based on purely conceptual inference independent of (spatio-temporal) intuition. 
The prospect of reconciling the phenomenological and the noumenal view of objects, 
which is at the heart of the problem of reconciling Kant's First and Second Critique, is 
not altogether hopeless however. Some hope is provided by the two arguments that 
follow. 
Firstly, although a consequence of the synthetic epistemology developed in the First 
Critique is that we can know nothing of what lies beyond our spatio-temporal 
experience, the very fact that we cannot have such knowledge precludes us from 
proving that there is nothing beyond the reach of synthetic knowledge. There is 
nothing in the First Critique that prevents us from speculating or making assertions 
about noumena, should we find sufficient (as opposed to necessary) grounds for 
doing so. The fact that we can think about noumenal objects does not mean that we 
can make epistemological claims about them or validate any and all assertions that 
we might make concerning such objects. On the other hand, the mere fact that we 
can have no knowledge (that is based on transcendental idealism) of noumenal 
objects, Kant claims, actually guarantees that propositions that we make about such 
objects are not inconsistent with the theoretical knowledge of the First Critique. At 
first sight this last claim is surprising but it follows, as I understand it, simply because 
of the incommensurability between truth statements about phenomena and 
noumena. 
The second argument that supports the idea that we may reasonably reconcile the 
first two of Kant's critical trilogy arises from pure reason's demand for completeness 
of explanation; and this demand for completeness is ultimately a demand for a 
noumenal, as opposed to a phenomenal, explanation of events in nature. Kant 
explains events in nature by tracing them back to an antecedent cause that is both 
necessary and sufficient to explain the event. But our experience of nature is limited 
to a phenomenal one, to the world of appearances in space and time. Kant goes on 
to argue that any given event can be explained in terms of antecedent events so that 
we are faced with an endless sequence of antecedent causes and consequent 
events. Our search for completeness of explanation can only be fulfilled when we 
find an event that is not pre-determined by some antecedent cause. Such an event 
cannot be a phenomenal event because, Kant claims, every phenomenal event 
requires a preceding event to locate it in space and time as demanded by the law of 
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natural causality. The demand for completeness of explanation implies, for Kant, the 
idea of a transcendentally free cause; a cause that does not require any antecedent 
cause and which must therefore lie outside space and time and is not subject to our 
understanding. As such the transcendentally free cause cannot be phenomenal but 
must be noumenal. 
The result of the foregoing two arguments is that the clear distinction between 
phenomena and noumena allows events to be seen as subject to determination by 
causality when seen as phenomena but as evidence of free causality when they are 
seen as noumena. All that pure reason has achieved here is to show that it is not 
inconsistent with the idea of transcendental freedom; it has not demonstrated the 
reality of such freedom. That demonstration is left for practical reason to supply. 
This is good news for Kant's architectonic goal for his Third Critique: reconciliation of 
necessity and freedom, reason and understanding. This goal of effecting 
reconciliation between the First and Second Critiques is a reasonable enough one 
and is an obvious explanation of the interest that motivates Kant's insistence on the 
disinterested nature of the aesthetic judgement in the Critique of Judgement. Were 
the aesthetic judgement interested, that is to say concerned with the real existence of 
an object, then the object would fall under a particular cognitive or moral concept, 
and the feeling of pleasure would be mediated by such a concept and Kant insists 
that the pleasure felt in the estimation of beauty is immediate. Kant cannot afford to 
let beauty be subsumed under either a cognitive or a moral concept if it is to act as a 
bridge between pure and practical reason. 
At issue here is the difficulty that any definition of beauty faces in its role as an 
analogous symbol of the moral good and its claim to autonomy from moral reason. 
This distance of the judgement of taste from morality echoes the distance between 
pure and practical reason. Bernstein (1992, p30) remarks that Kant sees nothing 
problematic in the duality between knowledge and reason, as evidenced by Kant's 
writing that states, 
Understanding and reason, therefore, have two distinct jurisdictions over one 
and the same territory of experience. But neither can interfere with the other. 
For the concept of freedom just as We disturbs the legislation of nature, as 
the concept of nature influences legislation through the concept of freedom. 
(Kant, 1790, Meredith edition, p13) 
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Unless morality can have some implication for, some effect on, nature (of which we 
humans are a part - because we can think of ourselves as phenomena as well as 
noumena) it is pointless. There must, therefore, be some unitary ground common to 
nature and freedom; for Kant this ground is the supersensible substrate of 
phenomena and humanity, which is not a principle or a being but simply an idea of 
mind, unknowable as such, that Kant claims is sufficient to provide the unifying 
ground that he seeks. Because the supersensible substrate is not a being it is 
invariant over time, and leads, according to Adorno, to a stasis in aesthetic theory. 
That well-known objection is not my main concern here. My concern is that the 
supersensible substrate is epistemologically opaque; to put it simply, it doesn't inform 
our understanding of what we can know about beauty. The experience of being 
confronted with the supersensible substrate in Kantian philosophy is not, I suggest, 
unfamiliar to those who have experienced the paintings of late modernism that 
adhere to the Greenbergian conditions for painting; both pose the question, where do 
I go from here? And both fail to answer it. My objection to Kant's posited 
supersensible substrate is ultimately very similar to Adorno's but proceeds from a 
slightly different point of view. 
Not only is the supersensible completely opaque to knowledge but also it is the 
ground for Kantian cognition as well as being Kant's ground for moral reason. 
Because it is the ground for both of these judgements a legitimation of beauty in 
terms of the supersensible cannot provide a specific link between the beautiful and 
the moral. 
This unsatisfactory situation arises because Kant requires beauty to be both 
autonomous from cognition and from morality, from nature and freedom. Yet he also 
wants beauty to provide some connection between the two distinct jurisdictions of 
knowledge and morality. If the judgement of taste is to form a bridge between 
understanding and reason then it must in some way disturb and subvert their 
mutually exclusive jurisdictions. The reverse of this argument is of more interest to 
me because it implies that Kant's logical separation of the autonomous jurisdictions 
of epistemology and moral reason must be highly influential on his construction of the 
nature of beauty. I suggest, therefore, that beauty as such is subverted and 
instrumentally conditioned by Kant because he forces beauty into a mediating and 
synthesising role between two dichotomous jurisdictions which, as he claims in the 
above quotation, enjoy completely separate areas of legislation. As Bernstein writes, 
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The structural necessity enjoining the destruction of beauty may be 
encapsulated in a kind of antinomy, the antinomy of aesthetic judgement. lt 
states: The conditions necessary for securing the autonomy of the judgement 
of taste necessarily exclude the worth of beauty from belonging to it 
intrinsically. In other words, what constitutes the autonomy of taste 
necessarily makes the value of beauty contingent, external and instrumental. 
And this has anfinomic force because the pleasure and universality of the 
judgement of taste are to be regarded as intrinsic to it. (Bernstein, 1992, 
p31) 
This antinomy is played out in the distinction that Kant makes between free and 
dependent beauties. The former are self-subsisting and do not presuppose a 
concept of what is the (internal or external) end or purpose of the object of 
judgement; they do not presuppose what the object is for. In contrast, dependent 
beauties do come under a concept of a particular end and are consequently 
conditioned by the concept of that end. Kant claims that when we estimate free 
beauty we are making a pure judgement of taste and that we must be able to make 
such a pure judgement otherwise the claim that the reflective judgement of taste is 
autonomous (from cognition and morality) could not be legitimated. The result of this 
requirement implies that there can be no free beauties that imply a conception of 
what the object represented ought to be. But what an object ought to be is not simply 
an estimate of an object's beauty; it is more than that because it is a concept. 
Moreover, it is a moral concept. Thus in order to be a free beauty and hence 
legitimate the pure reflective aesthetic judgement of taste an object must lack any 
intrinsic moral value or worth, it may be neither good nor bad. On the other hand, 
objects or representations of objects that are an end in themselves, as opposed to 
means to an end, and which are of intrinsic moral worth, are never simply beautiful, 
they are dependent beauties. 
We are, therefore, left in the unsatisfactory situation in which free (autonomous) 
beauties cannot supply the function of being a symbol of the moral. Kant's moral 
theory therefore requires the existence of some objects about which pure aesthetic 
judgements cannot be made and such objects cannot be concept free, intrinsically of 
moral worth or ends in themselves. Such objects cannot be simply beautiful. How 
then are we to form a clear idea of beauty as such that is not inconsistent with a 
(moral) value system that is based on the individual's power of reason alone? 
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This question becomes more acutely pressing in the artistic representation of 
persons. For Kant an artistic beauty is a beautiful representation (CJ prop 49) and if 
representation is the purpose of the work then the degree of verisimilitude achieved 
becomes the criterion by which the work must judged as to its success or otherwise. 
That sort of judgement is evidently not a pure judgement of taste because beauty is 
not, for Kant, the same as perfection in either the object or its representation. A 
perfect representation is not necessarily a beautiful representation and a beautiful 
representation need not be perfectly accurate in every detail. Representations of 
people in art are intrinsically dependent; they cannot be free beauties, not only 
because they are representations but also because Kant's moral law requires that we 
must always treat persons as if they are noumena and never as means to an end. 
This implies that people or their representations cannot be a means to aesthetic 
beauty, and further, that representations of people are necessarily constituted by 
moral criteria. Persons are not, therefore, properly the objects of a pure judgement 
of taste. Once again, beauty as such has become submerged under the weight of 
the instrumental role (to moral exemplification) that Kant has assigned to it. For Kant 
the moral takes precedence over the aesthetic consideration. But beauty is supposed 
to be the symbol of the moral; to be, in an analogical sense, a moral idea (inasmuch 
as it signifies a concept of practical reason). How then, can beauty as such be 
indifferent to, in the sense of failing to evidence and thus support, the moral 
constitution of persons? 
It is interesting, at this point, to compare Clement Greenberg's attitude to 
representations of people in painting with that of Kant. Greenberg is opposed, as we 
have seen in the previous chapter, to all "representations of recognisable entities" in 
painting, be they representations of anything ranging from the "merest outline of a 
teacup" to a person. In other words, Greenberg is indifferent to the distinction 
between noumena and phenomena, between moral freedom and the necessity of 
nature; he is only concerned that painting shall refer to the phenomenal experience 
of the flatness of the stretched up canvas. As Hickey (1999) remarks, the cost of 
such indifference is that beauty is denied any place in late modernist painting. 
In Modernist Painting Greenberg banishes representations of recognisable objects 
from painting. Yet the terms recognising and representing refer to the formal role of 
an active, perceiving subject - as do the feelings of pleasure in relation to a particular 
object that we call beautiful. Thus Greenberg's prescriptive conditions for painting in 
modernism exile beauty from painting; all that is left for the perceiving subject is 
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content, but, in Kantian terms, beauty is formal and is not given by empirical content 
alone. 
Although Kant allows a role for both subject and object in his predominantly formal 
theory of beauty through his proposal that a certain ratio between understanding and 
intuition is required for us to experience an object as beautiful, the result is a static 
conception of form. In the second half of this thesis I draw from the ideas and 
observations of contemporary neuroscience that allow me to construct a narrative of 
beauty that is based upon a new and dynamic type of form: one that follows from the 
reflexive and recursive relationship between subject and object in perception. Such 
form is capable of encompassing both the noumenal and phenomenal aspects of the 
human in our experience of beauty. 
Kant is largely uninterested in the specificities of painting or any other art works. He 
is not, however, uninterested in beauty as such, as evidenced by his distinction 
between free and dependent beauties. Unfortunately, in his attempt to establish a 
link between beauty and the moral, he is unable to establish free beauties, that is to 
say beauty as such, that is not already mediated by moral concepts, as a symbol to 
practical reason, to the moral. The consequence is that beauty itself, free beauty, is 
alienated from Kantian moral freedom. Kant, faced with a choice between 
developing a positive theory of the nature of beauty in itself and the pure judgement 
of taste that is indifferent to practical reason, or of developing a largely negative and 
formal theory that says very little about free beauty and has to rely on dependent 
beauty to evidence "beauty as the symbol of the moral", opts for the latter course. 
The consequence is that, once again, beauty itself has no real place in the 
discussion. 
There is, I believe, a significant similarity between the attitude of Greenberg and Kant 
to beauty; they are both prepared to subjugate it to their own disciplinary 
considerations. Another way of expressing this is to say that Greenberg is 
preoccupied with considerations of what he sees as the demands of Kantian 
necessity and self-critical pure reason. Kant, on the other hand, and by the time that 
he wrote his third Critique, is prepared to yield to the primacy of practical reason in 
any conflict that arises between judgements of pure reason, practical reason and 
reflective aesthetic judgements. As Socrates remarked (Caygill, 1995. p91), "all 
beauty is difficult. It is, I suggest, particularly difficult for those pre-occupied with the 
disciplinary considerations of modernist philosophy. 
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Returning now to the Kantian anomalies in the domain of taste that are played out in 
the conflict between his idea and his ideal of beauty, the former signifies a concept of 
reason and the latter is the archetype and standard of beauty against which all 
judgements of taste are made. For Kant the ideal of beauty is the embodiment of the 
rational (moral) idea of persons as being of intrinsic value, of persons as noumena 
rather than phenomena. I do not subscribe to this view because I claim that the ideal 
of beauty, the archetype of beauty, should be in terms of beauty as such, beauty 
unqualified by reference to a rational idea even if that idea is as important as 
morality. My objection to this claim results from (and is supported by) the objection 
that I made earlier in this chapter: Kant's privileging of moral over aesthetic reflection 
is a contingent rather than a necessary conclusion. It follows from the discussion 
above that, for Kant, free beauties cannot be ideal, as they presuppose no concept, 
moral or otherwise. Ideal beauties cannot be, as we have just seen, free beauties 
and so the objects of pure judgements of taste, precisely because they do contain 
moral concepts. As Bernstein (1992. p37) points out, if there were only free beauties 
no ideal of beauty would be possible and if there were only ideal (dependent) 
beauties no autonomous domain54 of beauty would be possible. 55 The point that I 
want to make here is that I believe that the ideal of beauty is properly a concern of 
beauty rather than primarily a matter for practical reason. My more general concern 
is that the weakness, amounting to failure, of the link that Kant establishes between 
the beautiful as such (that is to say between free beauties) and practical reason, fails 
to provide sufficient counterbalance to the link between beauty and cognition 
discussed earlier. The result is that the aesthetic judgement only achieves its 
autonomy at the cost of being overly attached to understanding. Such a close 
attachment begs the question as to how reflective, as opposed to determinate, the 
Kantian judgement of taste can claim to be. 
54 Later in this thesis I construct a biologically grounded theory of beauty that claims that the ground of 
beauty is intimately involved in the activities of theoretical and practical reason. Despite the crucial role 
that I assign to beauty I do not claim that it is wholly autonomous from reason. My reluctance to do so 
stems from the lack of any biological evidence that it is and also from my general position on complete 
autonomy that has been strongly influenced by my reading of Adorno who claims that autonomy must 
include within itself a heteronomous moment if it is to sustain its own meaning. 
55 Bernstein goes on to give an extremely interesting account of the implications of this paradox and of 
attempts to resolve it via arguments that rely on the unification of freedom and nature through beauty. 
He also shows why such arguments ultimately fail. I do not address these arguments here because of 
shortage of space and also because they also lead to a discussion of the sublime in Kantian aesthetics, 
a topic beyond the scope of this chapter. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have examined Kant's claim that the judgement of taste is 
autonomous from understanding and reason and that beauty forms a bridge between 
necessity and freedom, between humanity as phenomenon and noumenon. I believe 
that ultimately Kant fails to sustain that claim, and with it fails to satisfactorily unify his 
critical trilogy. Of much greater concern to me, however, is what I believe to be the 
problematic idea and ideal of beauty that Kant constructs in his attempt to unite his 
critical thought. On the one hand the failure of Kant's deduction for the judgement of 
taste gives rise to the standard objection to Kantian aesthetics: that all objects of 
cognition may be judged to be beautiful. Kant had difficulty in refuting that objection 
in a way that has been acceptable to his critics at the time and ever since. The result 
is that beauty is left, I believe, too proximate to the faculty of cognition and that 
problematises Kant's claim that beauty is autonomous from pure reason. On the 
other hand, Kant does not give a deduction for his claim that beauty is a symbol of 
the moral good that is furnished by the use of practical reason; he claims a deduction 
to be unnecessary. Whatever we may think of that claim, it leaves beauty, in the 
absence of any other specific link (the appeal to the supersensible substrate does 
not provide such a link for the reasons stated previously) to the moral in a very 
tenuous state that is unable to counterbalance its close proximity to cognition. 
My objection to Kant's Analytic of the Beautiful is that its methodology and content 
are always and already pre-conditioned by, and instrumental to, his First and Second 
Critiques. The result is, I suggest, that his investigation in the Critique of Judgement 
can never adequately address beauty as such, beauty free from instrumental 
concerns, to secure and unify the contents of his previous critical work. Of particular 
concern to me is Kant's failure to establish a specific connection between beauty and 
even the Kantian idea of the moral. 56 My reading of Kant, and the identification of 
specific paradoxes within his arguments that relate beauty to theoretical and practical 
reason lead me to the issue of the societal contingencies of ideas of beauty. Such 
contingencies may be drawn from Kant owing to his strong link between beauty and 
freedom that is indispensable to avoid the domination of nature, of necessity, within 
aesthetic discourse and so maintain aesthetics as a discursive practice. 
Be The Kantian idea of the moral is not based on a notion of the good which is either revealed divine 
truth, self-evident, or ubiquitously desired within a social community, but is grounded in a good that 
flows from a transcendentally free subject's exercise of her or his practical reason. As such Kant's 
appeal to moral freedom is ultimately an appeal to reason alone. 
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In the next chapter I propose that our feelings of pleasure and displeasure and 
subsequent judgements of an object as beautiful or otherwise are constituted by two 
entities: the specific empirical sensation by which singular objects are given to us in 
sensation and the neurological particularities of the human mind/brain. In broad 
terms, some of these neurological operations are characteristic of individuals (for 
social, cultural and historical reasons) and some appear to be common to us all. I 
am interested in both aspects and do not believe that they are mutually exclusive or 
reducible. 
To refer pleasure/aversion and beauty to the empirical nature of both external objects 
and our internal minds/brains is equivalent to an abandonment of the supersensible 
substrate for phenomena and humanity and its replacement by a sensible one. One 
part of this substrate is external to us and the other part is internal to us. The former 
is phenomenal and the latter resists subsumption under the concepts of either 
phenomena or noumena because it contains moments of both. 
My project is not to claim that our experience of beauty is empirically determined but 
it is to argue that it is empirically partially constituted both by external objects and the 
operations of our own embodiment. Beauty, I claim, is not the same as individual 
affect through sensation. It is more than that because beauty, unlike sensation, 
requires social agreement, negotiated in our social relations with others, to legitimate 
its claim to universality. The experience and estimation of beauty must be 
communicable to be social and to have any moral moment. 
Perhaps surprisingly, I claim that it is precisely because we have intersubjective 
neurological structures of mind/brain that the communicability and the moral nature of 
beauty is guaranteed as possible for us. Had we not such structures, how could we 
possibly legitimate our assumption that we can communicate, through facial 
expression, gesture, language or art, our feelings to others or form any even vague 
ideas about the feelings of other people? Without such structures how could we, 
alone as individuals, resist the domination of the necessities of nature or the tyranny 
of total freedom? I believe that our ability to empathise, and hence the possibility of 
civilisation, is contingent on our ability to communicate our feelings and to estimate 
the feelings of others and not simply our ability to have feelings. That is why I want 
to develop a narrative of beauty that is based on something shared with others in 
social relations, which is more than a private report on sensation. 
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The ground that I choose to legitimate my narrative of beauty is ultimately an 
empirical one. Yet the conclusion that it must therefore inevitably result in a 
deterministic view of humanity severed from our freedom as noumena, that it must 
deny the contingency of ourselves and our artistic productions on social and cultural 
factors, is, perhaps, a little too quick. In making that claim, I have in mind Simon 
Jarvis's (1998) compelling interpretation57 of the myth of Odysseus and his crew 
successfully avoiding destruction in their passage between the twin rocks of Scylla 
and Charybdis. Odysseus and his companions avoid the lure of the Sirens' song and 
consequently the ultimate domination of nature (their own deaths) by Odysseus 
plugging the ears of his crew and lashing himself to the ship's mast. I take the point 
of this myth to be that freedom (from the determinacy of nature) is only achieved 
through a curtailment of freedom itself; that freedom must, if it is to prevail, 
acknowledge its heteronomous moment to necessity. 
At the end of this chapter, which both reflects on and criticises aspects of Kant's 
critical trilogy, I want to describe the position that I adopt in relation to Kant in the 
second half of this thesis. In the following chapters I re-examine Kantian aesthetics 
from the standpoint of the rapidly developing discourses of neuroscience. In that 
project I want to maintain a place for both Kant's critical methodology and his moral 
values. I do not expect to achieve complete compatibility or commensurability 
between neuroscience and Kant at the philosophical level of his work. Indeed, 
complete compatibility would be undesirable because a significant difference 
between the two paradigms is necessary, in Kantian terms, if both neuroscience and 
Kantian aesthetics are to be able to obtain a critical purchase on the other. For that, 
each discipline must (in Adomo's terms) contain within itself a heteronomous 
moment to the other. This brings me to reflect on the influence on this thesis of my 
reading of Theodor Adorno's work. 
Like Adorno, I have a strong interest in, and admiration for, Kant's critical work. I 
also want to re-inscribe that work in a way that will make it relevant to the culture of 
my contemporary world. Though I share Adomo's ambition for a neo-Kantian 
aesthetic, I adopt, in following chapters, means to achieve it which both differ from 
those that Adorno employed and also echo them. Adorno looked back to the pre- 
57 This account is based on the work of Adorno & Horkheimer, 1997 translation, in "Dialectic of 
Enlightenment" p43-81. Because I prefer the succinct Jarvis interpretation of this Homeric myth, I have 
summarised it here. 
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modern, indeed pre-classical, age of mythos in Hellenic antiquity to find the critical 
tools for his project. He points out, however, that any knowledge of that age is 
mediated by the largely modernist culture (and its historical antecedents) of his time. 
To find my own critical tools, I now look forward to a time when the new discipline of 
neuroscience may provide us with a richer understanding of the relationship between 
mind, brain, body and world. The future of neuroscience is as inaccessible to me as 
the age of mythos in Greece was to Adorno, yet I believe that information and ideas 
about the dynamical operations of the brain, already furnished by neuroscience, 
suffice to make a start on such a project in the rest of this thesis. 
This point marks a transition from modernism to post-modernism in the structure of 
argumentation of this thesis. Yet neuroscience contains within itself a significant 
modernist moment, which I believe, following Adorno, that it must, if it is to sustain its 
own post-modernism. Similarly, in my painting practice, I want to maintain something 
of this dynamical relation in which modernist and post-modernist practices play off 
each other. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
NEUROSCIENCE. EMOTIONS. FEELINGS AND PERCEPTION 
The goal of science is not to open the door to everlasting wisdom, but to set a 
limit on everlasting error. 
(Spoken by the eponymous hero in Galileo, a play by Bertolt Brecht, quoted 
by PS Churchland, 2002, p1) 
This remark may or may not reflect the view of Galileo, but it is, I suggest, consistent 
with the philosophical project of Kant's First Critique, a major ambition of which was 
to limit the epistemological difficulties into which reason, unsupported by experience 
of the world, could lead us. But Kant goes further than that, because his critical 
philosophy rejects the Cartesian dualism that argues for a separation between the 
external material world of objects and an internal material world of ideas that is the 
mind; an idea that presents an insoluble difficulty in explaining how an immaterial 
mind, with no physical properties whatsoever can causally affect a body that has no 
mental properties, and vice versa. Kant argues for one world, the world that we 
experience as we experience it and of which we are a pact, not as immaterial minds, 
but as embodied persons in experience. Kant claims that the world must necessarily 
be capable of appearance to us in experience and that we can describe things, 
including ourselves and others, as appearances only if what we so describe is part of 
the world, that is to say a part of a material world. 
I do not want to imply that Kant's only interest was in a phenomenal, and hence 
causal, world of matter in its experience by material people. In the Second and Third 
Critiques Kant's interest shifts towards people conceived as noumena and to our 
faculty of judgement respectively; both of which ideas are either aporetic or simply 
contradictory to a purely phenomenal view of ourselves. But I do want to make the 
point that in the first part of his mature critical work, at the beginning of the 
epistemological (and hence, in Kantian terms, cognitive) revolution that flowed from 
it, Kant's methodology relied very heavily on his extensive knowledge of the science 
of his day. Kant freely acknowledges that fact, as we saw in the second chapter of 
this thesis, and Greenberg is especially admiring of what he interprets to be Kantian 
self-criticality because it is developed within a scientific methodology. Moreover, as 
we have seen in Chapter Two, the critical aspect of Kantian philosophy can be had 
from a Kant exegesis that is legitimated by his scientific methodology (his Copernican 
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revolution) without the necessity of an appeal to the transcendental Kantian subject 
or the supersensible substrate of humanity and phenomena. I take some 
encouragement, therefore, to venture into the field of contemporary neuroscience, 
and at the same time expect that I can establish a position that remains basically 
compatible and commensurate with Kant's critical methodology. 
By the end of the nineteenth century questions (and answers) about how material 
(extensible) objects are or appear to be, previously the domain of natural philosophy, 
had developed to such an extent that they were no longer considered as an essential 
feature of philosophy but were re-categorised as science. What remained to 
philosophy were questions about what we ought to do: ethics, politics and moral 
philosophy in general - and aesthetics. In recent years there has been a very rapid 
development in the youngest discipline of science, neuroscience, which is sometimes 
at odds with the introspective reflections of philosophers about the nature of mind. 
Philosophers are faced with serious difficulty in providing a theory of mind, not least 
because most mental activity is out of consciousness and so is opaque to their 
introspections. The very idea of mind as immaterial and as somehow separate from 
the material brain is now difficult to sustain. This is why I believe that more progress 
is likely to be made in theories of mind that do not refer to innate and autonomous 
faculties of the individual subject's mind, but which refer to the biological and 
functional operation of the brain and of its relation to other brains. My particular 
interest is in feelings of pleasure in the experience of beauty. Most philosophers 
and neuroscientists agree that feelings, including pleasure, are felt within the subject 
as part of experiencing external objects in the world. The problem is to explain the 
relation between these subjective feelings and the external objects on which they are 
predicated, and this problem is particularly acute if, as some philosophers believe, 
feelings are experienced within an immaterial mind. If, for example, concepts such 
as causality and necessity are held to be features of mind, can these concepts also 
be established as features of the external material world? If they cannot, then a 
problem arises as to how the immaterial mind can have useful and relevant ideas 
about material objects, or indeed about its own supposed feelings. Broadly, 
philosophers tend to believe logical procedures in understanding and reason to be 
the most helpful means of enquiry into such problems, whilst the neuroscientists 
58 At this preliminary stage of my argument, I am using the word "feelings" in a way that does not 
distinguish between emotions and feelings. I distinguish between feelings and emotions later, though, in 
common with most neuroscientists, I do not claim that they are distinct. 
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believe that, in addition to philosophical procedures, a biological explanation of 
feelings such as pleasure is helpful. 
As discussed in the last chapter, Kant conceives beauty as a feeling in the subject 
predicated on an external object. Feelings and their precedent phenomena of 
emotions are of considerable interest to neuroscientists both in themselves and 
because they form an explanatory narrative of the relationship between the internal 
mind embodied as brain and the external world. 
Before discussing the narrative of mind as brain that neuroscience offers, it is 
important to note that contemporary science in general and neuroscience in 
particular does not offer explanatory causal narratives. Rather, it seeks to establish 
correlations between phenomenal events that are temporally distinguishable and is 
very cautious about claims that an antecedent event is either a necessary or 
sufficient cause (or both) of a consequent one; science deals in contingency, not 
certainty, and has done so for most of the last century. The statistical model of the 
universe provided by quantum theory remains the dominant explanatory paradigm for 
all contemporary science and not just for physics. In this chapter and the next I look 
to neuroscience to supplement and mediate the established philosophical theories of 
beauty as feeling. The methodology of neuroscience is fundamentally different from 
that of philosophy in that it deals in correlation and not causality. This chapter, 
therefore, marks a shift away from prepositional arguments and towards pragmatic 
ones. 
This is not to claim that philosophy is unaware of the problems inherent in the notion 
of causality. Spinoza's9 philosophy of mind denies causal, explanatory or 
conceptual relations between (though not within) the mental (in-extensible) and the 
physical (extensible) worlds; instead, he claims that the mental and physical are 
different attributes, broadly, different modalities in Kantian terms, of one substance. 
Importantly, Spinoza claims only that the ensemble or network of our ideas is 
causally isomorphic to the network of things, including the things that make up our 
bodies. The term causally isomorphic implies, I suggest, a correlation between the 
50 Spinoza's Ethics and his Principles of Cartesian Philosophy address the relation between the mental 
and physical attributes. These primary sources, though lucid and elegant, are so very succinct that it is 
difficult to obtain the significance of Spinoza's ideas from them. I have found it useful to refer to Michael 
Della Rocca's (1996) book, Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in Spinoza for a supplementary 
explanation of the import of Spinoza's philosophical Parallelism. 
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forms of the mental and physical worlds rather than a relation between cause and 
effect that is one of logical entailment. 
The body cannot determine the mind to thinking and the mind cannot 
determine the body to motion, to rest or to anything else (if there is anything 
else). (Ethics, proposition 2, scholium 3) 
Spinoza regards the human body as a mode of extension and his theory of 
parallelism requires that there be a parallel in-extensible mode, that is to say an idea 
or thought, for the body. For Spinoza the mind is that parallel idea. 60 As Spinoza 
puts it, 
We have shown (In 2ps) that the idea of the body and the body, i. e. the mind 
and the body, are one and the same individual, which is conceived now under 
the attribute of thought, now under the attribute of extension. 
(2p21 s) 
This makes it clear that, for Spinoza, the mental and physical modes are simply two 
parallel representations of the same substance. The distinction that Spinoza makes 
between mind and body is a descriptive and conceptual one; it is a semantic and not 
an ontological distinction. Spinoza's ideas were obviously developed in the context 
of his response to Descartes, but their importance goes well beyond a refutation of 
the latter's philosophical position; they enjoy an increasing relevance in 
contemporary thought. Deleuze and Guattari (1988, Ch 6) acknowledge their neo- 
Spinozan positioning and, more importantly for my own positioning in this thesis, 
some neuroscientists, most notably Antonio Damasio (2003), regard, their own work 
as neo-Spinozan. 
For Spinoza, the mind, as overall parallel idea of the body, is constituted by a large 
number of less complex ideas. Each of these "simpler" ideas (Della Rocca, 1996, 
p24) is parallel to a certain part of the body or to an event that takes place in the 
body, including what he calls affections (affectio) in the body. Spinoza's parallelism 
between the body and its representation of itself, its mind, is not, therefore, some 
vague isomorphism between the body and mind as a whole but is much more akin to 
a one to one mapping, or correlation, between specific subsets of both modes. 
Spinoza goes on to claim that the human mind contains only ideas that are parallel to 
the affections of the body. It is important to remember that Spinoza only precludes 
so There is some controversy within the critical discourse about Spinoza as to whether he is referring to 
the individual body as the object of the idea that is the mind or of a body in general or body in the plural 
sense of a group of bodies. The problem arises because the original text is in Latin, which does not 
employ, as Della Rocca (p25) points out, definite or indefinite articles. Della Rocca takes the view, which 
I accept, that Spinoza is referring to the mind and body of the same individual person. 
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determination of the mind by the body and the converse; he allows that the two 
modes are capable of influencing each other through affect. 
It is easy to see how Spinozan philosophy appeals to neuroscience; it deals in 
correlation, a statistical and topological concept with which scientists are familiar and 
which avoids the difficulties of causality and necessity that have troubled scientists 
and philosophers alike. 61 Another aspect of Spinozan thought that has particular 
utility for the biological sciences is Spinoza's concept of conatus. This idea is one of 
two sufficient conditions for a collection of bodies (Spinoza uses the term bodies in 
the sense of collective groups of constitutive parts here) to form an individual. The 
details of the argument62are somewhat complex and there is not space to give them 
here. Broadly, Spinoza is claiming that individuals so behave as to maintain over 
time the same proportions of their relative motions and positions of rest to each 
other. The accepted interpretation of this idea is that Spinoza is using the notion of 
an atemporal fixed proportion of motion and rest of their constituent parts as a sort of 
portmanteau term to indicate an object's (and this applies to all objects, animate or 
inanimate, mental or physical) striving to persist, as a coherent whole, over time. In 
the case of animals this conatus is a striving to remain alive and is strikingly similar to 
a crucial biological idea, that of homeostasis that is fundamental to neuroscience and 
is discussed in detail a little later in this chapter. 
I have given a very brief synopsis of some of Spinoza's ideas above, in the context of 
a few remarks about causal necessity, for several reasons. Firstly, I wanted to show 
that there is a very respectable philosophical precedent for regarding the mental and 
physical realms as simply parallel representations of the same thing, the same 
substance. My interest in that is the consequence that neither modality can 
determine the other or, in Spinozan terms, have any concept of itself other than in 
relation to the other. This goes some way to subsuming the idea that there is an 
immaterial mind in control of a material body. Secondly, I want to suggest, following 
Churchland (2002, p55-58) that, 
61 Like Hume, scientists have difficulty in accepting that causality really is any less mysterious than the 
causal connections that it is meant to explain. It has proved extremely difficult to identify the necessity of 
causality other than in terms of a merely tautological reference to necessity as a property that causally 
determines. It is has proved impossible to identify causality and necessity as features of the world as 
well as features of the human mind. Kant certainly established necessity as a feature of the human 
mind but was not, perhaps, quite so successful in establishing causal necessity as anything that was not 
merely subjective. 
02 See Della Rocca, 1996, p30-40 for the detailed development of this idea. 
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A semi-Kantian strategy rooted in evolutionary biology might hypothesise that 
brains have evolved the capacity to infer causality from certain patterns of 
regularity observed in experience. Because of the need to make predictions 
about food sources, predators, and so on, this is a reasonable hypothesis, 
and it can be empirically explored. Partly because it can be empirically 
explored, it is regarded by some philosophers as fundamentally irrelevant to 
the genuinely metaphysical problem (of necessity and causality). 
I want to explore this hypothesis in the context of an explanation of our experience of 
beauty that makes use of the biological knowledge that we now discursively 
construct. Such knowledge has been obtained empirically as well as by 
philosophical enquiry. I do not regard these two disciplines as inherently 
contradictory. As I hope I have demonstrated above in my brief synopsis of Spinoza, 
not all philosophy is based on ideas of necessity and causality. My third point is that 
contemporary science is not based on such ideas either because it deals only with 
the probability of a given event occurring relative to specific conditions. 
Though emotions and feelings are often conflated together in common usage, I find it 
useful to distinguish between them because it facilitates a more productive 
understanding of both. As Damasio (2003, p29) remarks, 
The centrality of feeling obscures the matter of how feelings arise and favours 
the view that somehow feelings occur first and are expressed subsequently in 
emotions. That view is incorrect, and it is to blame, at least in part, for the 
delay in finding a plausible neurobiological account for feelings. 
Damasio goes on to explain that simple emotions precede feelings for two reasons. 
Firstly, emotions evolved in all organisms well before feelings. Even the simplest 
water dwelling life forms such as the amoeba start life equipped with the means to 
solve automatically the basic problems of survival for sufficient time to enable the 
average organism to reproduce itself at least. Such means include finding sources of 
energy, maintaining the chemical balances within the organism compatible with 
sustaining life in the context of the prevailing conditions, and repairing wear and 
injury and the effects of disease. All this is accomplished without any apparent 
creative intelligence or even a brain. The maintenance of the internal condition (the 
internal milieu) of an organism in a state appropriate to its continued survival and 
104 
well-being in relation to changing external conditions is called homeostasis63 and is a 
crucial concept in neuroscientific narratives (Churchland, 2002, p70-75) of emotions 
and feelings. It is useful for the arguments that follow to identify the four basic 
emotions and their correlated biological purpose in sustaining the well-being of 
organisms. These are expressed in terms of action as follows, 
fear: action to avoid a dangerous event taking place in the 
immediate future. 
anger: action to stop an event that is already taking place. 
sadness: action to recover a situation that has been lost. 
happiness: action to maintain the present status quo. 
This list is not a list of autonomous emotional categories and faculties such as Kant 
might construct and neither does it imply that more complex emotions are reducible 
to any one of these basic emotions; it is simply a first approximation that is useful in a 
discussion of emotions. It is relevant to note, at this point, that the oldest, in 
evolutionary terms, part of the brain of all vertebrate animals 64 plays a crucial role in 
the production of emotion and intentional behaviour. Such primary behaviour 
patterns are immediately recognisable by humans in terms of facial expression and 
skeletal posture. A significant degree of more or less correct emotional recognition 
is exhibited within all animal species and, to a lesser degree, even between animal 
species. 
Secondly, the capacity to display more complex emotions, characteristic of higher 
vertebrates, evolved much later and is built upon the simpler emotions of much 
earlier life forms. The evolutionary timetable for the transition from simple emotions 
to complex ones is correlated to the development of an increase in brain size and 
complexity that starts with a swelling of the top of the spinal cord in vertebrates to 
form a primitive brain and leads to the large brains of mammals and the exceptionally 
large and complex cortical brain development in humans. The evolution of emotional 
sophistication is associated not only with increasing brain size and complexity but 
also with the development of complex intellectual procedures, social structures and 
cultures that are characteristic of higher primates and humans. This increase in 
complexity and size of primate brains, particularly the very large and rapid increase in 
63 The biological idea of homeostasis is similar to Spinoza's concept of conatus mentioned earlier. 
84 The brain stem and the immediately surrounding group of brain organs known as the limbic system. 
See Appendix to Chapter Four. 
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size of the frontal lobes of humans, is associated with the complex emotional 
behaviour that is mediated, in humans, by learning, unlearning, sophisticated 
reasoning, long term memory and by social, cultural and artistic experiences over a 
lifetime. At this stage of evolutionary development, when emotions are both 
conscious and significantly mediated by thought, memory and reflection, emotions 
may also trigger feelings. 
Feelings are essentially private because although other people can see the direct 
and involuntary behavioural results of emotional activity: facial expression, flushing or 
skin pallor, pupil size, skeletal posture, gesture and respiratory rate amongst others, 
they cannot see directly the result of our memories, histories, values and thoughts. 
Because feelings are to do with the meanings that we form in our minds, as opposed 
to the intentionality that is directed outwards as action in the world by emotional 
behaviour, Walter Freeman (1999b, p12 and p193-212) refers to the solipsistic 
isolation, hence privacy, of our feelings that we alone experience after both we and 
other people have experienced the behavioural results of our emotions. 
I shall return to a discussion of feelings later, but now want to discuss the immediate 
emotional responses to stimuli (both internal and external to the body) that are 
initiated out of awareness and are always on public display and accessible to more or 
less correct interpretation by other people at a time that is only about 250 
milliseconds after we are aware (conscious) of them ourselves. 
Homeostasis, the maintenance of a constant internal milieu within narrow limits, is 
crucial to the survival of all animals. As Churchland (2002, p71-90) points out, 
human body temperature, for example, must remain within only 50 C of 37° to avoid 
death. Similar tight restraints apply to blood sugar, oxygen, carbon dioxide and a 
huge range of other chemical levels, to blood pressure and pH. The brain constantly 
and automatically monitors all perturbations to the internal milieu that have 
consequences for the health, and thus survival (or, as Spinoza puts it, the 
persistence in time) of the animal. When it detects deviations from the normal 
conditions within the internal milieu it produces a set of neuronal responses that set 
in motion actions by the animal appropriate to restoring it to healthy equilibrium - for 
example a movement towards food, water and warmth or seeking shelter. Some 
details of neuronal function in our bodies will be addressed later. For the time being I 
want to give an overall sketch, at the macro rather than micro level, of how 
homeostasis can be seen as the biological ground of our intentionality and emotions. 
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The process of homeostatic regulation of our internal milieu requires coordinated 
control of our organs, including the heart, lungs, viscera and the secretion and 
suppression of various hormones. Different configurations of these organs are 
required for different actions in the external world as an appropriate response to 
either an internal or external perturbation to the internal milieu, in order to restore it to 
its optimal condition. The animal requires a means of knowing the state of its internal 
milieu at any particular time and also of knowing what that internal state ought to be 
in order to direct its actions (that also require knowledge of the external world) to 
achieve a return to the optimal set points of its internal milieu. The nervous system 
(the brain and the entire configuration of nerves throughout the body) provides this 
means of knowing. In all vertebrates the flow of afferents (broadly the knowledge 
referred to above encoded in neurons as electro-chemical waveforms) both from the 
internal visceral organs and from the external world via the somatic sensory system, 
come together in the brainstem. 
The brainstem, together with specialised organs of the brain immediately adjacent to 
it, generally known as the limbic system, has changed very little over millions of years 
of evolution, and its architectonic structures are broadly similar in all vertebrates, 
including humans. The large and complex development of the human brain has 
evolved, quite literally as well as metaphorically, on top of the limbic system and is far 
from independent of it. Damasio (2000, ch 2) argues that this evolutionary gestalt 
process indicates that the limbic system plays a pivotal role in our self- 
representational capacities as well as its regulation of autonomic functions within the 
body. 
In the above discussion I have referred to the need for the nervous system to know 
certain "qualia"° of the interior and exterior world, in order to organise appropriate 
e5 I have placed qua/ia in inverted commas here to distance myself from the way in which Damasio uses 
the word. For Damasio (2000, p9), qualia are "the simple sensory qualities to found in the blueness of 
the sky... the sound of a cello.. . the 
fundamental components of images [of which perception allegedly 
consists] are thus made up of qualia". 
As Bennett and Hacker (2003) point out, Damasio is shifting the philosophical meaning of qualia away 
from the qualitative characteristics of experience and towards the characteristics of objects of 
experience. Bennett and Hacker (2003, p271-292) contend (and I concur with them) that experiences 
may intelligibly be described as possible subjects of attitudinal predicates; that is to say they may be 
agreeable or disagreeable, wonderful or dreadful etc., that is to say qualia are about the subjects 
affective attitude, and not about the actual subjects of attitudinal predicates. For example, if smelling 
roses and smelling lilac are both described as delightful then it is, so Bennett and Hacker claim, 
obviously false that every distinct experience can be individuated (picked out) by its distinctive 
qualitative character, or quase. Yet it is the qualitative character of the object, be it a rose or a lilac, 
which individuates the experience; the smell of a rose is qualitatively different to that of a lilac, though 
we may delight in both. In using the term qualia it is important to be clear about whether one is referring 
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visceral conditions and motor responses to optimise the state of the body's internal 
milieu. This is not to imply that there is some "immaterial subject within the material 
subject", some ghost within the machine, to which the nervous system presents 
epistemes for evaluation and action directed at both internal and external objects. 
Neither is it to imply that the nervous system is a store of past sensations to which 
incoming sensation is compared in order to evaluate it and act accordingly. 
Freeman (1999b, p10 -11) claims that the brain is an "open system" for sensation. 
By this he means that sensation as such is not stored in the brain but passes through 
it. As it does so it modifies in a subtle way the immensely complex, ever-active wave 
patterns of neuronal activity in the brain. Freeman claims that it is sense input 
qualified by an organism's history, learning and feelings that remains encoded in the 
dynamics of synaptic discharges between neurons at the local and global levels of 
brain activity. That is what Freeman means when he states that the brain retains 
meanings and not sensations. In support of his claim he cites extensive 
experimental evidence that animals exposed to exactly the same stimulus at regular 
intervals display patterns of synaptic activity that are recognisably specific to a 
particular animal and to a particular stimulus, but are always very subtly different to 
the previous patterns observed in response to the same stimulus. He concludes that 
emotional and intellectual mediation of sensation is required for memories stored as 
meaning in the brain. What the brain knows is constituted by the wavelike patterns of 
activity (and inactivity) of many millions of neurons that is immensely complex and 
varied and yet is remarkably stable over long periods of time - though it does exhibit 
very short-term instabilities. Many neuroscientists claim that this neuronal activity is 
the brain's function of knowing. Patterns of neuronal activity will be discussed later, 
but for now, I want to return to the functional operations of the limbic system. 
As already discussed the brain has to respond to both internal and external 
information to maintain the life of the animal. The brain has to organise the afferent 
input received from all the different senses and integrate them into a coherent whole, 
because in order to operate effectively in the world the body must perform as a 
coherent whole. Churchland gives the example of an animal with low blood sugar 
levels. Clearly the animal should be looking for food, as prompted by its nervous 
system, and not fleeing, unless flight is an immediate requisite for survival. 
to the subject's affective attitude or the sensory characteristics of the objects of experience. Perhaps 
the term is best avoided altogether. 
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Additionally, the animal may be thirsty as well as hungry; there may be both 
predators and potential mates nearby. The animal must choose between options 
available to it. It cannot do everything it needs to do at once and some options, such 
as flight or fight, may need to be done very quickly. Animals need to integrate and 
evaluate afferents and prioritise certain actions amongst all possible actions. In short 
animals have to make up their minds about what to do now. 
It follows that neuroscience sees the nervous system as setting in motion the initial 
actions of animals in response to external afferents, broadly, different sensations, by 
making some afferents pleasurable and some not. Enter beauty! Emotions can be 
thought of as making us pay attention to events in the outside world and respond to 
them by taking actions appropriate to optimising the state of our internal milieu, 
optimising the homeostatic conditions of our bodies. (See Damasio 1994, Cytowic 
1996, cited in Churchland 2002, p406 and 427 respectively). Emotions are aptly 
named in the English language because they are about evaluating possible motions, 
possible actions, as a result of immediate experience of pleasure or displeasure. 
Emotions are the ground of goal-directed actions. The end to which this 
purposiveness is directed is the self-preservation of the animal, the good of the 
animal. Because of technical limitations, neuroscience has so far restricted its field 
of study to individual animals and people. However, there is growing interest within 
the discourse in finding neurological explanations for observed social behaviour in 
both animals and humans. The technical problems are formidable but, given the 
level of current interest in such a project, and the lack of in-principle obstacles to it, 
significant progress may reasonably be expected in this field. For that reason I 
believe that neurological studies of emotions and feelings offer the possibility of 
providing a ground for ethical action. 
Since some animals, such as humans, can only achieve optimum homeostasis (such 
as mere survival at one end of the scale up to a secure and pleasurable life-style at 
the other end) through social grouping together, emotions are relevant to the good of 
society; they have a moral function in the wider social sense of the term. The fact that 
our emotions are not private but are public events that form the basis of inter- 
subjective communication that is indispensable to social grouping emphasises their 
potential function as the conditions for the possibility of moral actions. 
What I am suggesting here is that emotion rather than transcendentally free (Kantian) 
reason is the basis of moral action. Moreover, emotional behaviour is, in 
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neurological terms, contingent upon pleasurable or aversive experiences. The 
possibility opens up, therefore, of establishing a direct link between beauty and moral 
behaviour that is legitimated by those aspects of human emotional function that are 
inter-subjective because some of the immediate, non-conscious operations of the 
nervous system are common to us all. This is not to claim that all, or even most, 
human behaviour is determined by biology alone. I shall return to the relation 
between beauty and this "sensible substrate of phenomena and humanity" in more 
detail later in this and following chapters. For now, I want to clarify my position in 
regard to this brain-generated and goal-directed activity by humans and other 
animals which results in emotions and which Freeman (1 999b) calls intentionality. 
As Freeman (1999b, p10 et seq. ) points out, goal directed activity, when performed 
by humans, but not by other animals, is often referred to as volition: the result of will. 
It is widely assumed that only humans have the capacity to will their actions. 
Freeman claims that there is a neurological basis for intentional action by both 
humans and other animals that operates without will. The basis for his claim is that 
humans share with animals what is essentially the same neurological system in and 
immediately around the brain stem that allows all vertebrates to have what he calls 
intentionality. This is the ability to direct action towards a future outcome chosen by 
the animal "in accordance with their own growth and maturation", that is to say, in 
accordance with biological homeostasis. 
Intentionality is not the same as will because it is directed by emotion rather than 
reasoning, is immediate and usually non-conscious. Intentionality does not preclude 
the operations of will subsequently inhibiting or reinforcing the initial intentionality of 
persons. Intentionality is different from motivation, the reasoned explanation of an 
action, and is distinguished from desire, the awareness and experience that follow 
from an intent. 
Damasio (2000, ch2) makes a distinction between emotions, feelings and known 
feelings, thus implying that feeling may be unknown as well as known to us. He 
claims that feelings are inwardly directed towards the mind rather than outwardly 
directed, as are emotions, into the world. Feelings follow upon and are engendered 
by emotions. The notion of unknown (i. e. unconscious) feelings is somewhat 
counter-intuitive. It seems reasonable to assume that if we feel an emotion we must 
know that we are feeling it. Damasio argues that this is not so because the organism 
may represent in neurological and mental patterns a state that we call feeling without 
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being aware of that internal state. He claims that there is a great deal of evidence to 
suggest that we are not always aware of our feelings. Damasio gives, as example, 
the experience of realising that we are happy and knowing that we had been happy 
for some time before we realised A. That is true enough, but I suggest that a more 
general explanation is needed and may be had from the idea of feelings as parallel 
actions of mind to correlate emotional actions of the body. 66 If the emotions that 
accompany immediate intentionality expressed in physical actions are out of 
awareness, there appears to be no reason why their mental representations, 
feelings, should not be so too. 
The third stage of the continuum of these biological processes is the state of feeling 
made conscious. Consciousness of feeling is needed if we are to be influenced by it 
beyond the immediate present and is intimately bound up in the notion of self, as the 
conscious feeling we have of ourselves as a conscious entity that experiences 
feelings and which persists in time. 
At this point it is probably useful to summarise what I mean by the term emotion and 
then to discuss how emotion may be related to consciousness. My summary of 
emotion proper is taken from Damasio (2003a, p53) for the sake of brevity and 
clarity. However, I have reservations about Damasio's definitions of emotions and 
later in this chapter I introduce certain qualifications, even contradictions, taken from 
other authorities. 
1. An emotion proper, such as happiness, sadness, embarrassment, or 
sympathy, is a complex collection of chemical and neural responses forming 
a distinctive pattern. 
2. The responses are produced by the normal brain when it detects an 
emotionally competent stimulus (an ECS), the object or event whose 
Q8 That is to say, following Spinoza, feelings are the idea of the body by which the body represents itself 
to mind. The mind does not need to pay attention to all these feelings the entire time any more than it 
needs to pay attention to all the actions of the body all the time. 
Freeman (1999, p35-40) addresses this issue in terms developed by Thomas Aquinas. Briefly, Aquinas 
held that the body does not absorb stimuli from the world in an indiscriminate way, but changes its own 
form (assimilates itself to) only those stimuli relevant to its intent at a given moment. Thus forms of the 
world are created inside the self by achieving similitude of the self to stimuli that are relevant to present 
intentionality. Crucially, Aquinas's concept of the unitary nature of self implies that (conscious) 
perception (the organisation of sensation and construction of meaning) is a one-way process; it 
proceeds from us into the world. Were the process the other way round, we would be entirely 
overwhelmed by conscious perception of all the stimuli presented to us by the world. Our selective and 
unidirectional perceptual system matches our limited capacities of awareness to the infinite world 
beyond the self. Freeman claims that the body and brain are "open systems' with input and output of 
matter, energy and sensation, but in regard to the conscious organisation of perception and construction 
of meaning, they are closed. 
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presence, actual or in mental recall, triggers the emotion. The responses are 
automatic. 
3. The brain is prepared by evolution to respond to certain ECSs with specific 
repertoires of action. However, the list of ECSs is not confined to those 
prescribed by evolution. It includes others learned in a lifetime of experience. 
4. The immediate result of these responses is a temporary change in the state 
of the body proper, and in the state of the brain structures that map the body 
and support thinking. 
5. The ultimate result of the responses, directly or indirectly, is the placement of 
the organism in circumstances conducive to survival and well-being. 
Although I recognise the general relevance and value of Damasio's conclusions 
listed above, I adopt a narrative that differs significantly in emphasis from his. In the 
rest of this chapter I develop a model of the brain in terms of the dynamics of self- 
organising systems. Damasio's model is, I suggest, that of a passive brain reacting 
to external stimuli, and the logical arguments he deploys broadly adhere to the 
tradition of linear causality. I believe a system dynamic based on recursive and 
reflexive relations to be more useful and my narrative position in the rest of this 
chapter flows from that belief. 
Later in this chapter I describe the positivist-pragmatist model of neuroscience in 
detail. Not only does this model signal a crucial shift from traditional linear and 
circular causality to recursive and reflexive relations between non-discrete (non- 
autonomous) regions of the brain, but it also constructs a nested system of reflexive 
and recursive loops of information transmission. The description of brain activity that 
this model offers subsumes the meaningfulness of the terms causality and autonomy. 
That in turn has profound implications for the Kantian theory of beauty as taste and is 
discussed more fully in the next chapter. 
I prefer to avoid the implied ontological claims that Damasio makes in the five 
definitions quoted above because I believe that it is sufficient for my narrative to 
appeal to the very extensive body of published experimental evidence that merely 
establishes a correlation between emotion and specific brain patterns of electro- 
chemical neuronal activity. By emotion-proper, Damasio means emotions of a 
culturally/socially more mediated nature than the primary emotions of fear, anger, 
and sadness, happiness discussed earlier. Damasio constructs a linear gestalt 
system in which feelings are built upon emotions (that in turn are divided into a 
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hierarchical system of social emotions, primary emotions and background emotions). 
Below the level of emotions lie the strata of drives and motivations, which in turn are 
built upon pain/pleasure responses. At the very bottom of the tree are the 
"homeostatic roots" of the entire system: immune responses, basic reflexes and 
metabolic regulation. Broadly, as one ascends the gestalt, one progresses from 
unconscious to conscious emotion. Many authorities prefer the term awareness to 
that of consciousness because they think it avoids connotations of Freudian theory, 
thus sidestepping arguments about the meaning of the unconscious within the 
Freudian paradigm. For the same reasons I prefer to use awareness too. 
Damasio freely acknowledges that his linear gestalt of emotions is a simplification 
given as a useful introduction to a complex neurological system. His simplified 
approach leads, I suggest, to the idea that emotional activity and its neurological 
correlates can be adequately understood in terms of purely bottom up processing 
that is initiated by sensory input and which consists of a simple linear gestalt model 
of brain activity in which only certain discrete and relatively few highly functionally 
specified regions of the brain are involved. Such a model ignores the endogenous 
nature of intentionality and emotion (Freeman, 1998). Damasio's treatment may 
result in the impression that the role of the subject in respect to intentionality and 
emotion is almost entirely a passive one, initiated by sensation and determined by 
simple linear causal processes between immutable and culturally unmediated areas 
of the brain that are largely autonomous from the activity of the brain taken as a 
whole, that is, autonomous from macro-neuronal brain activity. I do not believe such 
conclusions to be compatible with contemporary neurobiology, for the reasons I shall 
discuss in the next section of this chapter. 
Freeman, in a review paper given at the Department of Molecular and Cell Biology at 
the University of California (Sept 1°A 1998) puts forward a narrative claiming that 
emotion is involved in all intentional behaviour. This paper is wide-ranging in scope, 
philosophically well informed and refers to contemporary neurological theories that 
have resulted, to a significant extent, from the author's own research and that of his 
colleagues. Because of the scope and complexity of Freeman's work I do not 
attempt to summarise it all here but will refer to those aspects of it relevant to my 
arguments as the need arises. At this point, in commenting on Damasio's definition 
(his term) of emotion, I should make it dear that Freeman tends towards the activist- 
pragmatist model of brain function. The distinction between the models of stimulus 
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response determinism and activist-pragmatism is an important one and a 
diagrammatic representation of both is given in Appendix Three. 
The stimulus-response or passivist-cognitivist model 
As may be seen from these diagrams the stimulus-response determinist view (also 
generally referred to in the literature as behaviourist or cognitivist) is a bottom up 
process. It is initiated by sensory stimulation; that is to say by sensation from objects 
outside the nervous system itself, even though such objects may be inside the body 
(visceral organs for example) or at the interface of the body with the world (the skin 
including the specialised retinal sensory receptors). The information provided by 
sensation enters the brain stem and is transmitted upwards via neural pathways 
(successive synaptic transmission from one neuron's axon (output channel) to 
another neuron's dendrites (input channels) - see Appendix Three for a brief 
discussion of neurons) to the thalamus. This flow passes through the hippocampus 
on its way to the thalamus. The hippocampus plays an important role in the ordering 
the information flow in spatio-temporal terms. The function of the thalamus is to sort 
the information for transmission to areas that are functionally specific within each of 
the primary sensory cortices: the visual, auditory, somatic, etc cortices. An important 
feature of the thalamus is to order the incoming information from the sensory 
receptors in terms of priority for attention and subsequent action or inaction. Each of 
the relay nuclei within the thalamus tries to suppress the activity of its neighbours so 
that the nucleus most strongly excited is sure to fire its synapse and transmit its 
information onwards. The purpose of this competitive selection is to ensure that the 
organism's attention is focused onto what matters most in the short term. This 
winner takes all strategy is thought to have evolved as a survival mechanism. 
The primary cortices have receptor neurons that synthesise the incoming information 
from the thalamus so as to form what are called "features", the primitive elements of 
sensation such as lines, colours and tones. Situated adjacent to the primary cortices 
are association areas which form representations of objects that are forwarded to the 
frontal lobes which in turn assemble the representations of objects into concepts and 
attach meaning and values to them. 
This stimulus-response model is broadly similar to Kant's explanation of the way we 
relate to objects in the world. The subject receives sensory input from the world, in 
Kantian terms empirical intuitions. This input is spatio-temporally encoded by the 
operations of the hippocampus and thalamus; in Kantian terms, it is ordered by the 
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pure a priori intuitions of space and time. Representations are sent to the frontal 
lobes, where concepts are formed and meanings and values attached. The Kantian 
equivalent of this last stage is the operation of pure reason and practical reason that 
are, broadly, equivalent to understanding and moral evaluation. 
The organisation of action output that is the motor system is very similar to the 
simplified account given above of the input process of perception, but in reverse. 
Motor output begins in the frontal lobes (where perception has just occurred) and 
proceeds downwards directly to the brain stem and indirectly via the amygdala. The 
frontal lobes are the site of rational selection and organisation of motor activity in 
respect to the perception of objects that have resulted from the synthetic processing 
of sensory input. The function of the amygdala, in this model, is interesting; the 
amygdala is an organ lying symmetrically on either side of neural pathways that 
conduct the flow of motor commands to the brain stem and thence, via the spinal 
cord, to muscles that move the body. The output from these amygdalic side 
channels rejoins the main channel and mingles with the neural synaptic discharges 
that are flowing down it. 
The output from the side channel that contains the amygdala is thought to 
emotionally qualify the main output channel; it "colours" the (rational) command 
signals with "emotional dye". There is a very considerable body of evidence to 
support this view from the late 1930's to the late 1970's. Much of that evidence 
resulted from clinical surgical practice on patients with dysfunctional amygdalae or 
behaviour patterns, or both. Such evidence is not without its problems, as I shall 
discuss later. More recently, however, experiments with improved imaging 
technology67 have supported the view that the amygdala is involved in all expression 
and experience of emotions. However, most of these studies are of fear responses, 
and I wonder if it is entirely valid to generalise the conclusions to other emotions. 
LeDoux (1996) has similar reservations; he points out that specific emotions have 
developed over long periods of time for very different purposes and claims that it is a 
crude assumption to talk about all the different emotions as one package. 
Freeman (1998) points out that the path of argumentation in the above stimulus- 
response determinism model is one of linear causality and that is a very problematic 
aspect of the theory, as I shall discuss shortly. This model is based on simple 
67 Particularly the development of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), which is capable of 
very high spatial resolution of active areas within the brain. 
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mechanical ideas despite its apparent complexity. It is not unlike understanding how 
a car moves through space and time; the fuel is metered into the engine, the 
sparking plugs fire, the pistons go up and down - and eventually the wheels go 
round. It is certainly true that if the crankshaft is removed the car will not move, but 
that does not legitimate the claim that the crankshaft causes the cars motion, only 
that it is indispensable to a normally functioning car. Similarly, clinical observation of 
behaviour patterns in higher primates that have, for various reasons, severely 
damaged regions of the brain, does not prove that the regions in question are the 
causal origin of the normal behaviour patterns that are missing in the damaged 
subjects. 
Freeman's specific objections to the above model are that it cannot account for 
expectant or anticipatory action for which no sensory stimulus is yet present, and it 
underplays the role of the amygdala that, as he claims, is known to be involved in, or 
even indispensable to, the formation of explicit memories, the colouring of motor 
responses with emotions, and movement of the body in relation to spatio-temporal 
abilities such as planning a path from where we are to where we want to go. More 
generally, and more philosophically, Freeman's objection is to what he sees as the 
Platonic stance of this model. As he writes in his paper Emotion is Essential to All 
Intentional Behaviours referred to above, 
Representations of objects and events are stored in memory banks as ideal 
forms, each having attached to it a label as to its value for the organism, and 
they are used to classify new (sensory) inputs by retrieval, cross correlation, 
template matching, error reduction... and assignment of value by passage 
through the emotional generators of the brain in the basal ganglia and brain 
stem. Questions of how the brain can a priori create its own goals and then 
find the appropriate search images in its memory bank are not well handled. 
The loss of the Cartesian pilot has left a large gap in the theory, because no 
one wants a homunculus, but cognitivists have no replacement. 
I agree, in general terms, with Freeman's synopsis of the stimuli-response 
determinist (i. e. cognitivist) model apart from the reservation that I have concerning 
his use of the term a priori. To use that term is to run the risk of collapsing into 
something like the Cartesian dualist dichotomy between the inner and outer worlds 
that he is in the process of criticising. Moreover, its use implies that the alternative 
model, the activist-pragmatist model or seif-organising brain model is premised upon 
a priori reasoning. I do not believe that such an implication is helpful because the 
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activist-pragmatist model does not proceed linearly from an a priori origin. Instead it 
is couched within the recursive and reflexive terms of non-linear dynamics. Such 
systems involve nested loops of reflexive relations within which it is meaningless to 
identify one element as the causal origin. Within such systems, which encompass 
both the internal and external world, the distinction between reasoning that is a priori 
or a posteriori, together with the Kantian necessity that adheres to a priori (including, 
I believe the synthetic as well as the analytic a priori) is largely subsumed. 
The activist-pragmatist (self-organising system theory) model 
A schematic diagram showing how perception occurs in mammalian brains in general 
within the terms of this model is shown in Appendix Three. It begins in the limbic 
system within the medial temporal lobe situated at the top of the brain stem. The 
limbic system sends signals to the brain stem to increase the inflow of sensation, to 
increase sensory receptor activity to a high level. At the same time signals are sent 
from the brain stem to the primary sensory cortices (that are dedicated to specific 
functions such as vision) to alert them to the hugely increased input of sensation that 
will occur some 100-300 milliseconds later. 
Similar signals are sent to the body's musculature to alter its posture to the most 
favourable position to receive the anticipated sensation and to prepare for anticipated 
action. The incoming sensation is sent to primary sensory cortices and thence to 
the entorhinal cortex, which lies immediately above the limbic system and contains 
the hippocampus. From the hippocampus the now spatio-temporally integrated and 
sorted sensation goes to the limbic system; we are now back where we started our 
narrative of the process of perception. 
The process now repeats itself but with a crucially important difference. On the 
second trip round the perceptive loop the entorhinal cortex is not only receiving new 
sensory information via the sensory receptors but is now also receiving the 
08 Except for olfactory sensation, which feeds directly into the entorhinal cortex. The olfactory system is, 
in evolutionary terms, the oldest of the senses. 
The other primary sensory cortices are built (quite 
literally) on and around it; their operation is more complex but their architecture is nevertheless evidently 
a development from the olfactory model. 
eo The area in question involves not only the entorhinal cortex but also parts of the surrounding 
neocortex and I refer to both of these areas in using the words entorhinal cortex. The term entorhinal 
originally designated the area of the brain that processes the sense of smell and this is rather confusing 
because the entorhinal cortex and neocortex are now thought to have a much wider role in coordinating 
all of the senses and, in exchanging information with the hippocampus, to play a crucial role in ordering 
phenomena in spatio-temporal terms. 
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processed/integrated signals from all the primary sensory areas in the cerebral 
cortex. This is because the entorhinal cortex sent all the initial information received, 
after processing in spatio-temporal terms by the hippocampus, to all areas of the 
cerebral cortex which then processed it according to their specific functional activity 
and are now in a position to return it in mediated and integrated form to the main 
organising structure of the brain which is the limbic system in the entorhinal cortex. 
A remarkable feature of the entorhinal cortex is that it does not send all this newly 
refined, mediated and integrated information downwards to the muscles, viscera, 
sensory receptors etc.; only about ten per cent of its output signal is directed 
outwards from the brain and around the external loop that includes both the self and 
the world. The other ninety percent is for internal circulation around the cortex, either 
directly or through the thalamus. Freeman claims that these internal loops between 
large interconnected populations of neurons that we identify as having specific 
functions within the brain are the basis for learning, memory, reason, culture history, 
... for all the unique quale of emotion in each of us, which 
is our inner 
experience of impending action. 
(Freeman 1998, p11) 
In a very real sense, I suggest, the activist-pragmatist model of the brain constructs a 
dynamic and largely self-organising system in which the detailed interaction and 
persistence over time of many thousands of related reflexive loops constitute an 
ensemble of (internal) qualia; and it is the unique nature and relationship between 
these qualia, persisting yet always subtly changing as a result of new experience, 
that we habitually refer to as the self. 
The positivist-pragmatist model is a move away from Kant's static formulation, based 
on the operations of autonomous faculties of mind. This shift is towards an action 
dynamic where all areas of the brain are involved in very rapid reflexive operations 
with each other that are repeated, in constantly changing ways, many times each 
second. The result is that the autonomous Kantian faculties seep into each other, 
mediate and are mediated by each other, and can no longer be meaningfully 
regarded as autonomous. This theoretical change is crucially important to a new 
understanding of beauty and ethics based on emotional responses. 
In the above brief summary of the activist-pragmatist model of the mind/brain I have 
given an extremely simplified summary of the central core of the perceptive loop only. 
Many of the details of the loop have been lumped together in an attempt to avoid an 
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overly technical description. There is a very real difficulty in describing systems that 
involve reflexive feedback loops, not least because most of us are accustomed to 
thinking in linear causal terms from origin to the end of the chain of argument. In 
reflexive and dynamic systems that are not initiated by some external cause there is 
no origin, end, or causality, as we commonly understand it. 
In the last quarter of the 20th century a new way of conceptualising the non-linear 
dynamics of self-organising systems emerged. Indispensable to that development 
was the hugely increased power and speed of very large computers. Anyone with a 
mathematical background will appreciate the analogy between the process of the 
(simplified) feedback loop of perception described above and the iterative solution of 
equations for which no analytic solution can be found. They will also recollect the 
extreme labour and tedium of solving even simple non-linear equations soluble by 
non-analytic means only. People are very bad at performing tasks which start with a 
best guess approximate solution which is fed into an equation and produces an 
approximate solution which, in turn, is fed back in again; and so on many hundreds 
or even thousands of times. They cannot maintain concentration or recollect the 
individual steps of such a process. Computers, in contrast, are very good at this sort 
of work and can now perform it thousands of millions of times faster than people. 
The results of such endeavours are sometimes in marked contrast to the tedium of 
the process; they are extremely interesting and complex mappings and images such 
as the fractal diagrams that have passed into popular culture. These diagrams are 
visual exemplars of chaos theory and non-linear system dynamics applied to self- 
organising chaotic systems. The brain is one such system and contemporary 
neuroscience applies such techniques to its understanding. Freeman (1992) claims 
that, 
The theory of chaos and non-linear dynamics, when applied to the functions 
of brains, can answer the fundamental mystery faced by the concept of intent, 
by showing how goals, their attendant values, and the creative actions by 
which they are pursued can arise in brains. Every intentional act is preceded 
by the formation of its character prior to its execution. And if perception is 
active, then things that are perceived in the body and in the world must in an 
important sense pre-exist in the sensory cortices as the predicted 
consequences of the act of searching. 
I am not clear why Freeman qualifies the last sentence in terms of searching. 
Presumably he is referring to situations in which the object in the world or body that 
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the brain wishes to have some relation to is not actually present to the senses; that is 
to say Freeman is using the word searching in the sense of anticipation, need or 
desire for, or expectancy. This passage from Freeman, taken together with the 
activist-pragmatic view of perception outlined above, has obvious resonances with 
the pioneering work of Merleau-Ponty (1962), in particular to his outward "arc of 
intentionality" into the world. Freeman's position within the activist-pragmatist 
paradigm of neuroscience is that perception is a form of intentional action and not a 
(passive) late stage of sensation. That brings him close to Merleau-Ponty (as he 
acknowledges) and distances his work from that of the stimulus-response determinist 
tradition. 
My own positioning is closely aligned to that of Freeman. At the same time I do not 
deny the value of the relatively simple linear logic employed in the passivist tradition, 
regarding the latter as a special case or as a reductionist approximation to the 
reflexive activist-pragmatist view; sometimes it is useful to look at a very complex 
dynamical process in small parts by considering only a segment of the closed 
reflexive loop. Additionally, I do not believe it is at all helpful to assign to either 
sensation or perception any position of hierarchical primacy in the operation of 
mind/brain. I accept that perception is an endogenous action, one that wells up from 
within us and is directed outwards into the world. Yet I also believe that in order to 
initiate an intentional act the brain must contain within itself some structure or 
dynamical operation that is to do with the external world; it must, to a degree at least, 
be formally related, even isomorphic, to the world of which it constructs perceptions. 
It is difficult to see how the brain can, at a particular moment, project itself into the 
world without some encoded prior knowledge of that world; and such knowledge 
must have involved a past processing of sensation from the world. That encoding of 
worldly knowledge may not have arisen from the prior experience of the organism; it 
may be socially learned or genetically encoded, but genetic encoding is, in 
evolutionary terms, a heritage from ancestors that adapted to changing sensation 
from a changing external world, and survived as a result of felicitous but entirely 
random genetic mutations. It is implicit in Darwinian evolution that such changes 
were random and not the result of intentional acts such as perception, either by a 
"witting artificer" or the organism itself. 
The question as to whether response to sensation or intentional action is the origin of 
our relation to the world (which includes our feelings of pleasure towards objects in 
the world) is, I suggest, not a very useful one. Perception as an endogenous activity 
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does not randomly well up from an inactive brain that is momentarily inattentive to all 
sensation. All the brain is always active and always receiving sensation from the 
external world as well as somatic sensation. A non-active neural pathway is a dead 
one and is quickly scavenged and replaced in a healthy brain. Though synaptic 
discharges between neurons may fall to a very low intensity and the frequency of 
their occurrence may diminish, the brain is never completely quiescent during the 
entire lifetime of the organism. There is always a background activity that involves 
both sensation and perception together in relational activity with each other. 
Perception does not suddenly pop up from a silent brain situation. It is no more 
useful to ask if perception is a response to sensation or vice versa than to enquire if 
the weather in New Cross is a response to the weather in Tunbridge Wells or the 
converse; or to enquire which town started the weather in the first place. The 
weather is a self-organising dynamical system, always both changing and persisting, 
which cannot be understood other than in reflexive and relational terms. In these 
respects the brain is very similar. 
In the process of writing about how emotional behaviours, that is to say intentional 
actions of which we may or may not be aware, arise as a result of neurological action 
in our self-organising brains, I have begun to ask questions of a different type. I have 
become less interested in questions such as "which bit of the brain does what? " and 
"does A cause B or B cause A? " and more interested in the question "what is the 
relation of the organisational dynamics within our brain to the dynamics of the world 
outside us? " In thinking about emotions, I am thinking about how we act into the 
world in space and time, but I am also thinking about how that world projects itself 
into us, how it both sustains and constrains us. It seems to me that once again I am 
becoming preoccupied with the insistent paradox that characterises this thesis from 
its beginnings: the insistent Kantian paradox of the conflict between freedom and 
necessity. Unsurprisingly, I have not been able to resolve the paradox, yet in 
returning to it, in different forms, again and again, I have come to believe that there 
must be something in common between us and the world that exceeds the statement 
that we and the world are both made of the same stuff: star-dust. That is both a very 
romantic, poetic idea and good physics. But it does not offer much explanation of the 
relation between the world and us. 
In the pauses between writing passages of this chapter I have imagined the scene of 
couples on a dance floor. A big crowd is having a lot of fun dancing a tango with 
great enthusiasm. This image has often recurred in periods of casual reflection and, 
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until now, I have pushed the image away and got on with writing about neuroscience. 
However, from my experience as a painter I know that the strategy of pushing away 
the visualisation of a new sort of image for a painting only works in the short term; 
eventually I just have to make that painting, whether it seems relevant to my practice 
or not, before I can move on. 
Each couple launch themselves onto the dance floor as we perceptually launch 
ourselves into the world of sensation. Once on the floor the couples accommodate 
themselves to each other, to the other dancers, and to the music. Within seconds 
each couple is in harmony with each other, with the other couples and with the 
music; a self-organising structure, a society, a coherent spatio-temporal dynamic 
forms very quickly, and no one is in charge of this dance. The dance has its rules, 
there is a given tempo to the music, there are constraints on the dancers in terms of 
the steps they may perform and yet there is a great feeling of freedom too. The 
process is pleasurable for the participants and the onlookers; more precisely 
perhaps, the experience is one of joy. How does this all come about? Before the 
dance may come desire and after it contentment, but I suggest that the dance itself is 
not quite either of these, it is joy felt in relational action. The musicians, dancers and 
onlookers come together in the action of their response to the rhythm of the music. 
The dancers know that what they do is beautiful, not because of the perfection of 
their technique or that of the musicians but because the relational activity, the 
dynamic between them that they jointly perform, is itself beautiful. 
I visualise the activity within our minds/brains, the interaction between our individual 
bodies and embodied minds and those of other people, and between the world and 
us, as being broadly isomorphic. That is to say I suggest that there is a great deal in 
common between the "music" of the dynamical actions of our brains and the "music" 
of the dynamics of the external world; and that it is this commonality of rhythm that 
enables us to dance in, and with, the world. Underlying all this activity is the 
motivating feeling of joy in participating in this relational process. 
suggest that the dynamical relations of intra-brain activity, inter-brain activity and the 
dynamics of the physical world must have much in common in terms of their self- 
organising structures and the relationships within and between these structures. This 
commonality is based in the fact that all three are largely self-organising dynamical 
structures that appear to operate on principles of reflexive and recursive relations, 
subject to certain restraints. In such systems the notion of autonomous entities lacks 
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relevance; what matters is the dynamics of the relations between entities, and these 
dynamics are not reducible to bottom up or top down processes but are a time 
persistent ensemble of circular relations of great complexity and richness of 
meanings. I believe that this ensemble of different brain dynamics, of different 
"dance tunes' with different beats and in major or minor keys constitutes our 
memories and meanings, our culture and our history, both at the individual and social 
levels. It is apparent in such systems that they are much more than an aggregate of 
discrete closed reflexive circular loops; loops often overlap in the sense that they 
share parts of their circuits with their immediate neighbours, thus insuring that the 
signals in one loop seep into the signals of another. In any local grouping of neurons 
that we lump together to categorise as an organ, none of constituents are truly 
autonomous but are interdependent parts of a community, which co-constructs its 
functional operations. 
Concepts such as autonomy, discrete identity, necessity and linear causality appear 
to have much to do with a modernist moment in western culture and little to do with 
how brains work. This is not to suggest that the discursive practices of neuroscience 
are ideologically free from modernist influence. But it is to claim that their 
methodologies favour a post-modernist interpretation of how the brain works as a 
dynamical reflexive system. The view that science is inherently driven by modernist 
thinking was clearly appropriate in Kant's time and, to a lesser extent, in Greenberg's 
too. That view is no longer appropriate for a discipline that enthusiastically 
encompasses reflexivity and relation, ipseity and alterity. 
In addition to these local regions the brain also functions as a whole in the sense that 
different global brain states regularly occur in which every part is involved. The 
signals of these global states operate at different frequency to the ongoing local 
activity and persist for only quite short periods of time. This macro activity usually 
lasts for a small fraction of a second only before changing to another global state. 
This unstable activity has an important role in limiting the duration of feelings of 
pleasure and displeasure. Its implications are discussed in the next chapter. 
Returning now to the details of the role of emotion in the brain, it is reasonable to ask 
how it is that emotion, if it is generated in the limbic system as described in the 
positivist-pragmatic account given above, does not simply increase, run out of control 
and completely dominate our lives. Similarly, if emotion occurs in the amygdaloid 
nucleus (a small part of the limbic system), as claimed by the passivist stimulus- 
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response (cognitivist) theory, why does it not burgeon out of control too? The 
problem is, I suggest, particularly acute for the stimulus-response/cognitivist theory 
because of its winner takes all view of the operation of the thalamus in emotional 
initiation. The positivist-pragmatic model offers an explanation at both the local and 
global levels of how the brain is able to ensure that a specific emotion once initiated 
does not increase and persist indefinitely. 
At the local level the explanation is primarily in terms of the space-time loop, which is 
at the core of the multitude of nested interconnecting loops of reflexive relation 
discussed above. The space-time loop represents the interaction between the 
hippocampus and the entorhinal cortex that lies immediately above it. Wilson & 
McNaughton (1993) have provided experimental evidence that the hippocampus is 
deeply involved in spatio-temporal behaviour. Both cognitivists and pragmatists 
accept that view, but the former believe that the hippocampus maintains a sort of 
cognitive spatio-temporal map and short term memory, whereas the latter believe 
that there is no map, no collection of facts or templates arranged sequentially in the 
hippocampus. Pragmatists believe that the neurons in the hippocampus maintain an 
ongoing field of synaptic discharges that are constantly modified by new spatio- 
temporal experience. They also claim that the field of synaptic activity is always 
changing as a result of its reflexive interactions with many other areas of the brain. 
That is to say that the pragmatist model is of a dynamic operator and not a static set 
of spatio-temporal memories. 
An extremely important aspect of the behaviour of this dynamical operator is that it is 
inherently unstable over time. That is not to claim that the hippocampus or any the 
areas of brain that it interacts with are unstable; the relational field constituted by the 
signals between them is the locus of instability. Neither is it to claim that the 
instability is simply random, that any and all sorts of signal activity may arise. 
Freeman (1995) has provided EEG evidence that the locus of these instabilities lies 
within the core of the limbic system and that the instabilities are chaotic; that is to say 
they may be predicted according to the logic of chaos theory rather than random 
chance. Quite specific wave patterns recur in time and are limited in number. The 
dynamical interactions of the limbic system have preferred patterns of activity that are 
referred to as states. In a sense the limbic system has behavioural habits. As 
Freeman (1998 p9) writes, 
In the language of dynamics the populations controlling the space-time loop 
constnuct and maintain an array of "aitractors" What this means is that the 
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limbic system has preferred patterns of activity. ... Each pattern is governed 
by an "attractor" with a "basin" of attraction, called that in analogy to a ball 
rolling to the bottom of the bowl to which it is "attracted" The basin is defined 
by the full range of conditions of the brain in which a pattern emerges. A 
collection of patterns is governed by an " attractor landscape'; in analogy to a 
set of bowls, such that the limbic system can only be in one at a time, but it 
can jump from one bowl to another, hence from one attractor to another. 
Each jump is the occasion of an instability. That is, the brain is continually 
changing its state, because it is volatile and unstable". 
A change of state within the limbic system is called a state transition and occurs 
between three and seven times a second. The state of a brain is a description of 
what it is doing in some specified time period (Freeman p143-172,1999a). 
Interestingly, this frequency range is close to that of successive frames in a celluloid 
movie; it seems to be about the minimum frequency for humans to experience a 
sequence of discrete spatio-temporal representations as a continuous, seamless 
visual event. Moreover, this is a characteristic frequency of the EEG output from the 
hippocampus; this reinforces the view that the space-time loop (between the 
entorhinal cortex and the hippocampus) is crucial to the chaotic instabilities of limbic 
patterns that govern the flow of intentional action/emotion (see Appendix Three for 
schematic diagram of the dynamic architecture of the limbic system). 
At this stage it is worth noting that stability in self-organising dynamical systems is 
relative to the time period of observation. Over a long period brains appear broadly 
stable; the concept of an enduring self, though arguably problematic, is ubiquitous. 
Over short periods of time, fractions of a second, brains appear very unstable. 
Paradoxically this short-term instability is needed to alter intentional action/emotional 
states thus allowing the possibility of there being a long term for us. The dynamical 
operations of the limbic system have been simplified in the above description to show 
its basic features. So far, I have only discussed, in simplified form, the operations of 
the limbic system, which is a localised area of the brain lying immediately above the 
brain stem. The operations of the system are crucial for the emergence of intentional 
behaviour patterns that are always spatio-temporal, for the perception-action cycle 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962) in which action and perception are concomitantly continuous 
outcomes and preconditions for each other. The components of the limbic system 
provide the neural basis, at the microscopic level, for all brain activity. However, 
there is more to brain activity than the limbic system; there is in addition a 
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macroscopic dynamic behaviour pattern that plays a very important role, particularly 
in higher primates and humans: the neurohumoral system. 
At the very top of the spinal cord, at the beginning of the bulb that is the brain stem, 
is an assembly of very specialised neurons called neuromodulators that occur in 
pairs and are embedded at the core of the brainstem. Their function is to secrete 
complex chemicals, which then rapidly permeate all areas of the brain. This system 
is found in all vertebrates. In humans about thirty different neuromodulator chemicals 
have already been identified and correlated with specific operational functions. 
Neuromodulators behave very differently to neurotransmitters; the latter operate at a 
very local level through exciting or inhibiting the intensity of the synaptic firings 
between neurons that are neighbours or near-neighbours. Neuromodulators, on the 
other hand, do not typically excite or inhibit local synaptic neuron connections; 
instead they enhance or diminish the effectiveness of synaptic pathways. They 
modulate the influence of the information transmitted around all the reflexive loops of 
the brain. 
These paired brain stem neuromodulators receive their input from all parts of the 
brain but especially important is the input that they receive from the limbic system 
during the formation of intentional action; that is to say, they receive, as it emerges, 
primary emotional input from the limbic system. The output from the 
neuromodulators' axons is very widely branched out through the neuropil. 70 Their 
secretions act on both cerebral hemispheres ensuring that their effect is global rather 
than local. Freeman (p145,1999b) claims that, 
This functional architecture is a major determinant of the unity of 
intentionality, because the entire forebrain is simultaneously affected by the 
action of each pair of (neuromodulator) nuclei. 
In this passage, Freeman shows the importance of neuro-modulation for the macro 
activity of the frontal lobes (forebrain). Broadly, the frontal lobes elaborate and enrich 
70 The neuropil is the substrate, the grey matter, throughout the brain in which neurons are embedded 
and grow. The last syllable of the word is derived, according to Freeman (p65,1999b) from the Greek 
for "felt"; thus referring to feelings. For me, however, the word felt has immediate connotations with the 
work of Joseph Beuys; it brings to mind his preoccupation with felt as textile: a word Itself derived from 
the Latin for a spider's web. 
These associations lead me to imagine the neuropil as a porous web that encompasses the whole brain. 
The neuropil may therefore be imagined as a grey felt in which all the neurons in the brain are 
embedded. The neuromodulators saturate this felt with a particular chemical. From time to time, the felt 
is wrung out and re-saturated with a different chemical, In a real sense the chemically saturated 
neuropil provides an emotional context in which the higher brain operates. 
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the predictions of the possible outcomes that may be expected to arise from 
intentional actions that emerge in the limbic system. They play an important role in 
perception. More particularly they play a very important role in a segment of the 
perceptual cycle known as preaffference, which is the order parameter, " (broadly, 
the restraint on the patterns of neuron firings), that shapes the attractor landscape 
discussed earlier, in such a way as to facilitate the maximum capture of sensation 
relevant to the expected outcome, relative to what the brain is attending to at any 
particular moment. 
The link between brain stem neuromodulators and the forebrain frontal lobes is 
significant for this thesis. A brief outline of the function of the frontal lobes is 
appropriate to explain why that is so. Most animals have a very small forebrain or 
none at all. Compared to even the higher primates, humans have an enormous 
forebrain, which is almost as large again as the entire brain of higher primates. The 
human forebrain affords us an excess of operational functions over the basic 
autonomic and goal-directed intentionality provided by the limbic and cortical 
elements of the evolutionarily older brain, which we have in common with primate 
animals. The frontal lobes of humans are not simply bolt-on additions like extra 
gigabytes of memory for a computer that allow us to do more of the same faster. 
They are qualitatively distinct in their operational dynamics and because they are 
involved in reflexive interdependency with our limbic system and the rest of our 
primitive brain these elements have developed to be significantly different from the 
corresponding elements of primate brains; the evolution of our very large frontal 
lobes has, to a degree, changed the entire system. 
71 See Freeman (1999b, p114-115). The notion of order parameter is important in understanding the 
distinction between noise and chaos in the firing patterns of neurons. Looked at on theme level the 
individual neurons in all areas of the brain (not just the brain bulb neuromodulators that we are 
considering here) appear to behave autonomously and to fire randomly, lacking any spatio-temporal 
pattern, such as a wave form, in their synaptic output. The output of a single neuron does not appear to 
be synchronised in any way with its immediate neighbours; it appears to behave autonomously. But 
when a large assembly of neurons is examined mesoscogically or macroscopically (by an EEG or MEG 
scan for example) it is apparent that interaction of large numbers of neurons together has biased the 
background noise towards an oscillatory signal; the uncorrelated action potentials of individual neurons, 
in their group interactions has made this oscillatory bias possible; noise has become chaos and chaos 
has a formal oscillatory structure that persists for a short period of time all over the brain. It is the 
constraint that the individually autonomous neurons exert on each other in the group that produces the 
order parameter that limits their autonomy as an ensemble. This limiting of autonomy is what physicists 
refer to as a reduction of the number of degrees of freedom in a system that involves coupled particle- 
particle interactions. An important difference between random noise and chaos is, as Freeman points 
out, that random noise activity at the micro level persists in time, whereas chaotic activity at the meso or 
macro level, because it is a constraint, can be switched on or off like a light switch. The order parameter 
is thus important in understanding the establishment and curtailment of meso and macro activity that is 
ordered, albeit chaotically, throughout the brain yet is carried by random autonomous activity of the 
individual neurons. 
127 
Neuroscientists broadly distinguish between the functions of the parts of the frontal 
lobes in the human brain as follows. The dorsal and lateral areas are involved in 
cognitive functions such as logic, reasoning, and prediction, and the medial and 
ventral areas are involved with social skills and the capacity for empathy. Freeman 
(1999b, p143) summarises these contributions as foresight and insight. The 
distinction between the functional specificities of the local domains (or patches in the 
jargon) in the fore-brain is only approximate because many such areas in all parts of 
the brain are always interdependently involved in the processes of reasoning, 
memory, moral evaluation etc. that collectively constitute both our personal and 
social history and culture. The broad distinction outlined above is useful, however, 
because neuroscientists often talk about dorsal or ventral "flows" to indicate the 
broad category of brain function to which they refer. It is important, nevertheless, to 
bear in mind that these local domains or patches though distinguishable are not 
distinct; none of them is wholly autonomous. Both dorsal and ventral processing is 
involved in complex human behaviour such as constructing meaning, learning and 
un-learning, the notion of self and consciousness. Freeman suggests that such 
sophisticated mental activities in humans are possible only through "global" co- 
operation that is mediated by the many patches that interact together via amplitude 
modulated transmission patterns at a frequency of around 40 Hertz; there is a very 
large body of experimental evidence that such wave patterns correlate to the 
sophisticated observed behaviours outlined above. This global activity occurs within 
and between both hemispheres and many authorities have proposed that this macro- 
level activity in the brain underlies the unity of perception and action and therefore is 
crucially involved in the concept of self. Freeman (p148,1999b) writes that, 
I propose that every neuron and every patch (throughout the entire brain) 
participates in every experience and behaviour, even if its contribution is to 
silence its pulse train or to stay dark in a brain image. What is important is the 
small fraction of semi-autonomous activity in every part that is co-ordinated, 
not the small fraction of neurons or patches that is more active than the other. 
I agree with this proposition. In any signal or logic circuit an off switch is every bit as 
important as an on switch. Also, I am happy that Freeman privileges the importance 
of a small fraction of semi-autonomous activity of all the parts of the brain over the 
winner takes all aspect of the stimulus-response/cognitivist theory, with what I see as 
its overly deterministic connotations. The emphasis on the semi-autonomous implies 
a recognition of the importance of a heteronomous moment that is involved in all 
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brain activity, without which any description is in danger of collapsing back into a 
modernist narrative about (Kantian) autonomous categories. 
As I approach the end of this chapter I want to summarise some of the matters 
discussed in it that are of particular relevance to the next chapter. Firstly, I want to 
draw attention to Freeman's claim that all actions are emotional (Freeman, 1998, 
Introduction). This claim, in one form or another, recurs in all his work. It applies 
both to all spatio-temporal actions whether in relation to objects momentarily present 
in sensation or to objects of the imagination. The claim derives from relating emotion 
to homeostasis. As Freeman (1999b p124) writes, 
will settle for describing emotions ft m the perspective of their relation to the 
biology of intentionality, not as powers in the physical sense, but as 
manifestations of brain dynamics. 
As outlined in this chapter, intentionality and hence emotion arises in the limbic 
system of the brain. Both the stimulus-response/passivist and activist/pragmatist 
models of brain function agree on this, though they differ significantly on the 
dynamics of the process and of the processes that follow it. The passivist theory 
does not have a great deal to say about higher brain/frontal lobe operations that are 
not limited to cognition. The activist/pragmatist model is one of the dynamics of a 
self-organising, chaotic system that is unstable in the short term. This model traces 
that part of the emotionally mediated output from the limbic system that flows 
ventrally to the top of the brain stem from whence it is transferred upwards by the 
neuromodulator paired cells to the medial/ventral and lateral/dorsal areas of both 
hemispheres of the forebrain. These areas, as already mentioned, are deeply 
involved in the formation of cultural, social and moral concepts and in the processes 
that we call reason, memory, and learning, all of which are indispensable to our 
estimation of beauty. 
The very important point that I wish to make here is that the perceptual information 
flow on which reason (both pure and practical in the Kantian sense) operates is 
already and always emotionally qualified. In an important sense therefore, reason 
depends for its operations on the intentionality of a person through that person's 
emotions that include their feelings, which may or may not be in full awareness. 
Reason is not, therefore, emotionally neutral; and neither is emotion entirely irrational 
because a part of the rationally mediated output from the frontal lobes flows back 
down to the limbic system. But emotions and feelings, in the broad sense, are either 
to do with approach behaviour/pleasure or aversive behaviour/displeasure. 
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Therefore the possibility presents itself of situating beauty, a predication of pleasure 
on an object of sensation, as a qualifier of reason, as a sort of prior emotional 
vectoring of the general direction which reason is to take. Similarly, both the 
absence of pleasure and feelings of displeasure also qualify the process of 
reasoning. If beauty as a feeling of pleasure is the spur to, and the mediator of, the 
intentional action of reasoning, and reason is an explanation of an intentional action 
that is contemplated, anticipated or has already taken place, then I suggest that there 
is a strong link between beauty and reason through the crucial biological concept of 
intentionality. In this way aesthetics come to occupy a central role in the operation of 
reason and the power and importance of beauty to rationality is recognised. In all of 
this, I am not claiming that beauty is the cause of reason because I am arguing from 
within a paradigm that does not recognise, and is not reducible to, the notion of linear 
teleological causality. But I am arguing that recognition of the motivating, dynamical 
role of beauty, or its absence, within the self-organising brain system is appropriate. 
Beauty, I claim, either as presence or absence, is crucially involved in perception, 
reasoning, and learning and thus in all cultural, social, and moral activity. Beauty is a 
precondition, quite literally, for "being in the loop" of all these activities; simply 
because it is a vital part of the reflexive feedback circuits in which all these activities 
are involved. Without beauty or its opposite, there is no motivation to actions, either 
physical or mental, that relate to the objects of perception; there is nothing to fire up 
resting neural pathways into excitation. 
The difficulties, discussed in the previous chapter, of reconciling Kantian pure 
reason, practical reason and the judgement of taste begin to dissolve; because 
beauty provides the heteronomous moment to pure and practical reason (previously 
considered as autonomous from each other and from beauty) that is indispensable to 
any attempt to unite them. No doubt there are technical difficulties of a philosophical 
nature in such a resolution, but I claim that it must be possible in principle simply 
because we have moved to a reflexive notion of brain and the nature of mind that 
depends on the dynamics of reflexive relations. In such a relational system, the 
concept of autonomy is irrelevant, and it was autonomy that was at the heart of 
Kant's difficulties in uniting his critical trilogy. There is no need for a supersensible 
substrate once strict autonomy is relinquished; we can make do with a reflexive 
dynamical sensible one that is the brain. 
In looking forward to the next chapter, the second aspect of brain dynamics that I 
want to discuss is that of learning and unlearning because I believe it to be very 
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relevant to beauty in art. In this chapter, all the arguments ultimately derive from the 
biological concept of homeostasis: how organisms act in such a way as to optimise 
the conditions of their internal milieu to survive in the changing conditions of the 
external world, through intentional actions that are (e)motivated to achieve that end. 
It is not immediately apparent how the production, circulation and reception of art 
may be accommodated within a homeostatic narrative. Art is not, prima-facie, 
necessary for biological survival, How is it, then, that feelings of 
pleasure/displeasure, indispensable for survival in our relation to nature, are also 
experienced in our relation to objects that have no apparent utility for survival? 
The explanation suggested in the next chapter is that although we cannot change our 
emotional experience we can change the objects on which we predicate it. The 
proposition is that the embodied visceral, cardio-vascular, epidermal, postural, 
respiratory and other internal bodily changes which we become aware of and call 
feelings are pretty much fixed for all animals, including humans. We can, however, 
learn to attribute these feelings to objects and intentional actions in relation to 
objects, in a way that cannot easily be explained as resulting directly from 
evolutionary development. This capacity of learning to re-attribute emotional 
responses to objects that were not previously emotionally competent stimuli has 
been observed, to a degree, in all vertebrates, and is especially developed in 
humans. Our ability to do this is important for this thesis because this is a thesis 
about visual art and our emotional response to art, not to nature. In the next chapter 
I shall discuss narratives about how we re-predicate our emotional responses to 
natural objects, developed in evolution for survival and well being, onto art objects. 
In the next chapter I investigate the neurological correlate to the Kantian distinction 
between the judgement of taste and desire. Traditionally, (in the last twenty years or 
so) neuroscience has not distinguished between feelings of pleasure and desire; they 
have both been interpreted in terms of dopamine produced by neuromodulators in a 
specific area of the limbic system/brain bulb. At the time of writing this view is being 
revisited by neuroscientists. I shall return to this topic in the next chapter because of 
its potentially significant implications for Kantian aesthetics. 
Lastly, 1 have become interested in the instabilities in various dynamical systems 
within the self-organising brain, discussed briefly towards the end of this chapter. 
This interest is related to my growing belief that the dynamical operations of the brain 
and the dynamical operations of the external world must be very similar for the 
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possibility of interaction between both in activities such as perception and intentional 
action. My interest is not in the correlation between internal and external "stuff" that 
is spatially defined, but in the similarity between the spatio-temporal system 
dynamics of brain and world. This interests me because it may have some relevance 
to the reflective Kantian judgement in aesthetics. What I am hinting at is that a 
certain instability in our perception of art - and in its reception and production - may 
need to be afforded to us by the specificities of the art object in order for us to 
respond emotionally, and by implication to respond aesthetically, to it. The prolonged 
play between concept and imagination, the deferment of reduction to a determinate 
concept of the artwork, that is characteristic of the Kantian reflective aesthetic 
judgement, may, I suggest, find its correlate in the instabilities of the transitory global 
brain states discussed earlier. Ambiguity, instability of meaning, is characteristic of 
art and of the brain's operational dynamics too. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND BEAUTY AS EMBODIED PLEASURE 
Feelings and their role in perception: passive model 
In this chapter I discuss the nature of beauty within the biological context of 
neuroscience. The Kantian account of beauty, discussed in Chapter Three, moves 
the discussion of beauty on from the pre-critical accounts of beauty that are 
grounded in either the idea of perfection or of sense; the wholly subjective or entirely 
objective notions of beauty are, to a degree, subsumed in Kant's treatment of beauty. 
I suggest that, in broad terms, the narrative of beauty offered by neuroscience is 
compatible with Kant's theory of beauty and his reflective judgement of taste. 
However, I believe that there are some important differences between the Kantian 
and the neuro-biological accounts of beauty and these disagreements and similarities 
are discussed in both this and the next chapter. In this chapter I use the 
pragmatism72 of science to critique and limit the Kantian theory of beauty, which is 
ultimately based in logical entailment from philosophical propositions. My 
methodology here is, I claim, a contemporary re-interpretation of the Kantian practice 
of using the experience and the scientific knowledge then available to critique and 
thus limit the speculations (as he saw them) of metaphysics. An example of such 
Kantian methodology is his epistemic reversal, discussed in Chapter Two of this 
thesis, which is modelled on the Copernican revolution in cosmology, and is 
fundamental to the critical methodology73 that is so crucial to his project. 
For now, I want to apply the basic ideas of neuroscience to a discussion of beauty in 
nature and then to beauty in art. As we have seen in the last chapter, neuroscience 
may be roughly divided into the activist-pragmatist and the cognitivist-passive 
approaches to theories of mind/brain. Yet both schools of thought share the view 
that feelings and emotions are, quite literally, of vital importance to the survival of an 
organism. In this respect the role of feelings of pleasure or displeasure are even 
more important to neuroscience than to Kant. 
72 The word is used here in its general sense rather than simply to distinguish between the positivist- 
pragmatist and cognitive-passivist theories of neuroscience. 
73 Kant's critical methodology may be obtained without any appeal to the transcendental subject simply 
because it is methodologically derived as if" it were so in his First Critique and makes no ontological 
claim. See Chapter One. 
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The concept of homeostasis, discussed in the previous chapter, is a central premise 
of contemporary theories that seek to correlate the activities of mind with those of 
brain in its relation to the rest of the body. For an organism to survive it must 
assimilate itself to the world in which it lives. It must maintain its internal milieu in a 
condition that keeps it alive and healthy. Both the internal milieu and the external 
world change over time and homeostasis is about adjusting the relation between both 
in such a way that the internal biological state is kept within tight parameters that 
delineate the boundary between life and death. To achieve that the organism needs 
to both engage with, and constantly perform survival-appropriate actions in, the 
external world. Neuroscience holds that emotion is the basis of all such intentional 
actions. We may or may not be aware of our emotions but in either case they are 
immediately on public display for others to recognise, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. When we emote we after the internal state of our bodies in readiness for 
specific actions. When we perceive these internal changes in our bodies, and when 
we perceive the relation between these internal changes and events in the external 
world, we have feelings that are pleasurable or displeasurable. 
Antonio Damasio (2003b) in an interview published in the New Scientist magazine 
(8/11/2003) summarises this process in the quotation given below. Because the 
quotation is a long one I have taken it in parts that are followed by my comments on 
it. 
too74believe that continuous signals from the body to the brain provide a 
continuous backdrop for the mind. In fact, I doubt that we could be conscious 
in the usual sense of the term if we did not have a backdrop. Body signalling 
is also the essential substrate for feelings. When we have an emotion we 
alter the state of the body in a variety of ways, and then we register the 
r sulting changes in the brain's body maps and feel the emotions. Emotions 
come first, feelings second. 
Damasio's positioning, as discussed previously, is broadly within the passivist 
cognitivist approach to perception. I suggest that in this part of the quotation 
Damasio is assigning a somewhat passive role to the brain in its relation to the body; 
the "origin" of feelings, is exterior to the brain. The body signals reaching the brain 
may come from the exterior world via the senses or be somatic information from 
organs, muscles etc. within the body. In either case they are not described here in 
74 Damasio is linking his own ideas to those of William James and Spinoza in this article. 
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terms that refer to a brain that initiates the process of perception. Damasio links 
emotion, via body signalling, to both consciousness and feelings and states that 
emotion alters the state of the body, which is subsequently "registered" in the brain's 
body "maps" and experienced as feeling. 
I acknowledge that a great deal of experimental evidence, accumulated over many 
years, supports the cognitivist view. I also believe that emotion is crucially important 
to the experiences that we refer to as the self, consciousness, and feelings. Yet I 
have reservations about the cognitivist model because it fails to emphasise the 
reflexive, or even the reflective, nature of perception and the non-linearity of 
"causal"75 relations in the brain. The cognitivist model also underplays the influence 
that reason has on the later stages of developing states of emotion/feeling as well as 
the influence of emotion on the operations of reason. 
The terms "register" and "maps have, for me, modernist associations; I imagine a 19th 
century cartographer recording new information on an old map in a vast library of 
maps. The map is then put away in the correct location and the cartographer does 
something else. My objection to this account is that it is expressed in what I see as 
broadly Cartesian terms. The information about the state of the body is not present 
to the cartographer unless he is looking at the map. A more contemporary analogy is 
of computer documents or files that are not present to the user unless commands are 
given to the central processor unit to retrieve them. The problem remains of whom or 
what gives these commands and the cognitivist model assigns this role to sensation 
from outside the passive receptor brain rather than to an active searching brain as 
conceived by the positivist pragmatist model. I return to this problem and critique, 
from a positivist-pragmatist position, the very strong emphasis that cognitivists assign 
to the role of sensation in perception, at the end of this discussion of Damasio's 
claims. 
The positivist theory holds that what the brain remembers is meaning rather than 
sensation, and that this meaning is always present and is constructed by the 
dynamical relations within the brain and between the brain, the body and the world. 
At the neurological level positivists believe that incoming information results from the 
active searching by the brain for specific information. When the information is found 
75 1 have placed the word causal in inverted commas because the notion of causality as logical 
entailment between antecedent and consequent events becomes increasingly problematic as the 
number of interactive elements of a complex seif-organising system increases; and the brain is a very 
complex system involving an extremely large number of neurons and neuronal pathways in various 
possible combinations. 
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it is synthesised with the always-present electro-chemical wave patterns in the 
immense number of neural connections in the brain that influence, and so modify, the 
patterns that existed a few milliseconds earlier. As I have discussed in detail in the 
previous chapter, the circularity, and especially the reflexivity, of the process ensures 
that the entire brain is involved in the construction of meaning; no part is wholly 
autonomous from another. 
There is therefore, no central processing, no command unit or homunculus within the 
brain because it operates as a self-organising entity in a way that is somewhat similar 
to our global weather system. Nothing is ever static. Nothing can be stored and 
retrieved unchanged at a later date. I do not want to repeat details of the dynamical 
operations of the self-organising brain here, but I do want to emphasise that the 
positivist theory of brain - and of mind - is primarily in terms of the relation between 
brains and bodies, brains and other brains, and brains and objects. The positivist 
approach (that is reflexive in its form) to the interaction between brain, body and 
world via emotion is somewhat analogous to an ongoing conversation between 
participants in a seminar; the differing meanings that individuals take away from the 
discussion are not reducible to the origin of a particular participant. 
Returning now to the next part of the quotation from Damasio cited above, in which 
he goes on to claim that, 
My view is that the substance of feelings, the heart of feelings, is really a 
perception of what has changed in our organism, in our bodies, during an 
emotion. Emotions are unlearned responses to certain classes of stimuli. We 
are equipped to have emotions, thanks to evolution. When we emote we alter 
the state of the organism in a rather profound manner - the internal milieu, 
the viscera, the musculature - and we behave in a particular way. The 
collection of these changes is the emotion... Feelings are the perception of 
these changes together with the perception of the object or situation that gave 
rise to the emotion in the first place. 
Damasio states here that emotions are unlearned responses to certain classes of 
stimuli and are the result of evolutionary changes. The context in which he writes is 
that of a short article in a scientific journal, and it would be unfair to take this 
statement as his considered position. In other texts, he states that emotional 
responses may, and indeed more often than not are, learned from culture and 
history. For example, Damasio (p53,2003a) writes in the following passage, 
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The brain is prepared by evolution to respond to certain ECSs (emotionally 
competent stimuli) with specific repertoires of action. However, the list of 
ECSs is not confined to those prescribed by evolution. It includes many 
others teamed in a lifetime of experience. 
Damasio's view is that the physical changes within the body such as respiration, 
heartbeat, changes in the viscera and musculature, hormonal changes etc., are 
qualitatively the same for any particular class of emotion, though they may vary 
widely as to the magnitude of change depending on the particular ECS experienced. 
We are capable of modulating our emotional responses according to the context in 
which our response to the ECS occurs, but not of altering, except as to degree, what 
is changing inside our bodies and the nature of feelings that result. 
I broadly agree with that view, though when Damasio refers to the context in which 
our emotional response change, I suspect that he is, in common with other 
cognitivists, referring to changes in sensational context. That is fair enough, but it 
ignores the importance of the intentional changes within us that have resulted from 
our own changing personal and cultural histories. Following Freeman (1999, ch4), I 
claim that although a particular ECS may remain constant over a period of time, our 
response to it will change over that same period of time because the meanings that 
we make will have changed as a result of our constantly and rapidly changing intents. 
Thus, we constantly qualify our response to exposure to the same stimulus that is 
repeated over time. These response changes may be observed at the neurological 
level (Freeman. 1999, ch. 4) as changes in the pattern of synaptic discharges within 
our brains. These changes may be small and the overall pattern remains 
recognisably that of a particular experimental subject over time, but the changes are 
clearly discernible. These changes demonstrate how our wider history of experience 
within a particular time period mediates our response to exactly the same stimulus 
presented to us at the beginning and end of the time period. Such changes are 
cumulative over successive exposures to the same stimulus and are important in the 
process of learning. 
Damasio goes on to claim that the brain is capable of behaving "as if' actual changes 
in the body had occurred through the process of imagination. The brain, he claims, 
can after its "body map" state very rapidly and directly by "bypassing the whole body 
altogether" through operations that he suggests take place in the pre-frontal cortex or 
the amygdala. At first sight this claim of Damasio, proposed in the early 1990s looks 
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promising because it seems to attribute some agency to the brain in initiating emotive 
states and hence feelings; it appears to be a shift away from the passively 
responsive brain and towards the positivist active brain. The use of the term "as if" 
(emphasised in this way by Damasio) is encouraging for Kant enthusiasts because it 
resonates with Kant's often used critical methodology. In more recent publications, 
such as the one quoted above, Damasio (2003b) demurs from these earlier "as if" 
claims, stating that "they may, to a certain extent, falsify what is really going on in the 
organism". His considered position seems to be that changes in the body generated 
by response to sensation are the basic cause of changes in the "body maps" of the 
mind which, in turn are indispensable to our having feelings at all. 
However, Damasio (2003b p50), is very dear about the intimate relation between 
cognition and emotion when he states, 
We don't separate emotion from cognition like layers of a cake. Emotion is in 
the loop of reason all the time. 
When Damasio uses the term reason he usually means theoretical reason, 
particularly cognition, rather than practical reason. He immediately goes on to write, 
We have inherited an incredibly complex emotional apparatus that, in 
evolution, was tied to certain classes of objects and situations that were fairly 
narrow - things that were threatening, that could cause anger or trigger 
compassion, shame or embarrassment. But now we have added to that 
repertoire of emotional triggers many other objects and situations we have 
learned in our lives, so we have the possibility of responding emotively to all 
sorts of situations. 
Damasio 2003b, p50 
Later in the same article, Damasio describes as ridiculous the claim that our 
decisions are determined by our emotions. He justifies this opinion on the grounds 
that, even though our emotions come to us through evolutionary and genetic means, 
the way that we have cultivated our relations with the world "depends entirely" on 
how we have been educated, on our family ideals and our the social environment. 
Although I support Damasio's claim that our lives are not determined by emotions, I 
do not see any need to go to the other extreme and claim that the way we live is only 
dependent on learning and other socio/historical/cultural factors. Without an 
explanation of learning, social, cultural and historical factors that takes at least some 
account of the specificities of our embodiment (that Damasio does not supply) the 
implication is that aspects of our nature such as genetic inheritance and sexual 
anatomy (as distinguishable from gender) are of no importance in our lives. I do not 
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believe that an explanation of the role of emotion is well served by situating the 
discussion in what amounts to a Cartesian dichotomy between nature and nurture. 
My principal objection to Damasio's analysis is that, although it (usefully) links 
emotion and feeling to cognition (a link to necessity in Kantian terms) it does little in 
providing an explanation, in terms of affective neuroscience, of how emotion is linked 
to the freedom (a link to Kantian morality) which, I claim, both makes a society and 
culture - that is based on more than individual self-interest - possible for us. Such a 
society, in tum, attempts to foster and protect freedom through its institutions and 
laws. What is needed is a narrative of how emotion and feelings are involved in, and 
supportive of, social and cultural life. A neurological narrative of how emotions, and 
hence feelings, foster the production, reception and circulation of consensual moral 
values is part of the project of this thesis. 
The relationship between emotion and feelings on the one hand, and reason, both 
theoretical and practical, on the other is important. There is a significant difference 
between Damasio's positioning and my own stance in respect to this relationship. 
Damasio's apparent anxiety is to defend emotion from the ancient stoic and the 
Platonic tradition in western philosophy, which perceives emotion and pleasure as 
threats to reason. The fear, in that tradition, is that corporeal desire, the lower and 
non-legislative Kantian faculty of desire, 76 will determine our actions and often, if not 
always, take precedence over the claims of reason on us. Broadly, the Platonic 
tradition regards actions that conform to social norms and are beneficial to others as 
rational and designates as emotional those that are detrimental to social order. 
Though I recognise that there is an important difference between these two sorts of 
action, I would claim that both are emotional and intentional. The basis for that claim 
was discussed in Chapter Four and is, briefly, that all intentional action is initiated 
and emotionally qualified by the limbic system" within the brain. The claim, within 
the Platonic tradition, is that emotion is rendered safe by its situatedness within the 
constraints of an educated and cultured society. 
76 The "higher" and legislative faculty of Kantian desire being pure desire in the exercise of freedom 
through the principles of morality achieved via practical reason. 
77 The substantial body of clinical evidence that supports (though I do not claim that it proves) this claim 
is that subjects with severe damage to the limbic system, particularly to the amygdala, are not only 
incapable of emotions and feelings, but are also incapable of making decisions to act. In contrast, 
subjects with severe damage to those areas of the brain such as the frontal and pre-frontal cortices 
(thought to be correlated to rational action) have no problem at all with taking action, but their decisions 
are often considered to be bizarre and socially/morally inappropriate. See Damasio A, (2000, p62-67) 
and (2003, p137-152). 
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I believe that part of the problem here is the conflation of emotion with desire. As 
discussed in Chapter Four, the positivist-pragmatic branch of neuroscience sees 
emotion in terms of intentional action that is defined and chosen by the agent of the 
action. Emotion, in this model, begins within the dynamics of neural activity in the 
brain - and it qualifies and is itself qualified by, every part of the brain, including the 
rational parts; it is the first step in all goal-directed activity (Freeman, 1999, ch. 1 and 
6). Emotion is not so much a passive response to sensation, but the basis of an 
active search for sense information that is relevant to a pre-formed intentionality to 
take action in accordance with our own growth, maturation and well-being. As we 
have already seen, it is not the same as motive: the reason and explanation for an 
action. Neither is it the same as desire: the awareness and experience that may 
stem from an action (Freeman, 1999, chl, p10). 
My own position in this discussion differs from that of Damasio in that I do not regard 
emotion as a threat to reason but as a condition precedent for it. Similarly, I do not 
regard feelings of pleasure or displeasure as threatening rationality but as 
indispensable to all action including mental acts, because I subscribe to the claim, 
elaborated later in this chapter, that pleasure is the common currency of the trade- 
offs that we make between conflicting motivations. That is not to claim that 
maximising pleasure inevitably and always results in moral and socially beneficial 
action. Such a result derives, I suggest, from inadequate education in what Kant 
refers to as moral ideas and moral feeling, rather than from pleasure itself. 
I do not want to put forward my own position as a mirrored reversal of Damasio's 
claim by suggesting that education, culture and society depend entirely on emotional 
responses to stimuli that have evolved and become genetically embodied in us. 
Neither do I claim that emotion determines how we relate to the world in a way that is 
apart from reason (pure or practical), culture, and history. I do, however want to 
assign a central and supportive role to emotion and feeling in the way that we 
construct social values, including moral and aesthetic judgements, as well as 
cognitive judgements. 
Although I suggest that the cognitivist view goes too far by claiming that the way that 
we live in relation to the world depends entirely on social, historical and educational 
factors, and positions these influences as oppositional to the embodied emotions that 
have come to us through evolutionary and genetic means, I welcome the cognitivist 
recognition of the importance of culture and history. I also support the cognitivist 
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view that basic emotional responses, together with feelings of pleasure or 
displeasure, may be re-predicated onto stimuli that apparently have nothing to do 
with the stimuli to which they are thought to have originally referred. Without that 
process, learning and art would hardly be possible. Yet I believe that the distinction 
between emotional responses that have been evolved and those that have been 
learned is not very useful and is at the root of the sterile debate that picks over old 
arguments about the relative importance of nature and nurture. 
For these reasons I prefer to continue my enquiry in the context of the positivist- 
pragmatist model of neuroscience. This is not a move that is designed to refute or 
replace the cognitivist view because I believe that the positivist view encompasses, in 
its generality, the best of the cognitivist model as a sort of reduced form or special 
case. In this respect my attitude to cognitivism is analogically broadly similar to 
Kant's willingness, discussed previously, to accept everyday empirical attitudes 
provided there is recognition of their ultimate contingency on transcendental idealism. 
Active perception: the temporality of beauty as pleasure 
The positivist pragmatist approach to our emotional response to stimuli and the 
feelings we experience in perception differs significantly from the cognitivist approach 
exemplified by Damasio. Freeman (1999, Ch 1, p21-35) claims that sensation from 
the body or objects in the world is not stored in the brain, 
Meanings form in our brains. We make representations and use them to 
induce the formation of meanings in others. Most people think that we attach 
meaning to representations (words, gestures, symbols and images) as 
carriers of meaning. Materialists and cognitivists also think that brains make 
representations inside themselves of the outside world and use these to store 
memories in the same way as computers, but they do not know how 
meanings are attached to their representations in either computers or brains. 
As a dynamicist and pragmatist, I propose that representations exist only in 
the world and have no meanings, and that meanings exist only in brains 
without being represented there. 
A little later, Freeman, in discussing the notion of perception developed by Thomas 
Aquinas and its relevance to contemporary neuroscience, writes that, 
Aquinas concluded from his conception of the unity of the self that the 
process (of perception) is unidirectional. Actions of the body exit by the motor 
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systems, changing the world and changing the relation of self to the world. 
The sensory consequences of the actions then enable the body to change 
itself in accordance with the nature of the world. However, the perception is 
only of the altered contours of the self inside (my underlining). No forms are 
pushed through or across the boundary. The key word he (Aquinas) used is 
"assimilation". 78 The body does not absorb stimuli, but changes its own form 
to become similar to aspects of stimuli that are relevant to the intent that 
emerged from within the brain. 
(Freeman, 1999, p36-37) 
My interest in this reflexive dynamic of intent, action and perception, in which subject 
and object are brought into relation with each other and in which each changes and 
is also changed by the other, is two-fold. 
Firstly, it is apparent that form plays a crucial role in the process. Moreover the form 
described above is not static but is dynamic. Such form is neither opposed to nor 
wholly independent of matter. Rather it is, in the positivist-pragmatist model of 
perception, a description of dynamical relation between the non-discrete material 
entities that we designate as brain, body and the world. This new type of form is 
reflexive and recursive; the brain plays an active and endogenous role in perception, 
but it makes no sense to identify the brain, the body or the world for us as the origin 
of this form because it is the dynamical relation between all these that is 
indispensable to such a co-relational form. 
In my practice I now try to make paintings that elicit this type of relation between the 
painted object and the viewer. The viewers see the image as spatially flat, as two- 
dimensional, or as recessive three-dimensional or in terms of intrusive three- 
dimensional space. The viewers are thus brought into awareness that neither 
themselves not the painting alone is the source of this changing spatial experience, 
but that it is given in the perceptual relation between themselves and the image. As a 
painter, I want to bring the image and the viewer together in a relation that is 
pleasurable. 
Secondly, form and beauty are intimately connected in the Kantian aesthetic, 
because, as discussed in Chapter Three, the Kantian notion of beauty is couched in 
formal terms. Similarly his aesthetic judgement differs from cognitive (but not from 
78 Aquinas uses the Latin "adaequatio" meaning a movement or tendency towards equality that does not 
arrive at identity with that towards which it is directed. 
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moral) judgements because of its form that is apart from concept and objective 
interest and is universally communicable. Kant could only satisfy these conditions, 
and could only link together the aesthetical and moral judgements, through a notion 
of beauty that is a formal one. 
In the light of all these considerations, I claim that what proximately drives the 
process of perception is the anticipation of pleasure or displeasure, that is to say, the 
joyful anticipation of beauty or the painful anticipation of its lack. I suggest that we 
experience beauty or its opposite in the process (that is to say as process) of altering 
our own form - as Freeman puts it, in changing the contours of the self - in our 
relation to external stimuli that are relevant to our momentary and changing intents. 
There are two important points that I want to mention here. Firstly, I have qualified 
my claim that beauty or its opposite drives perception by the word "proximate". I 
have done so to distinguish it (though not to claim that it is wholly distinct) from the 
"ultimate" nature of the role of beauty as a means to survival and well-being, as a 
response to the physiological needs described by the term homeostasis. I am quite 
prepared to accept that pleasure and displeasure may well have evolved in 
organisms many thousands or even millions of years ago as mechanisms to do with 
homeostasis. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that the 
pleasure/displeasure response occurred very early in the evolution of simple 
organisms. Explanations based on such early homeostatic developments may not 
be particularly helpful in directly explaining how it is that we take pleasure in activities 
that are not apparently related to, or explicable in terms of, physiology and 
homeostasis; an example of such activity might be going to look at paintings in art 
galleries. 
What I have in mind here is that pleasure may, in addition to its homeostatic role, 
have achieved something that might be described as a life of its own, that is neither 
directly related (nor totally unrelated) to purely homeostatic and physiological needs. 
The sort of thing that I have in mind is pleasure that has become partially dirempted 
from its original evolutionary referent. As a result of such a separation, the proximate 
considerations and choices that we make between alternative pleasures and 
between pleasures and displeasures that may result from various possible actions 
become no less important than considerations of the ultimate homeostatic origins 
and implications of our choices. What I am suggesting here is that the feeling self, in 
its quotidian relation with sensation from the external world, does not pay much 
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attention to the ultimate origin of its emotional responses. It does not much "care" if 
its emotional responses and feelings are instantial of natural evolution or cultural 
learning. By analogy, I am suggesting that in deciding between alternative emotional 
responses as actions we merely shop around for the best pleasure/least displeasure 
bargain and do not pay much attention to how we obtained our means, our money, to 
make a purchase. My interest in making this claim here is to subsume the distinction 
between evolved and learned responses because the available evidence, discussed 
below, is that both types of response are very similar in how, and with what intensity, 
they operate. However, the economic model of emotional action has much wider 
implications and I return to a discussion of them later in this chapter. 
This leads me to my second point, which is that pleasure and beauty are not 
absolutes but are relative to context and are transient. For example, as reported by 
Cabanac et al. (1972), hypothermic subjects will report pleasure when stimulated 
with moderate heat, and displeasure with cold. A hyperthermic subject gives the 
opposite reports. It is not the stimulus that elicits pleasure or displeasure but the 
relation between the stimulus and the internal condition of the subject. As soon as 
either the hypothermic or the hyperthermic subject returns to a state of normothermia 
(that is experimentally discerned by measuring their deep body temperature, rather 
than relying only on verbal reports or behaviour) all subjects become indifferent to 
moderate hot or cold stimuli. Pleasure is only observable, and is only reported by 
subjects, in the transient state in which the stimulus helps the subject to return to 
normothermia, i. e. to their internal set point of comfort in relation to internal 
temperature. 
Very similar results are observed in relation to taste, the term used here in the sense 
of pleasure or displeasure reported in the experience of ingesting food. Subjects 
provided with food of a given flavour will report it as pleasurable when hungry and 
describe it as unpleasant or report indifference to it when they are in a condition of 
satiety. Measurement of subjective behaviour, in terms of the amount of food eaten, 
confirms the relationship between behaviour and pleasure. This experiment reveals 
an interesting difference between contemporary scientific thinking and Kantian 
thought. The scientific interpretation is that the affective quality of the food 
consumed depends on quantity eaten in the very recent past. This introduces a 
temporal aspect to the idea of quality and contests the Kantian absolute autonomy 
between two of his four categories. Science today is not much interested in 
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autonomous categories or in an absolute distinction between subject and object as 
discrete entities. 
I find a particular aspect of these experimental reports especially interesting: the 
indifference of the subjects' response to mild pleasure/displeasure stimuli once 
homeostasis has been achieved. Paradoxically, it seems that as the optimum 
homeostatic condition is approached the pleasure experienced reduces to zero, that 
pleasure results in a state of indifference to the stimuli that a few moments earlier 
were pleasurable. I am left wondering quite what this indifference is. Is it 
contentment or is it boredom? Neither concept seems entirely appropriate; the 
former has mild connotations with pleasure and the latter with displeasure. It occurs 
to me that what might be happening here is that when pleasure reduces to zero, it 
immediately changes its sign from positive to negative and becomes displeasure that 
gradually increases with time. Perhaps the neurological correlate of this effect is a 
global state instability in the brain as discussed in the previous chapter. At first we 
do not notice that the very mild degree of pleasure experienced immediately before 
the homeostatic equilibrium point has become mild displeasure very soon after that 
point. But as time passes, the displeasure in the stimulus that previously was 
experienced as being pleasurable increases until we do notice it. At this stage the 
perceptive quest for pleasure related to a different stimulus begins. 
Such a process might, I suggest, provide a possible explanation of our inability to 
remain either contented or bored for very long. Given the crucial importance of 
pleasure to our biological survival, it makes sense that our bodies might "abhor a 
pleasure vacuum" and so provide a disincentive to the continuance of such a state. I 
further suggest that, over time, this mechanism has become abstracted from its 
homeostatic origin and applies equally to pleasure/displeasure experience predicated 
on all stimuli both evolved and learned. 
To date, there is no conclusive evidence to confirm or refute the suggestions that I 
make here. However, recent research's indicates that the experience of pleasure is 
not local (i. e. confined within the mesolimbic system) in terms of brain physiology as 
was previously thought, but occurs throughout the brain and is linked to unstable 
global brain states, as I suggest above. This research also shows that pleasure and 
desire, traditionally thought by neuroscience to be much the same experience 
79 See Berridge, KC and Robinson T E. (1998, p309-369), Brain Research Reviews 28. 
Also work by Edmund Rolls (2000), Oxford, and Jaap Panksepp (1998). 
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because they both appeared to be initiated and supported by dopamine production in 
the neurohumoral system adjacent to the brain stem, are largely (but not entirely) 
separate neurological functional operations. This is obviously relevant to the Kantian 
distinction (in the Analytic of the Beautiful, discussed in Chapter Three) between 
beauty as pleasure that is disinterested and apart from desire and pleasure in the 
agreeable that is not. It is also relevant to the more general problems with Kantian 
autonomy that emerge in this thesis. I return to a discussion of these matters later. 
The results of study of food taste, consumption and pleasure outlined above are not 
unexpected because pleasure has been largely defined already in behavioural terms, 
and the behaviour of the experimental subjects is familiar to us from everyday 
experience. But these experiments do not rely on observations of subjects' 
behavioural action in the world alone. Additionally they rely on both the verbal 
reports of pleasure that are available from human subjects and on measurements of 
restrictions and increases in the subjects' alimentary tracts that are directly related to 
lack or surplus of food. That is to say, they correlate pleasure directly to the internal 
homeostatic dynamical changes within the subject as well as inferring the experience 
of pleasure from the subjects' behaviour in the external world. Thus these 
experiments move beyond the tautological situation in which behaviour is explained 
in terms of pleasure and pleasure is only observed in terms of behaviour. 
Although these experiments yield results that are intuitively expected, 80 they are not, 
for that reason, trivial. It is important to both recognise and confirm the contingency 
of the dimension of affective sensation on the internal biological condition of the 
subject and to supplement the study of pleasure by observations that are not 
confined within behaviourist tautologies. 
These studies, as Cabanac (1997, p5) describes, have shown that it is possible to 
dissociate pleasure from behavioural observation and also to demonstrate that the 
seeking of sensory pleasure, together with the avoidance of sensory displeasure, 
have beneficial homeostatic consequences. Pleasure is means of discerning useful 
stimuli and a motivation for approach behaviour towards such stimuli as well as the 
reward for such behaviour that has already taken place. Symmetrically opposite 
80 As Cabanac (1997, p5) remarks, the affective dimension of sensation depends directly on the 
biological usefulness of the stimulus to the subject, and this dependence was noticed by the philosophy 
of antiquity. Aristotle (quoted by Pfaffmann, 1982) used the word "alliesthesia" to denote the contingency 
of the dimension of affective sensation, and to emphasise the importance of this contingency in relation 
to behaviour. 
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conclusions hold for the functioning of displeasure. Cabanac goes on to claim that 
the great advantage of this mechanism is that it does not require the participation of a 
high level of reasoning or cognition on the part of the subject. In support of this claim 
he cites the work of Garcia, Lasiter, Bermudez-Rattoni, and Deems, (1985) who 
studied the effect of the past history of subjects on their affective qualities of 
(alimentary) taste. These studies showed how illness experienced in association 
with a particular foodstuff completely changed their affective response to that 
foodstuff. Food that they had previously liked became repugnant to them. Five 
years after these events Garcia (1990) was able to show that the subjects 
experienced the same conditioned food aversion when awake, during sleep, or even 
under anaesthesia. The conclusion he reached is that as soon as a stimulus is 
discriminated, the affective dimension of the sensation, rather than higher order 
rational or cognitive activities of mind (that are suppressed during sleep and under 
anaesthesia), tell the subject if the stimulus should be sought or avoided. A 
surprising result of all these experiments is the strength and predictability of these 
conditioned or learned responses to stimuli that depend on the particularities of 
individual history and/or their relevance to the subject's intent. In the case of 
subjects instructed to seek out conditions of temperature most pleasurable to them, 
their behaviour could be predicted from mathematical equations relating their body 
temperature to external temperature conditions with the same degree of accuracy, as 
could their autonomic responses such as shivering or sweating. 
I claim that these food aversion studies call into question the widely held belief that 
those behaviours that result from learning are somehow much less strongly imprinted 
within us than behaviours that are autonomic, that learned behaviours are 
categorically distinct from autonomic ones because they remain in some unspecified 
sense more voluntary than behaviours such as heartbeat or respiration. Autonomic 
responses are rightly considered to be involuntary and thus not to require higher- 
level cognitive or practical reasoning and to determine activities like pulse rate and 
respiration. In contrast, pleasurable or displeasurable discriminations learned 
through personal cultural experience and history are often thought of as unnecessary 
in comparison to autonomic responses, as somehow surplus activity over and above 
that of survival, as luxuries almost. 
My point is that although the cultural objects onto which pleasure and displeasure 
responses are predicated may, as objects, be directly unnecessary to homeostasis 
and survival, pleasure and displeasure as such are not. Pleasure and displeasure 
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are, I claim, as necessary as breathing; we are naturally determined to have the 
ability to feel them because they are indispensable to our survival. In support of that 
claim I cite not only the neurological theories of affective responses discussed in this 
and the previous chapter, but also the evidence of Garcia's study cited above: that 
learned aversive responses are apparently as predictable and intense as autonomic 
responses. That is not to claim that learned responses in relation to, for example, 
particular works of art are universal in the same way as breathing is, but it is to claim 
that our ability to have such responses to art works is universal because our ability to 
experience pleasure and displeasure is so. In their operations, learned pleasure and 
displeasure responses are as predictable, replicable and of similar dimension as 
autonomic ones. I agree that, ultimately, autonomic responses may, and probably 
do, take precedence over proximate responses; it is unlikely that a person suffering 
acute respiratory problems from, say, an asthma attack will sustain aesthetic 
reflection on a work of art. Yet that does not imply that autonomic responses are 
somehow more universal than culturally learned responses because universality is 
an absolute and not a relative concept and does not rely on any judgement of the 
ultimate relative importance to survival of different activities. 
The claim that learned pleasure and displeasure responses to stimuli are universal in 
us is consistent with Kant's claim that our ability to make aesthetic judgements (as 
distinct from the claim that all people actually do make the same judgements) is 
universal. However, it is not the same as Kant's claim because its universality is not 
ultimately based in universal communicability, consensual agreement or common 
sense (sensus communis as sense in common) but in the observed universality of 
learned pleasure and displeasure responses. 
My claim that pleasure and displeasure responses, whether evolved or learned are 
necessary to survival and universal is not based on Garcia's studies alone. 
Additionally there is the large body of evidence, referred to in the previous chapter, 
that affective response emerges in the amygdala, or in the limbic system in general, 
and that the operations of higher reason are stimulated into action and always 
qualified by emotional responses and feelings that precede them. Moreover, a large 
number of clinicians have reported81 that patients who have suffered severe bilateral 
damage to the amygdala by accident, disease or surgical excision do not exhibit 
81 As reported in Freeman (1999, p141), Damasio (2000, p43-67 and 62-67), and Smith Churchland 
(2002, p214 and 227-228). 
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emotional behaviour or report having the feelings of pleasure or displeasure 
expected of them in response to stimuli. 
More interestingly, from the point of view of this argument, these unfortunate people 
exhibit very great difficulty in to making decisions between future possible actions. 
Such decisions as they do eventually make appear to those who care for them to be 
random and often rationally inappropriate. On the other hand, patients who have 
suffered severe damage to the cortical areas of the brain that correlate to higher level 
cognitive and moral functions have no difficulty at all in deciding what they want to do 
and promptly doing it, though their decisions often appear to be socially or morally 
inappropriate, particularly so in those patients with severe damage to the frontal 
cortices. This group of patients also exhibit strong emotional activity and report 
strong feelings. Although I remain cautious about taking behaviour patterns in 
patients whose brains are damaged as offering demonstrative proof of the functional 
activity of the undamaged brains of well people, I believe that such studies may have 
a supportive role to play in helping our understanding of brain activity. 
The conclusion that I draw from the above studies is that learned and evolved 
responses are very similar in their operations and both are universal in respect to our 
ability to make them. The point that I wish to emphasise is that although our learned 
responses may be built upon (and in that sense parasitic upon) our evolved 
responses when considered at the ultimate level, it may not always be useful to 
interpret learned responses in this way. It may, I claim, sometimes be more 
appropriate to consider learned responses in relation to each other rather than 
attempt to always refer them back to their supposed and somewhat inaccessible 
ultimate origins in the evolutionary process. This is what I call the proximate 
approach to understanding emotion and feelings, to understanding affective 
response. By analogy to the way in which we may look at a painting and respond to 
the image in terms of other paintings that we know, rather than in terms of the 
supposed subject matter of the painting before us, I call this the signifier-to-signifier 
approach to distinguish it from the signifier-to-referent approach that is more like the 
ultimate reference of learned responses to the operation of homeostasis in evolution. 
Kant claims that the estimation of beauty is always singular on the grounds that, were 
it not so, a comparative objective concept would be introduced into our judgement 
thus contradicting his claim that beauty is apart from all concepts. It might be 
argued that if we took the proximate, or signifier-to-signifier approach to estimating 
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the beauty of a particular painting we are comparing its beauty to other paintings and, 
in Kantian terms, our judgement is not a proper one. On the other hand, we might 
also argue that our immediate judgement of the painting was that it is beautiful and 
that we subsequently go on, as we are entitled to do in Kantian terms, to consider the 
painting in the conceptual terms by comparing it to other paintings. I do not think this 
problem is very important and I am more interested in the difficulties that the 
foregoing discussion presents to Kant's claim for autonomy between his faculties of 
mind. 
As already discussed in the previous chapter, the positivist-pragmatic model of the 
dynamical operations of the brain is deeply problematic for Kant's claim that the 
higher faculties of mind, pure reason, practical reason and aesthetic feeling, are 
autonomous, that is to say that each faculty is both free and gives the law of its own 
operation to itself. In the self-organising reflexive dynamics of the positivist- 
pragmatist model every activity of mind that neurologically correlates with an activity 
of brain is mutually inter-dependent with every other activity. Concepts such as 
Kant's discrete faculties of mind that are self-legislative in their operations, and are in 
linear, or even circular, causal relations with other faculties become difficult to 
sustain. As we have seen, reason, both pure and practical, is always already 
qualified by emotion. 
What has emerged in the discussion in this chapter is that emotion is indispensable 
to the higher operations of mind that we call reason, but that the converse is not the 
case. It appears from the experiments of Garcia and the observations of clinicians 
that affective response is possible in situations in which the operations of reason 
have been temporally suspended or permanently severely damaged or destroyed. 
Although Kant claims autonomy for all the higher faculties of mind, I suggest that we 
may reasonably draw from his work the conclusion that he regards morality, as given 
by the free exercise of practical reason, as ultimately in a position of authority over 
pure reason and aesthetic feeling; beauty is, for Kant, the analogical symbol of the 
moral and not the other way round. Neuroscience does not support that view. 
Although neuroscience does not deal in concepts of authority of one part of the brain 
over another part, I claim that it is fair to say that if asked to rank emotion, pure 
reason and practical reason in terms of indispensability for not only mere survival but 
also for well-being, most neuroscientists would put emotion at the top of the list. 
Evolutionists would certainly do so, if for no other reason than that emotional 
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responses are as old as the simplest living organism and the higher faculties of 
reason developed, in comparison, very recently indeed. Moreover, it is apparent 
from brain physiology and neural dynamics that reason is quite literally built upon the 
emotional apparatus of the brain. However, having said all that, we must recognise 
that we are as we are because we have the capacity for higher reasoning as well as 
for emotions. 
A theory of beauty as pleasure and the common currency of motivations 
I now want to turn to a discussion of the pioneering work of Michel Cabanac who has 
developed a theory of how we decide between various possible actions that are 
motivated by different or conflicting emotional claims. Cabanac's economic theory is 
an important contribution to our understanding of the role of pleasure and displeasure 
in decision-making and offers a new perspective from which we may interpret, in 
contemporary affective neuroscientific terms, the relationship between the Kantian 
judgements of cognition, practical reason and taste. As Cabanac points out, we are 
seldom faced with only one motivation at a time and so we need some means of 
ranking our emotional priorities to optimise our behaviour in relation to our biological 
needs. 
Many of Cabanac's papers are very technical but he gives a review of his work in a 
paper given at the conference of the Association for the Scientific Study of 
Consciousness at Pomona, Canada in June 1997 and I draw on the contents of that 
paper in my discussion of his work below. 
As Cabanac (1997) states, many explanations of predictive behaviour that are 
concerned with the proximate causation of particular behaviours actually operate at 
the level of ultimate causation through emphasising the evolution of traits that lead to 
reproductive success (my underlining). Cabanac claims that this is reasonable for 
animals but not for humans because, in the case of the latter, it is possible to obtain 
verbal reports on pleasure and so analyse in cognitive terms the proximate 
physiological and psychological mechanisms of decisions, thus going beyond the 
mere measurement of behaviour. 
Cabanac describes his project as follows, 
The thesis presented here is that the maximisation of pleasure and the 
minimisation of displeasure, not only leads to useful behaviour, but is also the 
answer to motivational conflicts. It is hypothesised that pleasure serves as 
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the common currency of the trade-offs between clashing motivations, the 
displeasure of frustrating one motivation being accepted for the sake of a 
larger pleasure obtained in satisfying another. 
Cabanac (p3,1997) 
In the same passage he goes on to explain that his experimental evidence for this 
claim has been derived, in the first instance, from situations involving only one 
motivation for a behaviour serving only one physiological (homeostatic) aim. 
Secondly he deals with situations in which two motivations compete for behaviour 
directed to the achievement of different physiological aims. He finally makes the last 
step to the analysis of situations in which motivations that do not proximately serve 
physiological aims are in direct conflict with those that do serve such aims. He then 
summarises the result of these experiments with the claim that his work has, 
... allowed (the) generalisation of the pleasure theory according to which 
unpleasant and even noxious behaviours may be accomplished because they 
are traded off for pleasurable rewards. 
I shall shortly return to a brief outline of Cabanac's experimental procedures and 
results, but I cannot let pass the modest claim that he makes for his work without 
comment. In my view, Cabanac has achieved far more than he claims credit for. For 
example, his introduction of the notion of a "common currency" for pleasure opens up 
the whole field of investigation to economic theory; it makes possible the analysis of 
emotional motivations, pleasure and displeasure responses and intentional behaviour 
in the terms of a discursive practice hitherto largely unused in this field. All of these 
activities have possible implications for aesthetics. Cabanac does not pursue this 
line of enquiry in any detail because his interest is largely in the quantitative 
experimental demonstration of his thesis within the discourses of psychology and 
affective neuroscience. My own interest is to develop a new exegesis of Kantian 
aesthetics, using neuroscience rather than the supersensible substrate as the 
unifying ground that links together Kantian phenomena, noumena and beauty. The 
discussion that follows and the inferences and conclusions that I draw from 
Cabanac's thesis are, therefore, my own rather than his. 
The notion of common currency, when applied to motivations not related immediately 
to physiological need (i. e. to homeostasis), introduces the idea that pleasure as such 
is a means of assigning value in all our decision making activities, and value is a 
moral, cultural and social concept as well as an economic one. The phrase common 
currency can mean, in contemporary usage, both cultural ideas and values together 
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with societal attitudes held in common by a social group, and also the money that 
circulates in an economy as the signifier of the exchange value of commodities. 
Both neuroscience and a large body of philosophical tradition agree that the Kantian 
faculties (both higher and lower) of mind are involved82 in decision making. In the 
Kantian system, practical reason, moral ideas and moral feelings are at the top of a 
hierarchical structure, below which come pure reason and aesthetic judgement, this 
last being in a somewhat inferior role to practical reason because it is the latter's 
analogical symbol. As already discussed, 83 Kant seeks to reconcile these faculties 
by his appeal to the supersensible substrate, a move that I have already criticised as 
being opaque to further enquiry. 
My introduction of Cabanac's economic idea of pleasure as common currency in 
decision-making marks a radical change in the discussion and contests the Kantian 
hierarchy of the faculties of mind. Now, considerations of pleasure and displeasure 
become the arbiter of value and will have the final say in the conflicting and 
competing claims of cognitive, moral and aesthetic motivations when we decide upon 
an action. Anticipation of affective experiences, rather than simply the exercise of 
reason, becomes the ground of resolution between motivational conflicts, and 
subsumes the autonomy of the three higher Kantian legislative faculties of mind listed 
above. This is because one of these faculties, the aesthetic judgement, has now 
come to enjoy an arbitrating role in relation to the other two judgements. If the 
judgements of pure and practical reason ultimately depend on the actual or 
anticipated experience of pleasure, the feeling in us in our relation to the world 
around us that we call the beautiful, then beauty assumes the importance that I have 
sought for it, in nature and in art, throughout this thesis. 
I admit to some initial surprise in finding my long sought after role for beauty in what 
amounts to an economic theory of its importance. On reflection, this is not quite so 
unexpected because the roots of the word economy derive from the Greek words 
meaning household and law; economy is about the organisation of the basic social 
unit of civilisation. The word economy still retains traces of this ancient meaning but 
has become somewhat overlaid by its use in a monetary context. Before discussing 
the common currency of pleasure in economic (in the monetary sense of the word) 
82 As discussed in Chapter Three of this thesis. 
83 Also in Chapter Three. 
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terms I want to linger for a while on its original use in Hellenic antiquity. I do so in 
order to provide a sort of counter-balance to what I see as the masculine engendered 
systematic approach of both Kant and the modernist moment in history to philosophy, 
particularly in the fields of morality and aesthetics. Kant's critical philosophy is 
couched in juridical terms, 84 he divides the faculties of mind between legislative and 
non-legislative operations - and the former are the higher faculties. He only 
addresses feelings in depth in the third and last part of his critical trilogy, near the 
end of his life's work. That is not to suggest that his Third Critique is an afterthought, 
far from it. But it is to recognise that it is built upon, hence qualified by, the very 
grand and systematic structure of the First Critique in particular. The point that I am 
making is that the rigorous systematic argumentation of the First Critique, and the 
arguments of the Second Critique that are couched in terms of autonomous freedom, 
may not always sit easily with the concept of inter-dependent relationships and 
mutual feelings of empathy that are evident in successful family life and friendships. 
That is why I believe that I need to retain the meaning of the word economy in 
antiquity in any economic narrative of beauty that I construct. Not to do so is to run 
the risk of collapsing back into a systematic account that simply replaces the 
hegemony of reason with that of beauty. In a post-modernist society, that at least 
lays claim to cultural pluralism and some degree of restraint upon privilege based on 
gender and wealth, I believe that to be inappropriate. 
To think about pleasure in the context of supporting and participating in the 
organisation of a family household or within a circle of equal friendships is to think 
about it in a very different way to the pleasure taken by a Wall St. broker or market 
maker in running his (and it almost always is his) business. The common currency of 
a household is our first experience of socialisation and education in terms of moral 
ideas and moral feelings. We learn, because we see them played out before us by 
our educatrice (and it almost always is a woman), about such matters as sympathy, 
empathy, consensual agreement and nurturing of others. We learn the value of the 
common interest rather than self-interest. Later in our childhood, at school, and at 
work and play, we learn about competitiveness, power and domination - and we 
usually learn it from men. This sort of learning comes later, like the lobster's shell. A 
carapace has its uses but it imposes severe limitations as well. 
84 As he makes clear in his Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason (first edition). 
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I make this digression here for a reason - and for a feeling. If I am to describe a new 
sort of beauty, one that is couched in the economic terms of common currency, I 
want it to be understood in terms of the ancient meaning of the word economy as 
well as the modernist meaning of that word. The two meanings are antithetical and 
mutually contradictory, but that is the point; without both, one will dominate and I 
suspect that I know which one it will be. My motivation for wanting to maintain an 
endless deferment of the collapse of my use of the "economic" into a singular 
meaning is simple. I do not want to elevate beauty to the juridical role of unlimited 
authority over the judgements of practical and pure reason that are both mutually 
wholly autonomous for Kant. Rather, I want beauty, in the aesthetical judgement, to 
support and be supported by cognition and morality in a reflexive inter-dependent 
relationship that nurtures the exercise of all three judgements. At the same time, I 
want to make beauty as pleasure the ground (used now in an agricultural rather than 
prepositional sense) from which the cognitive and moral judgements grow. I propose 
that the positivist-pragmatic model of neuroscience discussed in the previous chapter 
is capable of accommodating both the monetary and the domestic interpretation of 
the economy of feelings of pleasure and displeasure that are at the heart of beauty. 
Returning now to Cabanac's thesis, that the maximisation of feelings of pleasure 
together with the minimisation of feelings of displeasure are the common currency of 
resolving conflict between motivations, I want to draw inferences from that thesis 
using the term common currency in the monetary sense of economy. The term 
common currency implies that a currency is universally acceptable within a nation 
state or a group of such states. Additionally, currencies of one nation or group of 
nations may be traded for all other currencies outside a particular currency zone, 
through the workings of the exchange markets, which consensually agree exchange 
rates. Attempts have sometimes been made by an individual nation to protect the 
value of its currency through attempts to frustrate the wish of the international 
currency markets to reduce its value; the means employed have usually been either 
buying its own currency on forward contracts in the market or by introducing 
exchange controls for its citizens or subjects. Such attempts have always failed in 
the medium or long term. The point here is that the money markets actually do work 
by consensual agreement between traders and not by the unilateral actions of 
national governments or their central banks. By analogy then, Cabanac's claim that 
pleasure serves as a common currency of decision making implies, I claim, not only 
the universality of pleasure but also that its "value" is achieved by the consensual 
agreement of all those involved. The phrase "all those involved" means, in the 
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context of this thesis, all the activities of mind (the faculties of mind in Kantian terms) 
and all their correlates of the dynamical operations of the brain in neurological terms. 
Thus Cabanac's thesis, even taken in monetary terms, implicitly contains ideas of 
consensual, hence socially constructed, agreement. Such agreement supports moral 
ideas and feelings. His thesis thus appears to offer the possibility of relating those 
pleasures that we consensually agree to call beautiful, to moral ideas and feelings, 
and in this respect to be compatible with the Kantian theory of beauty. 
In economic theory at least, the price of goods and services is consensually agreed 
between buyers and sellers. If the price is too high, buyers will not purchase goods 
and the market is oversupplied relative to demand, causing the price to fall to the 
point where supply and demand are in equilibrium. A symmetrical argument applies 
if the price is too low, demand is excessive in relation to supply and the price rises. 
Such an economic theory of the price mechanism requires perfect knowledge of the 
market by both buyers and sellers. In practice, this ideal situation is seldom 
achieved, but in real markets it is often closely approximated, particularly in relation 
to commodities, especially so in the trading of currency which is a commodity in 
contemporary economies. 
By analogy, the brain may be presumed to "have perfect knowledge of its own 
market" in the trading of its conflicting motivations and to "price" them in terms of 
pleasure and displeasure in much the same way as we decide to make, or refrain 
from making, a purchase through considering it in terms of the opportunity cost of 
other purchasing decisions that we might make that are equally pleasurable - that 
are "for sale" at the same price. Moreover, this market analogy introduces a 
temporal aspect to pleasure based decision making. Buyers in a market economy 
are sometimes willing to defer enjoyment of a particular pleasure now, if they have 
the expectation that, by such restraint, they will be able to enjoy a greater pleasure 
later. They may also decide to accept the displeasure of debt in the future if they can 
obtain credit to obtain pleasure now. 
The implication of all this is that decisions are made between conflicting motivations 
such that displeasure is tolerated providing it is outweighed by pleasure that is 
anticipated either now or later. Analogically, I claim decisions regarding conflicting 
motivations that arise from judgements of pure reason and moral judgements are 
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resolved in the same way and are proximately' made in terms of feelings of 
pleasure, of beauty, either immediate or deferred, as the mechanism of evaluation. 
Such an argument requires that both the exercise of pure reason and practical 
reason are capable of being experienced as pleasurable or displeasurable, a 
requirement that is entirely consistent with Kant. 88 However, Kant does not really 
explain how the judgements of pure and practical judgement relate to each other 
except through his appeal to the supersensible substrate. Particularly, I claim that he 
does not adequately resolve the situation in which our faculties of pure reason and 
practical reason give rise to conflicting motivations - the by now familiar problem of 
reconciling necessity to freedom. He resolves this problem by assigning to practical 
reason what, I claim, ultimately amounts to a primacy over both pure reason and the 
aesthetic judgement. Yet, in a sense, I claim that he had the opportunity to resolve 
the problem through the feeling of pleasure that is experienced in all three 
judgements of cognition, morality and aesthetics respectively. Instead he chose to 
refer all three judgements upwards to the supersensible substrate, an idea of mind 
that is, by definition, capable of unifying these three judgements but is epistemically 
opaque. 
Beauty as the ground for all actions 
In contrast, my move here is, in a limited and qualified sense, to refer cognition and 
moral judgements downwards to the embodied feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
85 I use the term proximately here to emphasise that these decisions are taken in terms of pleasure as 
such, pleasure in the moment, which may be, but is not necessarily, experienced in connection to stimuli 
that have become affectively competent in the distant past through the mechanism of evolution. 
There is degree of similarity between the remoteness of evolution and the opacity of the Kantian 
supersensible substrate of humanity and phenomena; we cannot know anything about the latter and we 
don't know very much about the former that is not suppositional. 
For this reason I have chosen to emphasise the importance of the proximate operations of pleasure and 
displeasure in comparison to the ultimate ones. I believe that, in most decisions, we tend to concentrate 
on pleasures and displeasures as such, which, as I have suggested before, have become operationally 
dirempted from their ultimate origins in evolution and their ultimate homeostatic purpose. 
Proximate pleasure/displeasure based decisions have something of the quality of purposiveness without 
purpose: like the Kantian aesthetic judgement. Decisions that flow from ultimate pleasure responses 
only might, analogically be considered to be for a known ultimate end or purpose. 
86 As discussed in Chapter Three, the pleasure taken in aesthetical judgment results, for Kant, in the 
harmony or optimal ratio between understanding and intuition and this same optimal ratio is necessary 
for cognition and its communication to others. Pleasure is necessary for cognition and sufficient for the 
aesthetic judgement. Kant claims that we find pleasure in practical judgements through the exercise of 
our transcendental freedom in (Kantian) morality. This freedom is freedom from externally given 
authority and determination by objective considerations for such judgements, and the positive freedom 
to construct our own moral laws. Additionally, for Kant, the form of the aesthetic judgement mirrors the 
form of the moral judgement. For Kant, pleasure is experienced in the form of judgement itself. 
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in us that are the ground of the aesthetic judgement. These feelings are what we call 
beauty. 
Firstly, I do not want to give the impression that I am simply replacing the moral by 
the beautiful in a Kantian hierarchy of autonomous judgements, that in referring 
downwards to beauty, that I am simply elevating beauty upwards to replace morality 
in the Kantian system. I do not consider the faculties of mind to be wholly 
autonomous from each other, for how can they be, if pleasure and displeasure are 
the common currency between them all, partially constitute them all individually and 
result from operations within each of these judgements? Certainly, one can 
distinguish between theoretical cognition, morality and aesthetics but to do so, I 
claim, is a semantic distinction and not an ontological one. I also claim the support of 
neuroscience for my view that these judgements are not wholly autonomous from 
each other because such a conclusion is also consistent with the activist-pragmatist 
model of the reflexive dynamical operations of the brain discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
In terms of the monetary interpretation of Cabanac's claim that pleasure is the 
common currency of deciding between conflicting motivations, the Kantian faculties 
of mind are similar to currency traders in different countries trading their own national 
currency (that may be strong or weak) against the (consensually agreed) reserve 
currency. No single trader can control the market and all the traders have the same 
interest: to make money. They will happily sell their own national currency short to 
make a profit. If one replaces the term currency trader by a faculty of mind and the 
term national currency by a particular judgement such as, for example, moral 
judgement, the analogy is clear. Moreover, although a particular judgement is 
pleasurable to a degree, the maximum pleasure for all the traders is derived from a 
profit made in the reserve currency: pleasure as such. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, emotion is the basis of feelings because the latter 
result when we form a mental image of our body state that results from the former. 
Emotion and hence feelings are the beginning of the reflexive loop of perception and 
emerge in the meso-limbic87 system of the brain. As we have seen in Chapter Four, 
87 1 use the term meso-limbic because the precise mechanisms within the limbic system (and the extent 
of its boundaries from within which emotion emerges) are part of an ongoing debate in neuroscience. 
Although the origin of perception is different in the positivist-pragmatist and cognitive-passivist models, 
both agree that emotion and feelings emerge principally within the meso-limbic system, that is to say 
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the emotionally laden neural signals proceed upwards from the meso-limbic system 
to the higher (literally and metaphorically) area of the brain and the frontal lobes that 
are thought to be involved in complex reasoning, moral choice, detailed long-term 
memories and cultural learning and the making of considered decisions in 
awareness. Reason, both pure and practical in Kantian terms is thus qualified by the 
emotional content of the output from the meso-limbic system. 
This process leads me to the second point that I want to make in talking about my 
ideas of beauty in comparison to those of Kant. It follows from the discussion 
immediately above that the "material with which pure and practical reason has to 
work" - the information from the meso limbic system - is not emotionally neutral. 
There are, in a real sense, no purely objective facts of the matter upon which pure 
and practical reason can operate in a totally dispassionate (by which I mean emotion- 
free) way. 
To emphasise the importance of this point, I compare it to the familiar operations of 
Kantian sensibility. As I described in Chapter Two, Kant proposes that all our 
knowledge and experience of objects in the world, upon which Kantian pure reason 
operates, have already been qualified in spatio-temporal terms (have become 
phenomenal) by the pure a priori intuitions of space and time in us. This is the basis 
upon which Kant's transcendental idealism (set out in the Introduction to the 
Transcendental Aesthetic in his First Critique) is built. Kant claims that we can have 
no knowledge and experience of objects other than as they appear to us in spatio- 
temporal terms. 
Similarly, I now claim, on the basis of the evidence of neuroscience described here 
and in the previous chapter, that we can have no knowledge and experience of the 
world other than in emotional terms. Analogously to Kantian sensibility therefore, I 
claim that emotion is a condition for the possibility of the world of objects for us in 
experience. Because the later stages of emotion are felt by us in awareness and 
these feelings both motivate and reward intentional action I claim that we cannot take 
intentional actions - that include the mental actions described in Kantian terms as the 
judgements of reason - in a way that is apart from feelings. Moreover, in behavioural 
terms, actions are either to do with approach or aversion, the emotional correlates of 
which are, in awareness, the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Feelings of 
within the relatively small part of the brain that lies around the brain-stem bulb at the top of the spinal 
chord. Not all neuroscientists agree that emotions emerge only from within the meso-limbic system. 
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pleasure and displeasure are, in turn, the basis of beauty and the aesthetic 
judgement. Thus the enormous importance of the affective experience that we call 
beauty is revealed and supported by neuroscience. 
Because of the importance of this claim for beauty, that it is indispensable to the 
operations of the higher and legislative Kantian faculties of mind, I recapitulate the 
neurological evidence for that claim below. 
According to the positivist pragmatic theory of neural dynamics, the first step in the 
process of perception is an endogenous one. The search for sense stimuli relevant 
to our needs at a particular time and formed within us in terms of the relation 
between the internal conditions within our bodies to the conditions pertaining in the 
outside world, arise in us within the meso-limbic system88 that is situated immediately 
around the brain stem. 89 It is in the meso-limbic system that our general intent 
emerges, for example the need to seek food. The limbic system sends information 
about this general intent upwards to the higher reasoning areas of the brain and to 
the sensory cortices to alert them to the nature of our need and to prepare these 
areas for the expected inflow of sense information from all our sense organs relevant 
to that need. The upward flow of this information is qualified in two ways: spatio- 
temporally and emotionally. Very broadly, it is constituted in spatio-temporal terms in 
order for us to make any sense at all of ourselves in relation to our situation in the 
world of objects and emotion is attached to the information to indicate what sort of 
sense, what sort of meaning, that we need to make of the spatio-temporal 
information. The important point here is that no information reaches the areas of the 
brain that correlate to the operations of reason, memory, learning, culture and history 
unless it has already passed through the meso-limbic system that both spatio- 
temporally constructs it and emotionally contextualises it. 
The next step of the process is for these higher reasoning areas of the brain to send 
their signals, now qualified by cognition, moral value, history and culture, back down 
to the brain stem, via the motor cortices and hence, via the nervous system, to the 
internal organs and musculature of the body to put into effect an action or series of 
88 The small and very ancient part of the brain that includes the bilateral nuclei of the amygdala that lie 
on either side of the brain bulb and are close to the thalamus and hippocampus - see next footnote. 
89 This is also the area that includes the thalamus and hippocampus that are thought to be intimately 
involved in the space-time loop of pro-afference (see Chapter Four). It is where incoming sense data is 
converted into spatio-temporal terms. 
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connected actions in the world. But on the way to the brain stem bulb, a large 
proportion of these signals from the higher reasoning areas of the brain pass through 
the limbic system again and the rational content of these neural signals "seeps into"90 
the continuous formation of emotion in which the meso-limbic system is engaged. 
Thus the next loop of emotional output is itself qualified by pure and practical reason, 
memory, history and culture. This new emotional output from the meso-limbic 
system then flows up to all the higher areas of the brain for reprocessing. But, and 
this is the crucial point, the new information signals reaching, for example, the higher 
part of the brain that deals with cognitive reasoning and understanding, is now itself 
qualified not just by simple emotion as in the first loop of the process; it is qualified by 
a second stage emotional signal that is itself cognitively, morally, culturally and 
historically mediated by the products of the first stage loop. The same sort of 
description would have applied to all the areas of the brain that are involved in the 
formation of memory, morality, culture etc. should I have chosen one or all of these, 
rather than cognition, as my example for the second stage loop. These processes 
occur several times a second and faint (and always slightly changing) traces of them 
persist for long periods of time in our memories. 
By this simplified example we begin to imagine the enormous complexity of the 
processes involved in our everyday - or rather several times each second of every 
day - activities. At the same time the basic idea is the relatively simple one of 
reflexive mediation and relation that is quite different not only from linear causality but 
from circular causality as well. In reflexive processes each and all of the elements 
involved "folds onto"- and hence qualifies - every other element and is also "enfolded 
by" - and thus qualified by - all the other elements. It is easy to represent linear and 
circular causality graphically, but difficult to draw an image of reflexive relation; one 
has to draw ogive shaped curves between each element and every other one and 
even with relatively few elements one ends up with what looks like a series of figures 
of eight superimposed upon each other. The curves merge into one another and it is 
very difficult to see what is going on. This problem is interesting in itself because it 
seems that in our inability to form a coherent (spatio-temporal) image of reflexive 
causality we are pushing at the limits of our own spatio-temporal abilities - or pure a 
90 This "seeping into" or "colouring" of rationality by emotion and emotion by rationality, for example, 
arises, in neurological terms, both because the reflexivity of the loops that connect the specialised 
organs of the brain and because of shared neural pathways - shared circuitry - that carries signals to 
and from the different parts of the brain. More than one type of information is carried on the waveforms 
that flow along these neural pathways at a time. For example output from areas concerned with 
cognition may be carried on the same wav form as output from, say, cultural learning and memory. The 
neural circuits thus act like carrier waves for many different waveforms at once. 
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priori intuitions in Kantian terms. Since these intuitions are, for Kant, the conditions 
of possibility for our cognition of objects and hence our phenomenal understanding, 
and since the latter includes the concept of causality itself, I have the feeling that we 
may not be able to easily resolve this difficulty. 
Returning to the discussion of the support afforded by our neuroscientific 
understanding of the dynamics of the brain in relation to the autonomous faculties of 
mind in the Kantian paradigm, I claim that the idea of wholly autonomous faculties of 
mind is untenable from the standpoint of affective neuroscience. Kantian autonomy 
is, I claim, problematised even by the cognitive passivist model of perception, 91 but is 
made even more problematic by the positivist-pragmatic one. 
The implications of the positivist-pragmatic model of neuroscience for Cabanac's 
economic theory of pleasure as the common currency (in the monetary sense of the 
phrase) of the value judgements involved in decisions between different and 
conflicting motivations is far more encouraging. As I have just described, all the 
ongoing reflexive loops of the activities of the brain are routed through the meso- 
limbic system that generates emotion and hence feelings of pleasure and 
displeasure. 92 In the economic theory of pleasure the meso-limbic system around 
the amygdala93 has a role similar to that of the national Central Bank, the Treasury 
and the Royal Mint combined; it controls the money supply, and prints the money of 
pleasure. The point that I am making is that the particularities of brain dynamics 
according to the positivist-pragmatic model of neurology are compatible with, and 
supportive of, the ideas that I have drawn out from Cabanac's research. In the 
domestic sense of the word economy, the meso-limbic system is analogous to the 
consensual decisions that are required to reconcile the conflicting needs and 
aspirations of family members within the financial constraints of family income. The 
91 The passivist-cognitivist model also regards emotion as indispensable to intentional actions, including 
mental actions. Though the passivist model is not so sophisticated as the positivist one it shares with it 
the central role of emotion in intentional action. 
92 As stated in Chapter Four, about 90% of the output from the higher rational areas of the brain is fed 
back into the reflexive loops within the brain through the limbic system. Only about 10% of brain output 
flows down the spinal chord to the sensory motor and other somatic systems of the body. In other 
words the brain devotes almost all its energies to internal reflexivity, to what might be thought of as 
deciding policy and comparatively little energy to "purely executive commands that enable the 
implementation of policy". 
93 Recent research modifies the idea that pleasure is only generated in the limbic system itself; there 
appear to be other "sub-contracted" areas distributed throughout the brain and I shall address this 
matter in a later section of this chapter. These subsidiary sites will modify but not invalidate the 
argument that I make here. 
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alternative analogies of the operations of a command economy or the decisions 
handed down by a Victorian patriarch are not supported by the observed functional 
dynamics of the brain that are so clearly not based on wholly autonomous structures. 
In writing this chapter so far, several potential difficulties within the narrative have 
occurred to me. I have dealt with some, but not all of them, either because I have not 
been able to see how to resolve them or because I have felt that do so would disrupt 
the narrative flow and the argument that I was developing at that time. Before 
proceeding to the next section of this chapter, I want to comment on some of these 
problems. 
The first of these difficulties relates to the distinction that affective neuroscience 
makes, and which I have used, between emotional responses in relation to stimuli 
that have been learned and those that are thought to have evolved. This is, in broad 
terms, the distinction between nurture and nature as the origin of affective responses. 
It also relates to the distinction between the proximate and the ultimate origin of the 
feelings of pleasure or displeasure that we experience in perception of certain stimuli. 
The question arises as to what are the differences and the relationship, if any, 
between learned and evolved responses that are separated in their emergence within 
us by a vast period of time. What I am looking for is a concept that will relate these 
two types of affective response to each other. 
Earlier in this chapter, I mentioned the work of Garcia (1985) (1990) which 
demonstrated that learned aversive responses neither require the operations of 
higher reason (his experiments with anaesthetised subjects) nor are of any lesser 
strength and predictability than are aversive responses that are thought to have 
evolved and are classified as autonomic. Valuable though that work was, it is of 
limited application because it only refers to unpleasant aversive responses and not to 
pleasurable ones. Caution is needed when generalising from aversive to approach 
responses for two reasons. Firstly, such extrapolations often assume pleasure to be 
the symmetrical opposite of pain or fear, which some neuroscientists, notably 
Freeman (1999b), dispute. Secondly, subjects who are undergoing medical 
procedures (such as the inducing of general anaesthesia) are often in a heightened 
state of anxiety and even fear at the beginning of the study. Such antecedent states 
may well act as a contaminating variable to the variable under study, for example to 
an aversive reaction to a particular food taste. For these reasons, I believe that the 
problem requires a more general conceptual resolution. 
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Because the problem is set up in terms of the dichotomy between nature and 
(cultural/social/historical) nurture, what is at issue here is the by now very familiar 
conflict between the domination and necessities of nature on the one hand and the 
freedom that we seek in culture on the other. That, in a sense, is the ultimate cause 
of the difficulty and is never going to be easily resolved. However, I suggest that 
some progress might be made in looking at the proximate cause of the problem 
instead. This I claim, is the way that homeostasis, which is the ultimate biological 
origin of affective response and intentional action, is defined in terms of a single 
discrete organism in relation to the world beyond its physical boundaries. In theory, 
the optimisation of the internal milieu of such an organism within the context of the 
conditions around it could include the optimisation of its feelings of pleasure that 
result from its social relations and interdependence with other organisms of its own or 
a different kind, but in practice this social aspect is often ignored or reduced to a 
genetic explanation such as its desire to pass on its genetic qualities to future 
generations. The explanation that this desire comes "pre-installed" as instinct, itself a 
genetic explanation of the problem of how animals have this genetic interest, seems 
inadequate and tautological. 
A problem with all phenomenal and hence causal explanations of nature is that they 
are synchronic, an effect is always explained in terms of an antecedent cause that is 
itself the consequence of another cause, and so on. Moreover, these explanations 
are in terms of linear or circular causality that is supposed to occur between 
autonomous, in the sense of discrete, objects. I have already discussed some of the 
problems with the idea of causality in Chapter Four and so do not repeat them here. 
I do not know how this problem is to be resolved, but I suggest that some progress 
might be made if the concept of homeostasis were broadened to take more account 
of the fact that the sort of animals that we have the most interest in (higher 
vertebrates and humans) do not live as singular discrete entities but in social 
groupings that are as indispensable to their survival and well being as are their 
individual homeostatic operations. I am arguing for a neo-homeostasis that is also 
diachronic in terms of its reference to the self-organising dynamics of groups, 94 such 
dynamics being conceived in terms of reflexive rather than linear or circular causality. 
Such a theory would be couched in terms of group interest in the group as such, 
94 This model of homeostasis would differ from the traditional model in a fundamental way, just as the 
algebra of Group theory differs from the algebra of discrete entities. 
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rather than in individual objective interest. 9' What I also have in mind is a 
homeostatic interpretation that has the same form as the self-organising dynamics of 
the brain and which is also similar to the analogy of the dance that I mentioned in the 
previous chapter. 
The second of the difficulties that emerge from this thesis and which I have not so far 
addressed is the question as to whether affective neuroscience distinguishes 
between pleasure and desire as the motivation for intentional action. That is to say, 
is neuroscience using the term pleasure in the same way that Kant does or in the 
way that he uses the term desire, or in a way that is constituted by both of these? 
By the terms pleasure and displeasure, Kant is referring to our feelings that, for him, 
are our immediate awareness of being alive, or of the general effect of something or 
some event on the activity of living. Life, for Kant, is our ability to act according to 
desires and purposes. If an activity furthers our desires and purposes, or if it furthers 
our sense of our general ability to act (our sense of agency) then we call that activity 
pleasurable. If, on the other hand, an activity frustrates our desires, feelings and 
agency we call it displeasurable or painful. 
Pleasure and desire: neuroscience and disinterested beauty 
Although Kant situates feelings and desire in separate and autonomous faculties of 
mind and within each of these two faculties, distinguishes between the higher 
legislative and lower corporeal forms of feeling and desire, he is quite explicit that 
pleasure accompanies the exercise of judgements made in terms of all the faculties 
of mind. Kant claims (Caygill, 1995) that pleasure accompanies every practical 
judgement insofar as "The attainment of every aim is coupled to a feeling of 
pleasure". Similarly pleasure accompanies theoretical judgement, "by reason of the 
most ordinary experience being impossible without it". In the aesthetic judgement of 
taste pleasure assumes an all-important position in which it "denotes nothing in the 
object, but is a feeling which the subject has of itself and of the manner in which it is 
affected by the representation. " As Caygill (1995, p321) remarks, 
"Pleasure/displeasure is well on its way to becoming identified with vital force - with 
95 This sort of approach would enable the incorporation of moral considerations into biological 
explanations of intent, motivation and pleasure. In addition to more self-interest, group interest would 
play an important role and that would facilitate a closer compatibility between the Kantian approach to 
pleasure and aesthetics in which the concept of (objective) disinterest is so important because of Kant's 
interest in analogically relating the aesthetical judgement to (Kantian) practical judgement. 
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the feeling of life - and even the mind as such. " In support of that remark he cites 
from Kant's Critique of Judgement, 
"For, of itself alone, the mind is all life (the life principle itself), and the 
hindrance or furtherance of it has to be sought outside it, and yet within 
human beings themselves, consequently in connection with the body. " 
(prop. 29) 
This is a profound statement even for Kant. From the point of view of reconciling the 
Kantian theory of pleasure and the ideas of affective (embodied) neuroscience it 
would surely lead a "dream team" of quotations. It locates pleasure as something felt 
in the mind yet both fostered and limited by something not of the mind itself, a form of 
critical discursive methodology that is so typically Kantian; and because it is so 
characteristic of his entire critical work, suggests that this is more than a casual 
remark. In its reference to the embodied nature of pleasure it holds out the possibility 
of being commensurate, even compatible with the discourse of neuroscience. It links 
pleasure, via its experience in the mind with "all life" In short, it looks like very good 
news for those who want to use both Kantian aesthetics and affective neuroscience 
to critique, and re-inscribe each other, as I do. This ambition is not directed to 
achieving an identity between these two discursive practices because, were that to 
be achieved, the possibility of mutual criticality (in the Kantian sense of limitation of 
each by reference to something distinguishable from it) would be lost. All that is 
sought here, therefore, is a higher degree of relational interdependence between the 
two paradigms. 
The quotation cited from Kant is certainly useful, but problems remain because Kant 
(1798, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View)96 distinguishes between 
sensuous and intellectual pleasure/displeasure. He subdivides the former into 
pleasure caused by sensation or imagination; he gives examples including food, 
tobacco and sex. Sensuous pleasure/displeasure of the imagination is distinguished 
from sensuous pleasure/displeasure of sensation if it is also a partly intellectual 
pleasure or displeasure. The sensuous pleasures/displeasures of the imagination 
are what is of most interest in this thesis, because examples of these are pleasures 
in beauty and aesthetic taste. 
In his Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant situates the division of 
pleasure/displeasure in a different way. Here, intellectual pleasure is called a 
96 Cited in Caygill (1995). 
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"pleasure of inclination" if it both precedes a determination of desire and involves an 
object. If an intellectual pleasure both precedes a determination of desire and also 
does not refer to an object it is a "contemplative pleasure of taste". If it comes after 
such a determination of desire, Kant calls an intellectual pleasure an "inclination of 
reason". 
This complex taxonomy of pleasure arises from, and exemplifies, Kant's motivations 
for his pleasure of taste. From the above Kantian classifications of pleasure we can 
see that the pleasure of taste is a sensuous pleasure of the imagination because it is 
partly intellectual. But that alone in not sufficient to make it a contemplative pleasure 
of taste; additionally its intellectual element must come before a determination of 
desire (otherwise it would be an inclination of reason) and that intellectual element 
must not involve an object (if it did, it might involve not only objective interest but a 
determinate judgement of understanding). 
This complicated scheme has an analogy in the Critique of Judgement (Caygill, 
1995, p321). In that work, Kant introduces a new taxonomy of delight that is distinct 
from pleasure/displeasure in general and he translates the sensuous, imaginative 
and intellectual pleasures discussed above into the delights of the agreeable, the 
good and the beautiful. Kant, in the third proposition of the Critique of Judgement, 
defines delight as the "sensation of pleasure" and also as the "determination of 
pleasure or pain°. 
Delight in an object that is desired is what Kant calls the agreeable. Delight in the 
good or in perfection is, for Kant, practical (moral) delight. Delight in the beautiful has 
to satisfy more stringent, additional conditions. As I have already mentioned in 
Chapter Three, in my discussion of the Analytic of the Beautiful, our pleasure in the 
beautiful (now called our delight in it) must be without interest, subjectively universal, 
final without end (purposiveness without purpose) and necessary but not containing a 
concept. 
The purpose of my return to these conditions for Kantian beauty in this chapter is to 
discuss if they are compatible, and to what degree they may be so, with the ideas of 
affective neuroscience set out in this and the previous chapter. 
Firstly, are Kants conditions for our delight in beauty, that it is free of interest, 
compatible with affective neuroscience? By the term interest, Kant means (in the 
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Critique of Judgement) either what he calls pathological interest, the interest in the 
real existence of the object as agreeable to the subject's corporeal desires or pure 
interest. Pathological interest is interest in an object, not in itself, but only insofar as 
it is pleasant for me. Pathological interest is thus individual self-interest. By pure 
interest, on the other hand, Kant means an interest in an action for its own sake, as 
good in itself, as will based on principles of reason alone. Pure interest is a moral 
interest in the common good. Like pleasure in beauty at the level of aesthetic 
judgement, pure interest is universal and consensually agreed. Kant's motivation for 
separating these two aspects of desire is to ensure the autonomy of the moral law 
from the pathological interests that it is supposed to regulate. Kant defines the 
quality of the aesthetic judgement of taste in proposition five of his third Critique as 
being apart from any interest, either pure or pathological. This move is necessary 
because if the aesthetic judgement has interest, either pure or pathological, in the 
real existence of objects, then it is in danger, as we have seen in Chapter Three, of 
identification with determinate judgements (such as cognition), which invalidate the 
formal, reflective nature of the judgement of taste. As Caygill (1995, p261) points 
out, the judgement of taste avoids being directed towards the discrete ends desired 
by reason, both pure and applied, but is rather a question of orientation in the world. 
Science in general does not concern itself with the real existence of objects; it simply 
assumes the reality of objects for the purposes of its discursive operations. Because 
the philosophy of science, though not all scientists, recognises this assumption, I 
claim that science recognises the contingency of real objects. In his First Critique 
Kant is only interested in objects in so far as we can have epistemic relations to them 
in experience. In this respect Kantian and scientific thought are, as Clement 
Greenberg pointed out in his essay Modernist Painting, very similar. 97 Science 
(though not all scientists) is indifferent to the questions about the absolute existence 
of objects. Kant denies such existence for the world of objects, but that difference is 
not relevant to this discussion. Both Kant and science, I claim, recognise the 
contingency of real objects. 
97 It seems likely that Greenberg may have had in mind Kant's explicitly stated admiration for the work of 
Isaac Newton. Even in the 1960's scientific thought had long since ceased to be based on Newtonian 
concepts and is even less dependent on them today. So although Greenberg was correct in linking 
Kantian thought to the scientific thought of a generation or two before Kant, the same link cannot be 
sustained between Kant and science today. 
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The important area of discussion here centres on the question of whether pleasure in 
terms of affective neuroscience is distinct or not from Kantian pathological interest or 
corporeal desire. Ten years or so ago, the answer to that question would probably 
have been that it was not. At that time, neuroscience tended to conflate corporeal 
desire and feelings of pleasure together; most research into affect was directed to 
finding neurological correlates for approach behaviour and motivation in terms of 
desire, a term that was not distinguished from pleasure. Neuroscience had identified 
the neurocircuits and the neurochemical involved, dopamine, as the stimulus for 
intentional action and the reward for such actions that have value for survival and 
well-being. A very large body of research supported this point of view. 98 Typical of 
that research, were experiments in which animal and human subjects were given 
drugs to block the dopamine receptors in the brain. Experimenters observed loss of 
motivational behaviour and appetite in these subjects. In experiments on rats, 
Berridge and Robinson (1998) completely destroyed the dopamine production 
system in the rats' brains using neurotoxins, and observed that they would voluntarily 
starve to death, even in the presence of food, unless the experimenter intervened 
and fed them. When force-fed with sweet food such as sugar, the rats showed 
positive behavioural response, and when force-fed with quinine, which is bitter, they 
showed negative responses. Such reactions to sugar and quinine are entirely normal 
and expected in rats. Berridge concluded that the rats, despite the destruction of 
their dopamine-fuelled reward area in the brain, could still experience pleasure and 
displeasure in relation to food; they still "liked" sweet food and "disliked" bitter food, 
yet felt no "need" for either. Subsequent experiments were carried out on human 
subjects who were given drugs to temporally block or enhance their brains' dopamine 
receptors and thus their appetite for food. Each subject made taste reports when 
given various foods that they had either liked or disliked before the drugs had been 
administered. Their reports on taste remained exactly the same in terms of liking or 
disliking each of the different foods (as did their reports on the intensity of these 
feelings) and appeared completely independent of their enhanced or diminished 
desire for food. 
Following Berridge's early work, many other experimenters studied the response of 
both human and other animals to a variety of different stimuli and reached the 
general conclusion that pleasure may be experienced without desire. More recently 
the reverse procedure has been investigated; Pecina & Berridge (2000) gave people 
98 Research on how the dopamine system works has never been short of funding because of its 
perceived relevance to alleviating the social problems resulting from drug addiction. 
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the chemical naloxone, which blocks the naturally occurring brain opioids, such as 
endorphins and encephalins that have long been associated with pleasure 
responses. The effect of naloxone is to suppress the intensity of pleasure. The 
subjects reported loss of taste in foodstuffs but showed no reduction in the amount 
consumed. Though their pleasure in food was greatly reduced their desire for it was 
not. 
The experiments described above refer, in Kantian terms, to pathological interest, to 
corporeal desire. They are all studies that involve the subjects' pleasure and/or 
desire for discrete objects that have been determined in cognition by the subjects. 
They are about individual self-interest in the objects insofar as they provide pleasure 
for the subject in consumption and do not involve an interest in the object in itself, or 
as such. Panksepp J (1998) found that young rats that exhibit distress when 
separated from their mothers released opioids in their brains and exhibited normal 
calm behaviour when their mothers returned to them. They also exhibited the same 
change of behaviour when their brain opioid production was artificially increased and 
their mothers did not return to them. Panksepp concluded that feelings of social 
pleasures, particularly comfort and safety associated with social bonding are 
produced by opioids too. The link to social pleasure is interesting, I suggest, 
because although it clearly does not go so far as to link natural opioid production in 
the brain to Kantian moral feeling, it does link it to social behaviour. The importance 
of Panksepp's study is that it differs from previous research that linked a subject's 
opioid production and pleasure experience to phenomenal objects such as food. 
Now, however, such a connection is established in the context of the relation of 
individual subjects to other humans: to noumenal objects. Social pleasure of this sort 
seems to be more appropriately described in terms of Kantian pure interest rather 
than pathological interest. 
Following on from the experiments described above, a great deal of work has been 
done on the detailed structures of the brain that initiate and receive both opioid and 
dopamine production. The current view is that the site of opioid production is the 
ventral palladium, a small region within the limbic system immediately adjacent to 
nucleus accumbens that produces dopamine. Berridge, & Robinson (2003) have 
shown that the output of dopamine passes through the nucleus of the ventral 
palladium where it is qualified with feelings of liking or disliking and then passed on to 
the cortex of the brain. This description is, as they acknowledge, a simplification 
because much of the neurological circuitry for the production of pleasure producing 
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opioids is shared with that for dopamine production that leads to desire; and some of 
this sharing extends right down to individual cell level. 
The production and reception of pleasure enhancing opioids is also far more complex 
than previously thought. According to Rolls (2000) and his group, pleasure is not just 
produced in the very deep areas of the brain, as previously thought, but in many 
other areas of the brain as well. Initially, these secondary pleasure production sites 
were identified in the orbitofrontal cortex (one of the first areas of the brain to process 
incoming sense information). More recently, Rolls has found such secondary sites all 
over the cerebral cortex; opioid producing cells and clusters of cells are distributed 
through out the brain. The really astonishing aspect of this research is the extreme 
specificity of the very small number of neurons that comprise these sites. 9 Some of 
these tiny areas respond, for example to sweet tasting but not to fatty tasting food, 
some respond to the subjects being given a financial reward but not to other stimuli. 
Rolls and his group have concluded that although most of these very specific 
pleasure response areas may well be the result of evolution, many of them are not 
and have been formed through individual learning and experience. 
Before discussing the possible implications of all this research for aesthetics, I want 
to sound a note of caution, particularly in respect of the earlier experiments that used 
drugs to block dopamine receptors or the production of opioids. These experiments 
showed that certain animals and humans could feel pleasure without desire and 
desire without pleasure. The experiments did not take place in normal (drug free) 
circumstances and therefore are not a demonstration that we or other animals 
experience pleasure and desire separately in everyday life. However, the later drug 
free fMRl experiments of Rolls and others have tended to confirm Bemdge's 
conclusions inasmuch as they have shown that the brain circuitry and neuro- 
chemicals that appear to be the neurological correlates of pleasure and desire 
(conceived as liking and wanting respectively) are distinguishable in their operational 
functions and in subsequent behaviour patterns of subjects but also share some of 
their neurological properties together. I think it is fair to claim, as I do, that 
contemporary affective neuroscience supports the view that to distinguish between 
pleasure and desire is more than a semantic nicety, but less than an absolute 
distinction. 
99 The use of fMRI scanning, with its extremely fine spatio-temporal resolution has made this micro level 
research possible. See for example, Kringlebach, Do Araujo & Rolls (2003). 
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Affective neuroscience thus both supports and contests Kant's taxonomy of pleasure. 
It supports his view that desire for an object is not the same as taking pleasure in its 
presentation to us. Neuroscience also supports the idea (evidenced by the work of 
Berridge and others) that the possibility exists for us to take disinterested pleasure in 
an object's presentation to us even though we have no desire for it merely through 
our own pathological interest in it. However, neuroscience does not imply that 
pleasure and desire (as interest) are autonomous from each other and that we 
usually experience pleasure and desire separately from each other. Because the 
main production site of opioids (the ventral palladium) is so close to that for 
dopamine (the nucleus accumbens), and because the ventral palladium takes its 
signals from the nucleus accumbens and the outputs from both these organs share 
some of the same neurological circuitry, it is very likely that in normal (drug-free) 
conditions we experience pleasure that is, to a degree at least, mediated by desire 
and hence by the Kantian equivalent of interest. Moreover, because the time taken 
for the output from the nucleus accumbens to reach the ventral palladium is very 
short (because they are so close to each other) the signals from both these organs 
could not be differentiated in time10° in terms of our experience of them. Yet, as 
discussed earlier in this chapter, Kant insists that the intellectual element of the 
contemplative judgement of taste must come before the determination of desire. I 
claim that there simply isn't time for that to happen. Even if we experienced the 
intellectual element before it became mediated by a determination of desire, we 
would do so for only a few milliseconds and would not be able to distinguish it as a 
separate experience. 
Such a claim is deeply problematic for the Kantian distinction between the sensuous 
pleasures of the imagination (that includes beauty and the aesthetic judgement) and 
the pleasures of sensation. The former has both a sensuous element and an 
intellectual one that precedes desire and does not involve an object. The latter is 
given by objects and therefore may involve desire, as for example, does delight in the 
agreeable which is experienced in relation to physical objects and delight in the good, 
which is reasoned in relation to mental objects. The focus of my interest is the 
(Kantian) beautiful and the judgement of tastes that are sensuous pleasures of the 
imagination and so cannot involve desire in relation to an object. 
100 Humans cannot resolve experiences separated by less than about 150 milliseconds, which is a very 
much longer time than is required for dopamine mediated signals to reach the ventral palladium. 
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I claim that affective neuroscience obviously problematises the Kantian distinction 
between the beautiful on the one hand, and the agreeable and the good on the other. 
The agreeable refers to an object that is pathologically desired and the good to the 
object of pure desire that is the intellectual product of practical reason and 
imagination. In practice, I claim, we cannot discriminate in our experience between 
these different pleasures for three different reasons. 
Firstly because, as discussed above, pleasure is, to a degree at least, mediated by 
desire in normal circumstances, though this link may be severed in exceptional 
circumstances which involve intervention to block dopamine receptors. 
Secondly, because of the limitations of our ability to resolve events as separated in 
time, we are not able to distinguish, in our experience, the sequence of events in 
which pleasures and desires emerge into feelings in our awareness. 
Thirdly, I claim that we cannot distinguish between the qualities of different 
pleasures. By this I mean that, as embodied feelings in us, pleasures arising from 
judgements of pure reason, practical reason and aesthetics all feel the same to us. 
This is because the response in our bodies that we call pleasure is the same in 
respect to different stimuli of the same class. There are, I claim, only two such 
classes: pleasurable stimuli and displeasurable ones. What I am claiming here is 
that affective experience has only two forms, and that we can make distinctions 
between these forms but not within them. Certainly, we can, and do attribute our 
experience within each of these two forms to our relations to different objects, but I 
am claiming that such predications onto objects are no more (and also no less) than 
explanations we make to ourselves about the feelings of pleasure and displeasure 
that we have had. We learn to construct these explanations socially, we learn them 
in discursive practices, but the feeling of pleasure as such is not Qualitatively different 
for any of these explanations or indeed from the pleasure that we experience in 
constructing these explanations and discourses. In a sense pleasure as such has no 
history for us as we experience it. More precisely, it may have a history but we do 
not know it in the moment that we experience it, because it is not qualitatively 
differentiated according to origin. We might be able to differentiate it according to 
when we experience it, but as I have explained above, pleasure centres are located 
throughout the brain in areas that deal with what we have learned to call moral, 
social, cognitive, corporeal etc. functions. Pleasure signals are produced from all 
these areas very rapidly and appear to us to take place at the same time, and what 
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interests me, both as a student of visual art and of Kant, is the world of experience as 
we experience it. 
I claim that my idea that pleasure does not reveal the origin in us from whence it 
came, that its history is not available to us through the quality of our experience of 
pleasure itself, is entirely consistent with Cabanac's theory of pleasure as the 
common currency for motivating and rewarding intentional action and as a means of 
resolving emotional conflicts. If, for example, we look at the money that we are 
carrying about with us we know its value as to quantity but not as to quality. The 
individual notes and coins only vary in respect of the magnitude of the value they 
denominate. We may know where the money was minted but that is not important to 
us. We may also know that we withdrew a certain amount of cash from a bank 
machine a few days previously but we also know that the money in hand did not all 
come from that source because it includes change from various purchases that we 
have made subsequently and we cannot distinguish which note or coin came from 
which shop. Moreover, we don't care. We have no idea of the particular history of a 
particular note or coin yet we know that it has passed through many hands and been 
involved in many transactions. Some of these may have been morally good actions 
and some entirely otherwise. Some of the things purchased by the money in the past 
may have been aesthetically pleasing or otherwise. We could write an entire novel 
about the life history of a single coin. Such a work might well be boring; it would 
certainly be entirely speculative and irrelevant to what we now decide to spend the 
money on. The money in our hand reveals nothing about its origin or the causal 
chain of events that preceded our possession of it. It also tells us nothing specific 
about the objects that we shall spend it on; though it places limits on these choices, 
they result from the quantity of money and not its quality. It only contains quantitative 
information. 
So it is, I claim, with our reflections on the quality of pleasure. We cannot distinguish 
between feelings that result from, for example, ten percent pleasure in cognition or 
understanding, thirty percent moral concepts, thirty seven percent aesthetic 
judgement of taste, and twenty three percent corporeal desire, or from situations in 
which all, or some of these percentages are reversed. We would be able to make 
such distinctions if the pleasure we derive from particular judgements came "colour 
coded" or if the faculties of mind, when exercised individually (which, in 
neuroscientific terms they never are) or in combinations came to us with a specifying 
"bar-code" attached that could be read at some "check out" in the mind. I propose 
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that there is no colour code or bar-coding for pleasures arising from different 
judgements and faculties and all the checkout consists of is an old fashioned till that 
simply counts the money. 101 
There are several significant difficulties with this model in its application to decision 
making. As Cabanac has pointed out, we do not take decisions by simply choosing 
the action that we anticipate will provide us with the most pleasure; instead we 
choose to do what results in the maximisation of the algebraic sum of pleasure and 
displeasure. If we choose a particular action we take into account the displeasure 
that will result from the frustration of other actions that we might have taken, but 
which have been precluded by the action that we intend to take. For example, if we 
forego a choice to satisfy corporeal interest, we may obtain moral pleasure as a 
result. This moral pleasure may be slight in the moment of choice, but we can 
foresee that over time it will result in greater pleasure for others and for us too. We 
are acting to avoid future displeasure. The pleasure that is immediately the greatest 
does not always win out. A further complication is that pleasure and desire, in 
neuroscientific terms, are not wholly separable or autonomous for the reasons 
already discussed. I suggest that this is an advantage as well as a disadvantage, 
because a degree of specific objective interest within pleasure itself may be the 
means by which we relate pleasure to actions in respect to objects in the world. If all 
pleasures feel qualitatively the same, as we experience them within ourselves, we 
must have something to link pleasure to particular objective conditions in order to 
take action relevant to those same conditions. This may be the function of desire in 
decision-making. I refer here to the lower rather than to the higher form of this 
Kantian faculty of mind. That is to say, I refer to corporeal desire or gratification 
rather than to pure desire in the exercise of reason. 
A further important point emerges from what I claim is the qualitative commonality of 
pleasure that results from the exercise of judgements that involve different faculties 
of mind. My point here is that is precisely because the qualitative aspect of these 
pleasures is the same for us in experience that we are able to re-predicate pleasure 
101 I do not suggest that we are not at all interested in the political, social and economic conditions (the 
means of production) in which goods and services are produced, but simply that information about these 
matters is not given in the object that is money itself. 
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from one faculty of mind (that I regard as a mental object102 of reason) and 
imagination) onto another mental object (faculty). Additionally, this goes some way 
to explaining how it is that we can re-assign the pleasure felt in the presentation of a 
particular real object in the world to one faculty of mind to another faculty of mind as 
well. 
For example we experience pleasure in the mere cognition and recognition of all 
objects; and let us suppose that we cognise a group of identical cookie jars on a 
shelf. The affective result is that of cognition that we experience in all objects. 
Through the process of aesthetic education and the productions of Andy Warhol we 
can also come to refer these same cookie jars to our faculty of aesthetic feeling and 
judgement. The result is that our pleasure is still predicated on the cookie jars but is 
greatly increased in magnitude. 103 We are not aware of feeling two distinct kinds of 
pleasure simultaneously. The pleasures in the different judgements are 
complementary rather than competitive. A more general example is the ease with 
which we re-predicate the pleasure that we take in natural objects onto art objects. 
We experience pleasure in the beauty of our fellow humans. Presumably this 
predication has evolved for reasons connected with reproduction and the production 
of healthy offspring, yet we also take pleasure in paintings of beautiful people and 
even in paintings that are not figurative at all and have no direct connection to 
reproduction. This pleasure that we take may be explicable in terms of similarities of 
spatio-temporal form or colour as form between all these objects and I shall return to 
that a little later. An alternative explanation is that pleasure actually is the formal 
quality common to all experience that enables these endless re-predications that we 
make. 
This suggests that the pleasure as form felt by us in the presentation of objects that 
are directly relevant to homeostasis is qualitatively the same as the pleasure we take 
in objects that are not. It would serve no obvious natural purpose for it to be 
different, and would make learning as re-predication onto different objects more 
102 My point is that it is all too easy to reify the products of our imagination and thus regard them as 
really existent discrete objects; we get so used to the autonomous Kantian faculties of mind that we 
forget their contingency on just those operations of mind that they explain. 
103 Some of the increased pleasure may result from the fact that we are, in looking at an array of cookie 
jars, experiencing the pleasures not only of cognition and presentation, as would be the case for a single 
cookie jar, but of recognition and representation provided by repetition. In Kantian terms we should not 
judge an array of objects beautiful because beauty is always singular. Again, affective quality of 
experience is being changed by quantity, this time being increased rather than decreased as in 
Panksepp's experiments, described earlier. 
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difficult. If pleasure is to be the common currency of motivation, intentional action 
and reward for homeostatic enhancement it needs to be able to be assign value to 
the complete range of possible actions. There is no advantage and only 
disadvantage to having different currencies circulating within an economy at the 
same time. Yet pleasure needs to have some specific connection to objects, 
especially if the quality of pleasure is the same for all objective experience. Without 
an objective moment to pleasure we could not discern which of the objects in 
perception were pleasurable and this supports the point made earlier that it is the 
function of desire to provide that specific objective moment for all pleasure. The fact 
that the ventral palladium receives the output of the nucleus accumbens, that 
pleasure is always constituted, to a degree, by desire appears to support that view 
because desire is objectively interested and specific. 
Because Kant uses the term form in an ambiguous and sometimes aporetic way it is 
appropriate to temporarily suspend the main discussion here in order to explain my 
own use of that word. Broadly, I have followed Kant's usage as my thesis has moved 
from one Kantian topic to another. Thus, in Chapter Two I use the word in the way 
that Kant does in his First Critique: form is restricted to meaning the pure a priori 
intuitions of space and time that enable and order phenomenal objects of sense for 
us. Such form, for Kant, is not derived by abstraction from matter. Kant describes 
this type of form as "form of sense" and contrasts it to the "forms of understanding" 
which relate to objects of thought; these two types of Kantian form together make 
possible synthetic knowledge. 
In the Second Critique Kantian form refers to the universal form of moral law in so far 
as it is suitable as the determining ground for free will: it is only the form of an action 
that has moral significance and not the desired material ends to which the action is 
directed. This meaning of Kantian form is relevant to this thesis because the Kantian 
(moral) judgement of practical reason shares its form with his aesthetic judgement. 
In his Third Critique Kant attempts to resolve the oppositional relation between form 
and matter that is apparent in his previous work described above. Kant's strategy, 
described in Chapter Three is to bring form and matter closer together through his 
use of proportionality or ratio between understanding (the determination of matter 
under concept) and the imagination (the determinable in general). In the Critique of 
Judgement form, as the quality of the aesthetic judgement of taste, remains 
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abstracted from matter just as it did in the moral context of the Second Critique. Kant 
claims that aesthetic quality is independent of the matter of the art object and 
consists only in its pure finality of form. Yet, as Caygill (1995, p204) points out, Kant 
claims in another passage of the same Critique that this pure finality of form can only 
be revealed by means of contrasting it with the "charm" or the matter of a judgement 
of taste. This aporia exemplifies the crux of the problem of Kantian form, which 
Caygill lucidly summarises in his statement that form and matter must be mutually 
implicated since form, as determination, is meaningless without matter to be 
determined. As Caygill goes on to write, 
this opposition is analogously played out in Kant's texts as form as purity, 
matter as impurity; form as universality, matter as particularity, form as 
identity, matter as dii%rence; and even form as subject and matter as object. 
(1995, p204) 
Throughout my thesis I have referred to correlated dichotomies such as those 
between autonomy and heteronomy; freedom and necessity; consensual agreement 
and self-interest; ipseity and alterity, and so on, but common to all these binary 
oppositions is the failure of modernism to acknowledge that autonomous rather than 
relational entities are a consequence of a chosen ideological position. 
Form is particularly important to these last chapters of my text because in them I 
choose a different position, and thus move away from the traditional opposition 
between form and matter. Kant refers form to a finite, noumenal human subject 
though he certainly recognises the importance of that subject's social and moral 
feelings and obligations. I want to emphasise that social role by referring to a subject 
that does not simply engage in relations with other people and the world but is 
constituted by, and in turn constitutes, those relations. Such a view of the human is 
exemplified by the reflexive and recursive nature of the dynamical operations of 
perception described in the positivist-pragmatist model of neuroscience described 
earlier. 
An important aspect of my thesis is the idea that the social macro-scale activities of 
people, the meso-scale dynamical relations between the brain and the body and the 
world, together with the micro-scale intra-brain activities within individuals all share 
the same reflexive and recursive dynamical form. Form, albeit of a different nature to 
Kantian form, is a very important concept for me, as it was for Kant. My turn to 
neuroscience in Chapter Four, to find a discipline that is largely extraneous to 
Kantian philosophy in order to critique it, has had the significant result of undermining 
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the traditional opposition between form and matter. That is because the origin of the 
reflexive and recursive form of the dynamical operations of the embodied brain that 
neuroscience correlates to mind, is abstracted from matter. More accurately, it is 
abstracted not from discrete material entities but from the dynamical relations 
between non-discrete entities. Such a form is not wholly immaterial because its 
ground involves dynamical relations between material objects that are the brain, the 
body and the world. I do not claim in this thesis that the mind is the brain but only 
that what we designate discursively as mind has a correlate in the relation between 
the three semantic entities of the brain, body and world in relation. Similarly, when I 
employ my extended theory of beauty as pleasure (based on Cabanac's economic 
model of intentional actions) I write of pleasure and displeasure as qualitatively 
independent of the specific mental and physical actions that they motivate and 
reward; pleasure becomes the common currency and pathway of all intentional 
actions. 
That looks like a very formal theory of pleasure, but it is not formal in the traditional 
sense because I do not mean to imply that pleasure and displeasure as form are 
wholly abstracted from either mental or material objects or actions. Rather, I see 
pleasure and displeasure as a common space or field of feeling that motivates and 
rewards all of these but is not qualitatively specified by either mental or material 
objects alone. The form that I describe here is both mental and material in origin 
because it stands in relation to both the mental and material natures of humanity, 
mediating one with the other. Thus beauty as pleasure becomes the means of 
bringing phenomena and noumena together in the human. 
The major problem with using the positivist-pragmatist model of neuroscience to 
critique the general Kantian system of the taxonomy of pleasure, autonomous 
faculties of mind (ultimately based on the autonomous categories) and autonomous 
forms of judgement is that the former is based in reflexive operations between non- 
discrete entities within a self-organising system and the latter deals in linear 
causality, discrete entities, and autonomous judgements. There will always be 
difficulties in terms of compatibility and commensurability between the two systems. 
But, in a sense, that is the point of using neuroscience to critique Kantian aesthetics; 
it is within the locus of such difficulties that creative insights and partial solutions 
occur. No claim is made here that neuroscience is somehow more objectively 
truthful (whatever that may mean) than Kantian introspection, or the converse. 
However, they are distinguishable narratives, even meta-narratives, within which the 
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nature of beauty may be considered. They are not wholly distinct because Kantian 
thought, particularly in respect to its self-criticality, has been influenced by what are 
now termed classical scientific ideas. Neuroscience in turn, indeed all science, has 
been strongly influenced by the Kantian systematic method; it still deals within the 
terms of cognition, reason, affective feelings etc in a systematic way that carries 
traces of Kantian thought, though sometimes it tries quite hard not to. 
Returning now to the relationship between Kant's treatment of pleasure as beauty 
and aesthetical judgement in his Analytic of The Beautiful, and comparing it to certain 
conclusions drawn from affective neuroscience, we have already seen that, in term of 
the latter, the Kantian absolute distinction between the beautiful, the agreeable, and 
the good cannot be sustained for the reasons given above. In broad terms, it is fair 
to say that the positivist- pragmatist view supports the Kantian claim that beauty, as 
pleasure, is not given in sensation by objects but is a feeling within us that is apart 
from objective interest. Against that conclusion, is the fact that contemporary 
affective neuroscience research demonstrates that pleasure and objective desire are 
not wholly autonomous because they share, in part, the same neurological circuitry 
and the part of the output of the dopamine-based desire production in the brain feeds 
into the opioid-based main pleasure producing centre. I think it is fair to conclude 
that neuroscience supports the Kantian view that beauty is largely apart from 
objective interest with the proviso that beauty contains within itself an objective 
moment mediated in terms of interest. 104 Such a conclusion is very much within the 
neo-Kantian paradigm that Adorno constructs and which was mentioned briefly in 
Chapter Three. Indeed in those terms, the objective moment of beauty is necessary 
for beauty to maintain a degree of autonomy from objective interest. 
Questions remain as to whether or not affective neuroscience, particularly in the 
context of the positivist-pragmatic model, support or contest the Kantian claim that 
beauty and the judgement of taste are subjectively universal, exhibit purposiveness 
without purpose, and are subjectively necessary without reference to a particular 
concept. These are the matters that Kant examines at length in his Arguments of 
The Deduction in the Third Critique when he returns to his discussion of the beautiful 
after a long detour into the notion of the sublime, though they also begin to emerge 
within the Analytic of The Beautiful. Because I have discussed them in Chapter 
104 That is to say an objective moment that is "tinged" with desire and not simply given by objects as 
sensation. 
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Three, I shall not do so again here, but simply comment on them from the point of 
view of positivist-pragmatist neuroscience. 
There is a general difficulty involved in any detailed comparison, on a point-by-point 
basis, between the Kantian arguments in both his Analytic and Deduction and the 
conclusions of affective neuroscience. This is because the systematic structure of 
Kantian argumentation that is made in terms of autonomous categories, faculties of 
mind and judgements, is not reflected in the discourse of neuroscience which 
proceeds on the basis of non-linear causality, and reflexive operational dynamics 
between organs of the brain that are far from autonomous from each other. 
Technical arguments in one paradigm are often not directly translatable and able to 
carry meaning into the other. There are, in other words, problems of 
commensurability between the two paradigms in which technical arguments proceed 
within the context of significantly different methodologies and disciplinary concerns. 
For these reasons I do not give a point-by-point discussion of Kant's text in relation to 
neuroscience at the micro level of argumentation. Instead, I look to the general 
concerns and motivations of Kant's text on beauty and compare it to the general 
conclusions of the positivist-pragmatist model of neuroscience. Broadly, therefore, 
my comparison proceeds at the level of intent because I believe that this is where the 
similarities and differences most clearly appear. 
Firstly, I ask if Kant's claim that beauty and taste are subjectively universal is 
supported by affective neuroscience. Kant's interest here is to establish his idea of 
common sense (sensus communis) as the a priori, hence subjective, principle of the 
judgement of taste, that ensures the universality of our ability to respond to the 
beautiful. Underlying this interest in universality, for Kant, is the need for our 
response to the beautiful to be universally communicable between people. Kant has 
already established, in the First Critique, this universal communicability for objective 
cognition, and via his supposition of an optimum ratio between the elements of 
imagination and understanding both for cognition of objects and for an estimation of 
beauty, developed in the Third Critique, he links the aesthetic to the cognitive 
judgement and "borrows" the universal communicability of the former for the latter. 
The problems that this move creates have already been discussed in Chapter Three. 
Kant also needs universal communicability in the judgement of taste if he is to 
symbolically and analogically link it to his moral philosophy that rests upon reasoned 
consensual agreement for the common interest and not merely individual self- 
interest. He needs his faculties of mind to work harmoniously together for the good 
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of the organism that is the individual and he needs individuals to work in the same 
way for their common (moral) good. For both these reasons he needs 
communicability that is both intra- and inter-subjective. Neuroscience has a similar 
pre-occupation with intra-subjective communicability, and has some, though less, 
interest in the latter. 105 Affective neuroscience sees the role of pleasure and 
displeasure as crucial to the resolution of different motivations that arise from the 
operations within the brain that broadly correlate to the operations of the Kantian 
faculties. Pleasure, in the positivist-pragmatist model of neuroscience, is the 
common currency of decision making and is the inducement and the reward for 
behaviours that enhance homeostasis: a concept not unlike that contained in 
proposition 29 of the Critique of judgement cited earlier in this chapter, 
For, of itself alone, the mind is all life (the life principle itself), and the 
hindrance or furtherance of it has to be sought outside it, and yet within 
human beings themselves, consequently in connection with the body. " 
Kant is taking a view of the purpose of mind that is very close to the homeostatic 
view of the purpose of brain. Feelings of pleasure are indispensable for both 
paradigms. 
We saw in Chapter Four that Freeman (1999b) regarded feelings as ultimately 
private and solipsistic in contrast to emotions that are immediately public. This looks 
like a negation of my claim that affective neuroscience supports the universal 
communicability of Kantian beauty and aesthetic taste as feelings in us. By the term 
feelings, Freeman means that which we experience in the mind as emotions 
mediated by our entire life history, culture, memories etc. Such highly individual 
experience is not easily, or perhaps even ultimately, communicable to others. On the 
other hand, he strongly supports the idea that our immediate emotions and our 
emerging intentional actions are communicable. The distinction here is between the 
very beginning and the end of the gestalt process that builds emotions into feelings. 
Where the line is drawn between emotions and feelings is arbitrary within a process 
that is a continuum. It is true to say, however, that neuroscience considers inter- 
subjective communications in general at a level below the Kantian level of discursive 
practice leading to consensual agreement. Neuroscience, including Freeman's 
writings, agrees that the basic emotions of approach or aversion, that imply a general 
105 As evidenced by the currently developing interest in neuroscience applied to social psychology. 
There is current interest (J Banfield and A van der Lugt) in these matters at the University of 
Magdeburg, Germany, and at Dartmouth College, NH, USA. This research is in progress and at the 
time of writing no papers have yet been published on the affective responses of two or more subjects in 
conversation. 
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feeling of pleasure or displeasure are immediately apparent to others as changes in 
our embodiment, as actions such as facial expression, postural changes etc. These 
are powerful means of communication that apply across language and even species 
barriers in an immediate way that spoken or written communication does not. They 
are far less ambiguous and more trustworthy than words as indicators of basic 
emotions. Kant claims that both ordinary cognition and the aesthetic judgement rest 
upon the same unique conditions. 106 Neuroscience claims that these conditions, the 
spatio-temporal encoding of all sense input and its mediation in terms of 
pleasure/displeasure are common to all subjects and inform all mental activities. I 
claim that neuroscience does, on balance, support the Kantian idea that the feeling of 
pleasure in beauty is, via the instantly public nature of emotion, universally 
communicable to others. 
Kant claims that beauty in both nature and art is seen by us to be purposive but 
without purpose in the sense that it appears to be made for a purpose, which is 
conceptually and necessarily unavailable to us. This is equivalent to claiming that 
beauty has finitude, it is complete in itself, but has no end. In the particular case of 
art, Kant claims that the artwork may have some purpose involved in its production 
only and that knowledge of such purpose is insufficient for us to determine the object 
as beautiful, though it may, coincidentally be so. Kant relates purposiveness to the 
intentionality of the artist, yet there is more at stake than that, because for Kant, 
purposiveness as such is the explanation of our feeling of pleasure in aesthetic 
judgement. This claim is based on the argument that the achievement of any 
purpose is pleasurable and, in the absence of any knowable concept of purpose it is 
purposiveness, through it's as if relation to purpose, that provides pleasure for us. 
The two basic demonstrations that Kant gives to support this claim rely on the 
aesthetical and cognitive judgements sharing the same unique a priori conditions 
once again and we return to the argument Kant made in the previous section (that 
rested upon his concept of common sense as sensus communis) that the former 
therefore enjoys the same universal communicability as the latter, and therefore act 
in harmony in their relation or proportion to each other. 
What does neuroscience make of all this? Neuroscience is not really interested in 
the purposiveness of pleasure because it has a very clear idea of the ultimate 
106 As discussed in Chapter Three as the standard objection to Kant that refers to the necessary 
conditions for cognition being the sufficient ones from aesthetic judgement. 
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purpose of pleasure: the means the body employs for enhancing homeostasis and as 
the reward107 for doing just that. Neuroscience is not faced with the problem of 
harmonising the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding to produce 
pleasure because it regards pleasure and displeasure as indispensable to the 
operations of all mental activities rather than the result of some proportion or ratio 
between them. Within affective neuroscience pleasure is the optimising agent in the 
operations of all actions, mental or physical rather than the consequence of 
proportional activity between (mental) actions. It is true that pleasure acts also as a 
reward for activity that has homeostatic utility, but that is to refer pleasure to the body 
as a whole in its relation to the world rather than to particular mental activities or 
some ratio between them. This is a fundamentally different standpoint from which to 
consider pleasure compared to that of Kant. It might be argued, that pleasure as the 
common currency of all intentional action and as the means of resolving conflicting 
motivations, mental or physical, displays purposiveness rather than purpose because 
pleasure, like money, has no specific objective end. That is only true in the 
somewhat paradoxical sense that pleasure has no specific objective end because it 
is relevant to all ends. I do not accept the view that the plurality of all ends excludes 
from within itself singular objective ends. I cannot see how neuroscience can be 
enlisted to support the Kantian argument for beauty as purposive without purpose. 
Although I recognise the ingenuity of Kant's argument here, I also sense that he is in 
some difficulty with this part of his Deduction; it is more than usually aporetic and 
contradictory, and I am prepared to exclude it from my own conditions for beauty. 
This brings me to the last point for consideration, which is that, for Kant, beauty and 
the judgement of taste are subjectively necessary (lie a priori in us) without reference 
to a particular concept. In making this claim, Kant is talking about necessity as a 
modal concept, he is referring to the manner or form of the judgement itself rather 
than to its content. That is to say, he is claiming that the aesthetic judgement 
behaves as if it were conditioned by an a priori principle. Kant therefore claims that 
the aesthetic judgement is singular (as I have discussed previously) and is 
exemplary. He also claims the aesthetic judgement is conditional on the subjective a 
priori principle of taste which Kant claims is common sense as sensus communis. 
We are back to common sense again and it is difficult to see how the claim for the 
107 Neuroscience is not concerned with the Kantian view that the expectation of reward or punishment is 
not a proper motivation for disinterested action. This moral view finds its aesthetic analogue in Kant's 
theory of beauty as purposiveness without purpose. I align my theory of beauty with the neuroscientific 
view here, for reasons already mentioned and dealt with again a little later in this chapter. 
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subjective necessity of the aesthetic judgement adds very much to the appeal to 
universality through inter-subjective common sense made earlier. Here Kant is 
referring the claim for the universal communicability of the judgement of taste back to 
the claims made for the cognitive faculties in the First Critique; that is to say his 
ultimate legitimation for the claims he makes for the universality of the judgement of 
taste is to the transcendental subject that, as Burnham (2000, p58) remarks, makes 
possible a common world about which all humans can think and speak. 
I suggest that, inasmuch as neuroscience has any bearing on the Kantian claim for 
the existence of a hidden subjective a priori principle for the universal 
communicability of the judgement of taste, or for the mysterious optimum ratio and 
thus harmony within our cognitive faculties and the judgement of taste, it is to be 
found in the self-organising and reflexive dynamical operations of the human brain. 
A replacement for the transcendental subject: neuroscience and universality 
I suggest that the neurological dynamics of brain provide a more epistemically useful 
alternative with which to explain "the common world about which we all can think and 
speak", than do the Kantian transcendental subject and the supersensible substrate 
of humanity and phenomena. I propose therefore, that we may dispense with the 
supersensible substrate and the transcendental subject as the ground for subjective 
universality in beauty and aesthetic theory. I am not proposing that we dispense with 
the idea of subjective universality as such, because all that I am doing is choosing a 
different ground for that claim. However, that choice has implications; if it had not, 
there would be little point in making it. 
We still need subjective universality for many, but not all, of the reasons that Kant 
needed it. Universality is important because it allows us to have the possibility of 
empathy for other people and an experience of a common world of thinking and 
feeling, by which I mean a world, in our experience of it, that has the same basic 
experiential structure for us all, though is not exactly the same in its experiential form 
and content for each individual who lives in it. If we have this sort of world in 
common we have the possibility for meaningful communication of our thoughts and 
feelings to others and hence for relationships mediated by both self-interest and the 
wider social interest; we have the possibility for a moral social order. 
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All this sounds very much like the Kantian ambition for our relationship to the world of 
phenomena and noumena, and it is; the nature of beauty that follows from the 
positivist-pragmatist model of the dynamical operations of our brains may be 
compatible with Kant's (and my own) general moral motivations and be of a very 
formal nature, but here the similarity ends. The crucial differences arise because the 
formal nature of the neurological model to which I appeal is qualitatively very different 
to the formal (modal) arguments that Kant makes in establishing his conditions for 
beauty and the judgement of taste. 
The Kantian conditions for beauty and the aesthetic judgement are constructed in 
terms of autonomous faculties of mind that interact within the terms of a logical 
entailment that is based on linear causality between the discrete (because wholly 
autonomous) mental objects that are judgements according to the operations of the 
different faculties of mind. These faculties are themselves divided into legislative 
(higher) and non-legislative (lower) parts. This hierarchical, linear and formal 
structure was both Kant's philosophical inheritance and social conditioning from the 
emerging modernism of the world in which he lived. At the same time, Kant did much 
to strengthen and secure this tradition; he was both the product and the creator of 
modernism. 
The formal structure of the positivist-pragmatist model of the operations of the brain 
and its correlation with mind is based on observations of the reflexive interactions 
between different organs that are not autonomous from each other and have very 
little meaning other than in their interdependent relation with each other. Moreover 
the brain itself cannot be considered other than in relation to the whole body, 
including brain, which in turn is in a constant reflexive perceptual relation between 
itself and the "objective" conditions and dynamical form of the world beyond its own 
boundaries. Indeed, the idea of boundaries between the brain, the body and the 
world is subsumed by all these intra- and inter- reflexive dynamics, none of which are 
reducible to linear or even circular notions of causal relations between discrete 
objects, whether physical or mental. I have placed the word objective in parentheses 
above because the Cartesian dichotomy between subject and object becomes 
deeply problematic within each and all of the reflexive systems that we call the brain, 
the body and the world. Part of Kant's project was to contest or even to refute 
Descartes, but the reflexive dynamics that I have described above, push that process 
much further. 
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It is interesting to note that the account of the reflexive, dynamical operations of the 
brain furnished by the positivist-pragmatist theories of affective neuroscience are 
supportive of, and supported by, the research by many authorities interested in the 
dynamics of what is commonly referred to as the fold. By this I mean the basic 
concept that informs the post-modern discursive practices concerned with ipseity and 
akerity in the understanding of the self, the dynamics of the transition from pre-noetic 
to noetic perception, and all the similar embodied dynamical correlates that we use to 
describe our daily activities. Most notably relevant here is the work of Francisco 
Varela and Natalie Depraz (2000). 
The appeal to the reflexive nature of brain, body and world as the ground for, and the 
field within which, human experience is played out, may appear, in terms of its 
generality, somewhat similar to Kant's idea of supersensible substrate that I have 
criticised in this thesis. As we have seen before, the supersensible substrate is, 
even in Kantian terms, epistemically opaque; we cannot access experience and 
knowledge about it. On the other hand, the dynamical operations of the brain 
described by neuroscience offer an explanation for all our perceptions of the 
phenomenal world including ourselves as phenomena. I am not yet convinced that 
neuroscience will do the same for us as noumena, but neither do I rule it out for the 
future. 
Turning now from these general considerations to the specific implications of 
positivist-pragmatic neuroscience for Kantian taste, it is immediately apparent that 
Kant's claim that beauty is apart from concept and the judgement of taste does not 
involve objective considerations of the object of the judgement are incompatible with 
this neurological model of affect. There are several specific reasons for this. Firstly, 
as we have seen in this chapter, pleasure is never, in normal circumstances, free 
from conditioning by objective interest as corporeal desire. The opioid-based 
pleasure circuits are shared, to a degree, with the dopamine output from the nucleus 
accumbens. Secondly, output from all the brain locations that broadly correspond to 
the Kantian faculties of mind, happens for us, not as a series of sequential events, 
but as a continuum of pleasure/displeasure experience. Thirdly, all pleasure, from 
whatever part of the brain it might be considered to originate, feels the same to us in 
our embodied experiences that we call feelings; we cannot distinguish, in the 
moment, how much of the pleasure that we are feeling comes from any particular 
faculty of mind or its Kantian sub-divisions. Pleasure is the same currency for the 
entire economy of the brain. For example, we cannot ever know from the quality and 
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quantity of pleasure that we feel, that it results from a proper Kantian aesthetic 
judgement; we do not know that our pleasure is in beauty alone, uncontaminated by 
the agreeable or the good, and that it results only from an aesthetic judgement of 
taste. 
For the same reasons we cannot make, within the neuroscientific paradigm, a 
meaningful distinction between purposiveness and purpose. In that paradigm all 
pleasure is experienced as purposive, not just pleasure in what Kant calls aesthetic 
judgement, and all pleasure (and displeasure) is ultimately for the same purpose: the 
enhancement of homeostatic well being. Within the neuroscientific discourse, there 
is no antinomy of taste to be resolved. 
None of the foregoing remarks render the Kantian theory of beauty and taste useless 
or irrelevant. On the contrary, I claim that they enrich it because they re-define it in 
terms that are more relevant to our pluralistic contemporary world. They are not so 
culturally and politically embedded in modernism and yet they permit a modernist 
moment. What they do not permit is the domination of beauty by the hierarchical and 
autonomous structure of modernist thought. The Kantian conditions for beauty are 
still of enormous value, but now as desirable traits within artistic practice and not as 
determining conditions for beauty in such practices. The parallels between this 
conclusion and my critique of Greenberg in the first chapter of this thesis now 
emerge and will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Form and the re-predication of pleasure onto new objects 
Before concluding this chapter, I want to briefly discuss an aspect of Kant's theory of 
beauty that does carry over into the neuroscientific theory that I have developed and 
which brings the two approaches into close proximity: the importance of our 
experience of pleasure in spatial form. Affective neuroscience has long been 
interested in the small areas around the brainstem that deal with spatio-temporal 
encoding of sensation and the formation of pleasure and desire. Because of the very 
close proximity of these two functional structures and the known interdependent 
nature of organs within the brain it was reasonable to suppose that these two 
fundamental activities mediated each other. The combination of spatio-temporal 
encoding and the production of pleasure at the same time might account for our liking 
for form. Such a view was supported by some early ethological work on vertebrates. 
Two examples of that work are discussed briefly below because they are relevant to 
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the emergence of the recognition of the crucial importance of form in affective 
responses. 
Ramachandran & Hirstein (1999, p18) describe an experiment in animal 
discrimination learning. Rats are individually taught to discriminate between a square 
button and rectangular one (with an aspect ratio of, say 3: 2) by being rewarded with 
food for pushing the latter. They very quickly learn to respond to the rectangle with 
an above chance frequency compared to their response to the square. If another 
rectangle with an aspect ratio of say 2: 1 (one with greater "rectangularity") is 
introduced into the experiment, a rat will respond to this new rectangle significantly 
more frequently than to the previous one. Each time the aspect ratio is increased the 
rats respond positively to that increase, showing little interest in rectangles of lesser 
aspect ratio. Ramachandran claims that because the rats' responses to rectangles 
of increased aspect ratio is significantly greater than their response to the original 
rectangle, on which they were trained, the rats are not learning a prototype but a rule: 
rectangularity. Such a rule is, of course, a formal one. 
A possible objection to the above conclusion is that the learning of a rule may be 
linked to the pleasure experienced in the activities of recognition and representation. 
Thus Ramachandran's and Hirstien's experiments do not necessarily link learning a 
rule to exaggerated form alone. My own position here is that pleasure is experienced 
in both exaggerated form and in recognition and representation. Further research to 
establish the relative importance of the different factors involved would be useful. 
In a different experiment, Tinbergen (1954) reported observations on the chicks of a 
species of seagull. The adult females of that species have a small red spot on their 
beaks and, in their natural surroundings, the chicks peck at their mothers' beaks to 
obtain food. Tinbergen found that the chicks exhibited the same response when 
presented with an entire dead female seagull, just the head of a female seagull, or 
even a stick with a dot of red paint on it of about the same size as the dot on female 
seagulls' beaks. The response activity of the chicks increased significantly when 
presented with a stick with two such painted dots, and even more so with exposure to 
a stick with three red dots. 
Both of these experiments illustrate what Ramachandran calls the peak shift effect: 
the observed tendency of animals to not only predicate their pleasure responses on 
to form (whether spatio-temporal or form as colour) rather than on the learning 
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prototype itself, but to experience more pleasure from exaggerated formal qualities 
compared to the form of the original stimulus. Ramachandran therefore argues that 
this peak shift effect is a key principle108 for understanding what he calls the 
evocativeness (in neurological terms the affective competence as a stimulus) of art. 
He does not claim that this is the only such principle for affectively competent art, but 
simply that it is an important one. He goes on to conclude that all such affective art 
has about it something of the nature of caricature: the suppression, to a degree, of 
what is general or average to the class of the object represented and the 
exaggeration of the particular qualities of a specific object. He does not confine this 
conclusion to the caricatures of faces of tourists produced by pavement artists, but 
claims it applies to all art. 
Although Ramachandran reports on observations of animal behaviour that correlate 
exaggerated formal qualities of objects with the re-predication of pleasure responses 
onto such objects, he does not offer an explanation, in homeostatic terms, of why 
exaggeration of form is so important. At this point, I want to advance my own 
narrative as a possible explanation for the behaviour patterns of animals described 
above. 
Animals need some incentive, some prospect of increased pleasure, to re-predicate 
their feelings of pleasure from a prototypical stimulus onto a new stimulus, for 
otherwise they would not do the work of learning and would remain satisfied with the 
prototypical stimulus. This implies that we need some difference (some alterity) in 
the new object from the old one, in order to stimulate in us some expectation of 
positive difference (as to quantity) of the pleasure we shall experience. Without such 
expectation we would not use resources to learn and be curious about the world. 
Such learning and curiosity has obvious homeostatic advantages; on the other hand, 
it has potential dangers too, if the process is simply random. It is, I suggest, the 
formal sameness (as to quality) between the prototype and the new that provides a 
degree of homeostatic safety in our re-predication learning. 
Exaggeration of form has the possibility of providing ipseity (as to quality) and thus 
safety, and also alterity (as to quantity) and thus difference, and hence motivation to 
change. I suggest that our ability to generate formal ideas in response to natural 
objective stimuli has both evolved and been culturally learned and that we have 
108 1 also acknowledge my own direct interest, as an artist who is trying to make beautiful paintings 
through strongly emphasising spatial form, in supporting his thesis) 
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carried that ability over into our response to art objects. Our ability to exercise 
aesthetic taste at the level of sensation may well be ultimately and intimately 
connected to our ability to exercise taste at the level of sensation, which even the 
simplest organisms possess for very good homeostatic reasons. 
I acknowledge the value of Ramachandran's thesis, especially his emphasis on 
spatio-temporal form as an important constituent of pleasurable response to an 
object, as the experience of beauty in art. However, I do have some reservations 
about the experimental grounds for his conclusions. 
Firstly, Ramachandran's thesis is supported only by behavioural observations, and I 
would like to see direct neurological confirmation of the brain dynamics of the 
animals involved in these experiments in addition to reports on their behaviour. Apart 
from the general consideration that direct neurological evidence is always useful to 
avoid possible tautological outcomes in behavioural studies alone, such studies 
might well be able to quantify the roles of opioid and dopamine centres in 
experimental subjects. That sort of information is useful in estimating the relative 
roles of pleasure and desire in the observed behaviour. Despite the fact that the 
positivist-pragmatist model of affective neuroscience appears to lessen the absolute 
importance of this (Kantian) distinction, it has by no means rendered it irrelevant. 
That is because knowledge of the relative importance of pleasure and desire allow us 
to estimate the relative roles of the subject and the object in affective experience, and 
that is potentially useful to practicing artists. 
Secondly, Ramachandran's claim that our experience of beauty is related to formal 
exaggeration seems, to me, a little problematic in strictly Kantian terms. For Kant the 
sublime has aspects of the awesome or overwhelming, sometimes because of sheer 
magnitude. The Kantian sublime also has about it the qualities of counter- 
purposiveness, outrage, something of the other combined with the familiar sameness 
of everyday experience. It is, in this sense, something to do with ipseity 
uncomfortably combined with afterity. There is, I suggest, something of this feeling 
about seagull chicks pecking frantically at a wooden stick with three red dots on it, or 
rats repeatedly pushing at a rectangle that does not give them food. There is a 
degree of unease, even pain, in contemplating these events, that for me, resonates 
with the Kantian sublime. The question arises therefore, as to whether the response 
of these animals is more appropriately described by the idea of the aesthetic 
response to the sublime rather than to the beautiful. Perhaps it does not matter very 
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much because neuroscience has, as described above, subsumed the Kantian 
distinction between the sublime and the beautiful inasmuch as affective neuroscience 
allows beauty a conceptual moment in relation to objects. Additionally the 
experience of awe (or any other emotion) directly related to magnitude (that lies at 
the heart of the Kantian sublime) is conceptual and objective because it is ultimately 
a mathematical concept that involves objects. Neuroscience does not appear to 
distinguish between the beautiful and the sublime, and if it did, one suspects it would 
not amount to an absolute distinction. Nevertheless, I suggest that any future 
experiments that are devised to investigate Ramachandran's peak shift hypothesis, 
might usefully bear in mind the Kantian difference between the beautiful and the 
sublime. 
For all the reasons described above, I claim that Ramachandran's hypothesis, that all 
affective art is not only constituted by formal qualities but is even more affective if it 
exaggerates these qualities, is an indicative support to my own ideas of the 
importance of form to beauty, rather than a demonstration of their validity for us in the 
experience of art. 
In the next chapter, I draw out my general conclusions for the implications of my 
critique of Kantian aesthetics in terms of contemporary neuroscience for Greenberg's 
conditions for the autonomy and quality of painting in modernism. I also discuss the 
implications of affective neuroscience for my own painting practice and for Kantian 
aesthetics in general. The inter-dependent nature of the brain in regard to its own 
internal dynamical operation and its external relations to the world pose problems for 
the notion of absolute autonomy in general and the autonomy of both particular art 
practices and for the idea of art as a discursive practice that is able to sustain its own 
domain of autonomy; these issues will also be addressed. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
A NEW ROLE FOR BEAUTY 
reflections 
I begin this chapter by revisiting the subject matter of Chapters Two and Three. The 
former questions Greenberg's claim to Kantian authority and the latter examines that 
authority insofar as it explores some of the difficulties that arise within the Kantian 
paradigm. Both of these chapters critique their authors from a position within 
modernism. 
Chapter Four, which reviews the contemporary discipline of neuroscience, marks a 
shift to a post-modernist critical positioning and begins the critique of neuroscience 
itself. Its aim is not only to summarise the cognitivist-passivist and the positivist- 
pragmatist theories that inform this new discipline, but also to critique the former and 
older tradition that has its roots in modernism from the standpoint of the latter, which 
emerged within a post-modernist culture. In Chapter Four I establish my own 
position within neuroscience as lying broadly within the positivist-pragmatist model. 
However, I take care not to devalue the importance of the cognitivist approach or to 
entirely dirempt my own positioning from it; to do so would be to ignore a central 
tenet of this thesis: that which is to sustain its own ipseity must include within itself a 
moment of alterity. I have drawn this conclusion primarily from Kant himself whose 
critical methodology developed in his First Critique relies on his use of experience to 
limit what he regards as the excesses of logical entailment, which result in the 
speculative dogmatism of metaphysics. I have also followed Kant's methodology in 
his epistemic revolution, discussed in Chapter Two, which analogously appeals to 
Copernican cosmology, which proposed a then revolutionary scientific model of the 
phenomenal world. In this thesis I have tried to do something similar; I have tried to 
critique established Kantian aesthetics through an appeal to the science of my day, a 
science that also confronts us with a revolutionary view of our feeling selves as 
phenomena. '(* I do not expect the ghost of Kant that haunts this thesis to approve 
of my conclusions, challenging as they are for his taxonomy of beauty as 
disinterested pleasure, the autonomy of his aesthetic judgement and his idea of the 
supersensible substrate that includes the transcendental subject. Yet perhaps his 
109 Neuroscience may eventually influence how we regard ourselves as noumena 
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spectre would not take issue with my general ambition and methodological appeal to 
the science of my own times that I have made. 
In Chapter Five I turn from neuroscience in general to affective neuroscience in 
particular together with its implications for a contemporary notion of beauty as 
pleasure, though not as entirely disinterested pleasure. The ways in which 
neuroscience supports and contests Kantian aesthetics are addressed in some detail 
in Chapter Five and these technical arguments will not be repeated here. In this 
chapter I want to step back from such details and look at the broader landscape of 
the relation between Kant and contemporary affective neuroscience. At the same 
time I suggest that affective neuroscience may usefully learn a great deal from Kant's 
critical project because neuroscience, just like any other discursive practice, needs to 
look beyond itself to establish its own self-criticality and limitations; and where better 
to look than to Kant's genius for operating at the extreme edge of his discourse yet 
remaining part of it? It is not, I suggest, that Kant's specific conclusions are of 
particular use to neuroscience, but rather that his motivations and his ability to 
reframe old and intractable difficulties into new and more creatively useful questions 
that are still relevant. Many of the scientific authorities cited in this thesis, notably 
Freeman, Damasio and Churchland have considerable interest in philosophy, 
including the philosophy of the Enlightenment, and that has been very useful to me 
because it has helped to establish limits on the remit of their theories. 
I began my research for this thesis with a detailed study of Greenberg's essay 
Modernist Painting because of its direct relevance to my painting practice, which 
was, and still is, based on my interest in pictorial space, surface quality and form. 
Most of my friends who were painters were very dismissive of Greenberg's work; it 
curtailed their freedom as artists, it was modernist, so how could it be relevant to our 
post-modernist world? Nobody was interested in Greenberg any more. I understood 
and sympathised only with the first of these objections. I sensed that somehow 
Greenberg had gone too far yet I could not identify quite where this had happened in 
his argumentation; I felt that he could not be dismissed so quickly because his 
arguments seemed so compelling. I read the established critiques of Greenberg and 
was especially influenced by the work of Rosalind Krauss, Michael Fried and Thierry 
de Duve. These authorities frame their critique of Greenberg within a wider critique 
of modernism as a political, economic, cultural and historical moment, in terms of its 
consequences for art as a discursive practice, or (in the case of de Duve) in terms of 
a re-inscription of the Kantian resolution of the antinomy of taste; that is to say, in 
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terms of the content of Kant's Third Critique. My own approach has been somewhat 
different because I wanted to look at Greenberg's work in terms of the legitimacy or 
otherwise of his appeal to Kantian authority as such, and I believe that appeal to 
have been made primarily on disciplinary rather than aesthetic grounds. That is to 
say, I believe Greenberg's appeal is to the methodology of Kant's First Critique. At 
issue here is the question of whether Greenberg's view of autonomy and criticality is 
the same, or even compatible with, Kant's use of those terms. 
For Kant, the notion of autonomy is not confined to disciplinary considerations within 
the First Critique but, as moral freedom, is central to the subject matter of his Second 
critique. Moreover, because Kant claims that beauty is the analogical symbol of the 
moral, the notion of autonomy is a constituent of his Third Critique; it famously 
appears in his claim that nothing gives the rule for art except the freely expressed 
ingenium of the producing artist. However, Kant's employment of the notion of 
autonomy ultimately raises serious problems, which I claim he was not able to 
satisfactorily resolve, for the coherent unity of his critical trilogy. 
The thread of autonomy in Greenberg and Kant 
Autonomy is a connecting thread that runs through the whole of this thesis. It runs 
through the work of Greenberg and Kant as the modernist response to the ancient 
and difficult problem of reconciling the concepts of freedom and necessity. It persists 
as a clearly visible thread until we get to the discourse of neuroscience where it 
disappears. I want to pursue this analogy of woven threads, of textiles, a little further. 
Greenberg weaves a single but very strong thread to tie the flatness of the image in 
painting to the flatness of the object that is the painting. Greenberg's timeless 
conditions for the autonomy and quality of painting have, I claim, the form of a 
determinate judgement of cognition rather than a Kantian reflective judgement of 
taste. They certainly fulfil the very clear purpose (the end) for which they were 
intended: the autonomy of painting. There is no purposiveness without purpose about 
Greenberg's thread. Analogically, Greenberg's thread, that is as thick as a ship's 
hawser, secures the ship of painting to the safety of the flat and solid dockside that is 
its substrate; the ship and its artistic crew are safe from the perils of theatricality, 
sculpture, film and mass entertainment that inhabit the rocks and shallows beyond 
the harbour wall. 
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There are, however, a few problems with this solution. The ship has become useless 
as a ship because it can't go anywhere and the crew become extremely bored and 
rebellious after about five years; they throw the captain overboard and sail off into the 
blue yonder with a reluctance ever to tie up in that particular harbour again. The 
hawser is deemed useless for any other purpose; it is too thick to be woven and it is 
not considered to be beautiful enough to be worth keeping. This outcome, though 
unavoidable, is not altogether desirable because Greenberg's recognition of the 
importance of flat pictorial space in painting and his identification of that importance 
as manifested through a trait in the historical evolution of painting"O remains 
valuable. 
Kant's approach to the form of argumentation is very different to Greenberg's; he is 
not much interested in analytic identities between objects though he employs the 
ideas of discrete entities, autonomous from each other and connected by linear 
threads of causality. These threads however, are much finer, more subtle and 
numerous than Greenberg's single hawser. They are woven into a complex textile in 
the baroque style. Despite the ingenious construction of that work it remains 
something woven on a traditional loom; the threads still run in straight lines and 
although they proceed in different directions and pass over and underneath each 
other they remain identifiably separate entities. The threads Kant uses are taken 
from his inheritance of a roughly two thousand year old European philosophical 
bequest with which he is very familiar. Kant is always concerned not to let one of the 
(broadly) two types of ancient thread, rationalism and empiricism, that he uses 
dominate the other and this leads to compositional difficulties in the appearance of 
the finished piece of work. 
On presentation to the world, Kant's work is immediately recognised as a hugely 
important development and also provokes a controversial reception. Some complain 
that what he has produced is a one-size garment that doesn't fit all. Others complain 
that, taken as a whole, it simply doesn't quite work or that it is so formal that it is 
almost content-free. Yet others protest that the unique ontological thread that Kant 
has woven into an otherwise methodological text for the express purpose of unifying 
its disparate and sometimes contradictory parts is invisible, unknowable and is not 
really there. These protesters entertain suspicions that the ontological unifying 
thread in the weave has something of the quality of tautology about it. They also 
110 1 refer to his essay Towards a Newer Laocoon written some twenty years before Modernist Painting. 
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think that Kant's use of an ontological thread indicates a drift towards the dogmatic 
metaphysical claims of which he was so critical at the beginning of his First Critique. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, all these objections, Kant's work still fascinates his 
readers. For two hundred years people have unpicked and rewoven parts of his text 
in order to address issues within it that concern them. Some of them have produced 
texts that are very creative indeed and address many, but not all, of the difficulties in 
the original work, yet remain recognisably Kantian. "' The work of some of his other 
critics has not been so felicitous. 
In recent years a new group of researchers have again asked the first and the third of 
the three fundamental questions posed by Kant: "What can we know? " and "How do 
we feel? "' 12 Neuroscientists claim that the answer to these questions may lie within 
the dynamical operations between the tiny (but not discrete) particles of the stuff of 
which our brains are made and between the dynamics between our brains, our 
bodies and the world beyond our bodies. They do not claim that the material 
"objects"' 13 of which our brains are made are capable of providing the answer to 
these questions, they are much more interested in what is going on in the dynamical 
relations between these objects. Neither do they claim that intra-brain dynamics 
considered apart from the dynamics of the body and of the world may provide the 
answer to these fundamental questions. They conceive of the brain and the body 
together as a self-organising system, 1' which is without meaning other than in its 
relation to the world beyond it. Neuroscience does not deny the value of 
philosophical introspection. It is probably fair to say, however, that most 
neuroscientists regard their observations of brain activity as the ultimate explanation 
of these two questions - and the answers to them - rather than philosophical 
introspection. 
11 1I have in mind here Theodor Adomo's re-inscription of Kantian aesthetics. 
112 As yet not much attention has been paid to Kant's second question, " What ought we to do? " 
113 1 use quotation marks here to emphasise the recognition by neuroscience that the boundaries of 
these organs of the brain are somewhat arbitrary. The objects of neuroscience are non-discrete, "soft" 
or "fuzzy" rather than hard-edged. This is not seen as a consequence of experimental imprecision, but 
to do with the contemporary scientific concept of object as a continuum. 
114 The idea of an embodied brain as a self-organising system is basically similar to the idea of an 
organism that gives to itself its own rules, to the transcendentally free subject that is indispensable to 
Kant's critical trilogy, and is especially important in his moral philosophy. 
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The theories of neuroscience are not woven on the traditional loom that I have 
described above. Not only is the thread they use more than a thousand times finer 
than the silk of a spider's web, it is not woven in straight lines but in multiple and 
chaotically (but not randomly) organised recursive and reflexive loops. Moreover the 
threads are not lines of causal connections but of correlated dynamical activities 
between distinguishable but not distinct (autonomous) areas of the brain. The 
situation is more complex still because each thread is connected to up to ten 
thousand other threads. By that statement I do not mean that it simply butts up 
against other threads as in a conventional textile, but exchanges part of itself - its 
neuro-chemical fluids - with other threads (neurons) at the same time receiving 
neuro-chemicals and electrical signals from all those neighbouring neurons. ' 15 Most 
fundamentally of all, the text of the brain is not woven, but grows and organises that 
growth within the context of body and the world. In this description I am not 
contrasting or opposing the dynamical activity of the brain to the dynamics of 
discursive practice, consensual agreement, relationships, culture and history - all the 
things we know and value about our active selves. I am saying that the dynamical 
operations of the embodied brain is the correlate within each of us, of all these 
things, the archetypal dynamical form that is, as such, the universal ground that we 
seek for all these activities of mind and body. The textile that neuroscience studies is 
both fundamentally different from, yet ultimately the origin of, the work of Greenberg, 
Kant and everyone else. It is this play between ipseity and alterity in the relation 
between individual persons and the basic commonality of their brains that I find so 
fascinating. 
Returning briefly to the work of Clement Greenberg, we have seen that he appears 
to hold the view that space is given in sensation by objects or relations between 
objects, that flatness is a spatial property of the object that is the painting (and of the 
image within it) and is simply "visually transmitted' to the beholding subject via 
sensation. Kant on the other hand claims that space is not a property of objects or of 
relations between them but is generated entirely within the subject. At issue here is 
the fundamental question of whether the subject or the object is the origin of 
experience; for Kant it is the former and for Greenberg it appears to be the latter. 
This question matters a great deal because an active subject is indispensable to 
115 The analogy to some sort of ceaseless, promiscuous and frantic sexual orgy between all the tiny 
constituent parts of the brain is bizarre, but not altogether inaccuratel 
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Kantian methodology, autonomy and self-criticality all of which are explicitly claimed 
by Greenberg (and are, I claim, unjustifiably conflated by him) as the authority for his 
conditions for the autonomy and quality of painting in modernism. Yet the 
Greenbergian subject appears to have a totally passive role in Modernist Painting. 
I claim that neuroscience strongly supports the Kantian view of an active subject in 
spatial perception, indeed in all human activity, mental or physical, in relation to the 
world of experience. As described in Chapter Four, the positivist-pragmatist model 
identifies the dynamical interaction between the thalamus and the hippocampus, 
which is indispensable to the preaffference loop of perception. It is the operator that 
converts all incoming sensation into spatio-temporal form as electromagnetic waves 
transmitted onwards to all areas of the brain. The cognitive-passivist model of 
neuroscience also agrees, though it differs significantly in operational detail, that 
spatio-temporal encoding of all sensation takes place in this general area of the 
brain. Both models agree that spatio-temporality is generated within the brain. 
Neither model takes the view that there is any point in all this subjective spatio- 
temporal activity without sensation from the world, and that sensation is therefore 
crucially involved in perception, but that does not mean that sensation alone suffices 
for it. 
The positivist-pragmatist model (which I adopt as my own position in this thesis) goes 
much further than the cognitivist-passivist one in emphasising the active role of the 
subject because it claims that the subject actually initiates the process of perception. 
The subject only perceives what is relevant to it in the moment; it starts to search for 
sensory information about the world that is relevant to its bodily needs at a particular 
time. This in turn implies that it must have some general idea, some anticipation, of 
what might be relevant to those needs. That general idea of what might be relevant 
is provided by its memories, which are not stored sensation or representations of 
objects but are the meanings that it has made of previous experiences of objects. 
These meanings are encoded in the (spatio-temporal) features of the constant yet 
always subtly changing patterns of neuronal electro-chemical waveforms that persist 
over very long periods of time. The exact patterns of brain activity are particular to 
individuals; they are not free from individual values, culture, learning and history. 
What is claimed to be universal by this model is the dynamical form of these activities 
and our ability to perform them. This formal universality is similar, though not 
identical, to Kant's claim for the universality of his aesthetic judgement and to his 
concept of judgement as a power in us in general. I claim that the positivist- 
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pragmatist model does provide support for a very active subject in all aspects of both 
intellectual and emotional experience and for the subject as the origin of space and 
time. The passivist-cognitivist model provides much less support, but also agrees 
that the subject is active in the construction of spatio-temporal concepts. Neither 
model of neuroscience supports Greenberg's very passive concept of the subject, 
especially in terms of space and time. 
The concept of absolute autonomy is central and problematic in the work of both 
Greenberg and Kant. As I have claimed in Chapter Two, they do not use the word in 
a way that suggests that it has the same meaning for both of them. Greenberg 
clearly considers art in general to enjoy an autonomous domain from other human 
productions. He also sought to establish the complete autonomy of painting from all 
other art forms; he wanted autonomy for painting within the general discursive 
practice of art that was itself autonomous from non-art practices. Kant had a similar 
ambition for autonomy between the different judgements that support his three 
Critiques, yet he wanted his work as a whole to be a unified system autonomous 
from the rationalist and empiricist traditions that informed it. For Kant, artistic 
judgement and feeling are aesthetical and as such their form is reflective and not 
determinate. Yet Kant claims that the form of aesthetic judgement is shared with that 
of moral judgement, as it must be if he is to claim that beauty is the analogical16 
symbol of the moral. What is perfectly similar about the relation of the Kantian 
judgement of taste to his judgement of practical reason is that they do not involve 
objective determination, objective interest or empirical conditions as their end. Thus 
although Kant tries to maintain the mutual autonomy between his moral and aesthetic 
judgements he has difficulty in maintaining an absolute autonomy between them. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, ' 17 Kant has the same sort of difficulty, though for 
different reasons, in maintaining autonomy between his aesthetical and cognitive 
judgements. Yet Kant also needs a heteronomous moment shared between these 
different judgements if he is to unite his critical trilogy as a whole. 
The point I am making is that Kant had great difficulty in providing a unified 
explanation of his faculties of mind (equivalent, in broad terms, to an explanation of 
116 As discussed in Chapter Two, the term analogy has a special meaning for Kant; it is the perfectly 
similar form between the antecedent and consequent terms of the analogy that is shared between 
dissimilar things. 
117 The necessary conditions for the judgement of cognition tum out to be the sufficient conditions for 
the judgement of taste. 
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the possibility for a unitary self) and at the same time retaining the idea of complete 
autonomy between the faculties of mind, between the different aspects of that unitary 
self. I have always been surprised that Greenberg, despite his claimed admiration 
for Kant, apparently disregarded the warning evident in Kant's work, which is that 
unrestrained autonomy between the parts is bought at the expense of autonomy of 
the whole and the converse. Greenberg thus comes very close to Kant insofar as 
they both experience very similar difficulties as a result of their preoccupation with 
the idea of autonomy. 
Greenberg's problem of sustaining the autonomy of painting within the autonomy of 
art in general parallels Kant's difficulties of maintaining the autonomy of the faculties 
of mind within an autonomous (coherent and unitary) theory of mind. If painting is to 
be altogether separated from other art forms it has to expunge from within itself 
whatever it shares with any other art form. What is common to all art forms is, by 
disciplinary definition, that they share a formal quality designated by the term art. 
Therefore painting, to be completely autonomous from other art forms, must cease to 
share that quality and that designation. That is not a satisfactory outcome. As we 
have seen in Chapter Three, a similar problem is experienced by Kant, who has 
great difficulty in finding any free (self-subsistent) beauties, beauties as such, 
unmediated by either moral or objective elements in their constitution. This problem 
has ultimately arisen because Kant wants to ensure the autonomy of the aesthetic 
judgement of taste, yet in doing so he has had to make beauty an objectively empty 
concept. In these circumstances it is clearly not going to be easy to find a specific 
object that is a free beauty. 
We have a situation in which Kant and Greenberg come almost full circle inasmuch 
as the difference between them is, to a significant degree, subsumed; Greenberg 
establishes the complete autonomy of painting in modernism at the cost of making 
such painting autonomous from its own discursive practice: from art. Kant 
establishes the autonomy of the aesthetic judgement of taste from the judgements of 
practical reason at the cost of bringing beautiful objects very close indeed to ordinary 
objects of cognition yet paradoxically cannot find more than a handful of objects of 
cognition that actually satisfy the condition that they are free beauties. 1" We have 
arrived at a situation in which Greenberg has, to a degree, been reconciled to Kant 
but only insofar as his work suffers from the same intractable problems that arise in 
1t8 Kant (CJ prop 16) can only come up with a very few rather disappointing examples such as parrots 
and humming birds, seashells and wallpaper borders in the Greek style. 
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the work of both authors through their use of the concept of absolute autonomy for 
disciplinary reasons. That is not the sort of Kantian authority for Modernist Painting 
that Greenberg (presumably) had in mind. 
At the end of Chapter Two I drew attention to Greenberg's reference to 
representations of two-dimensional space in painting, rather than simply to two- 
dimensional space. I do not want to repeat the details of my argument here but only 
want to say that, at that time, I felt that such a reference to representations by 
Greenberg had the possibility of evidencing a subjective moment in his spatial 
arguments that are the basis of the claims he makes in Modernist Painting. My 
motivation was to find a way in which Greenberg's ideas could be seen as having a 
subjective moment that would sustain, to a degree at least, his claim that his theory 
of painting was critical in the Kantian sense. Although I have been very critical of 
Greenberg's determinate conditions for painting, I value his emphasis on the 
importance of flatness in pictorial space and criticality in painting; I wanted, therefore, 
to retain some authority for Greenberg's ideas as an important historical trait in 
painting, but not to the degree that they became prescriptive for painting practice. 
Given the empiricist positioning of Modernist Painting taken as a whole, I thought that 
a subjective interpretation of Greenberg's use of the term representation (such as 
would link him to Kant's conception of space) seemed possible but improbable; and I 
still hold that view. My present position on this issue is that both Greenberg and Kant 
leave their use of the term representation ambiguous as to whether it is subjective or 
objective. 119 This ambiguity now seems to me to be part of the general problems 
associated with autonomy discussed in this chapter. The problem of autonomy is 
primarily a methodological one for Kant. In the preface to the second edition of the 
First Critique (CPR, Bxvi) he comments that pre-critical knowledge assumed that "our 
knowledge must conform to objects" but goes on to say that now, "we must make 
trial and suppose that objects must conform to our knowledge" Kant uses the term 
"make trial" to indicate a methodological and not an ontological claim. The question 
of whether we epistemically conform to objects or vice versa obviously informs his 
famous letter of 1772 to Marcus Hertz, in which he writes, 
I asked myself- What is the ground of the relation of that in us, which we call 
"representation" to the object? 
119 Kant usually uses the term subjectively but on occasions either uses it in an objective sense or 
leaves its sense of use unclear. 
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Kant proceeds for the rest of his critical trilogy on the methodological supposition that 
objects conform to us, but at least he has asked the critical question at the outset and 
is fully aware of the suppositional nature of his answer to it. Greenberg, I claim, 
never asks anything remotely similar to Kant's critical question, but proceeds on the 
basis that we epistemically conform to objects and that to be critical ft suffices simply 
to identify the flatness of pictorial space with the flatness of the material substrate of 
the painting. The fundamental point that I am making here is that Greenberg's 
position is one of simple ipseity and Kant's position has reflected on the relation 
between ipseity and alterity. That is the difference in positioning that, I claim makes 
Kant's work critical and Greenberg's not. A passing reference to representation by 
Greenberg does not, I suggest, suffice to negate that difference. 
This problem with Greenberg's essay Modernist Painting is additional, though not 
wholly unrelated, to the contradictions discussed earlier of the compatibility of 
Greenberg's determinate and objectively interested claim to aesthetic autonomy for 
painting and Kant's reflective and objectively disinterested aesthetic judgement of 
taste. It is not altogether surprising that two very modernist men should both 
encounter what are, at base, the same serious difficulties as a result of their 
enthusiasm for the inherently modernist concept of autonomy. 
The need for modernist discourses to privilege one aspect of a dichotomy at the 
expense of suppressing the other has been a familiar trait of modernism since 
Descartes. Although Kant makes very considerable progress in avoiding the 
dichotomy between empiricism and rationalism he cannot altogether avoid it. The 
critical question goes some way towards accepting the need for a relation between 
ipseity and alterity rather than an absolute distinction between them. Kant sets up a 
relation between subject and object in which each contributes to, and is 
indispensable for, experience and knowledge of the world by us. Neither subjects 
nor objects alone suffice for that, but the circular relation between them does. It is 
that relation between the ipseity of the transcendental subject (whose sole content 
consists in the ability to reason) and the alterity of objects in the world (which do not 
reason) that together enable the world as we know and experience it. 120 In this 
sense the circularity of Kant's question is a reflective one and anticipates the 
eventual emergence of his reflective judgement in his Third Critique. 
120 The pure a priori intuitions of space and time are, for Kant, form and not content. That separation 
and opposition is integrated and, to a degree, contested in this thesis. 
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Though this development preceded Greenberg by nearly two hundred years it is a 
method of potentially far greater creative potential than his determinate judgement 
that operates linearly and analytically within the sameness of empirical objectivity 
without any subjective moment. Having said that, however, Kant's answer to his own 
critical question does not, I suggest, quite fulfil the promise of the question itself and 
this is evidenced by all the difficulties and aporiai in his work discussed in Chapters 
Three onwards of this thesis. The problem is that to overcome the problems inherent 
in a system based on autonomous categories, Kant has to "go up a level" from 
methodology to ontology; he has to posit the transcendental subject as part of his 
supersensible substrate of humanity and phenomena. After studying Kant for a while 
one comes to recognise this change of gear in his text as a move that indicates that 
he is in some difficulty. This problem is ultimately a very simple one; it is that having 
established the autonomy of the (categorically based) parts of his work he cannot 
establish the autonomy of the whole through the same methodological means. That 
matters because the ability to meaningfully ask his three fundamental questions: 
What can we know? What ought we to do? How do we feel? is part of ourselves. 
Moreover our notion of self is a unitary one that persists over time and not a self split 
into irreconcilable parts. 
Towards a new theory of beauty: ipseity and alterity, loosening the grip of autonomy 
What is needed then is some explanation of this unitary self that has the possibility of 
encompassing those epistemic, moral and affective aspects of the Kantian subject 
signified by these three questions. Moreover, I believe that this required explanation 
should itself be methodologically based and epistemically accessible rather than an 
ontological claim that is, by definition, opaque to further enquiry. It is for this reason 
that, in Chapter Four, I make the turn to neuroscience. 
Neuroscience has several advantages compared to Kantian methodology and 
philosophy for my project. Firstly its discursive operations remain at the contingent 
level of methodology and do not appeal to ontological/metaphysical claims when in 
difficulty. Neuroscience observes and seeks to explain the functional operations of 
the brain and it supposes that these correlate in some not yet fully explained way to 
the operations of mind. It does not identify mind with brain; it does not make 
ontological claims. The link between mind and brain remains a contingent and 
methodological one. We are asked to proceed with our enquiry as if mind conformed 
(in the sense of sharing dynamical form of operations) to brain, and in this sense 
204 
neuroscience echoes the self-critical epistemic methodology of Kant's First Critique. 
However, we are also asked to proceed as if brain conformed to mind, in the sense 
that neuroscience regards knowledge of people's reports on what they think and feel 
and their reasons for the mental or physical actions that they perform as just as 
important as the empirical observations of the brain using very complex and 
expensive machines. The point that I am alluding to here is that if neuroscience is 
asked the critical Kantian questions: "do we epistemically conform to objects? " or, "do 
objects epistemically conform to us? " then it will answer yes to both questions; and 
at this point an important difference between modernism and Kant on the one hand, 
and contemporary neuroscience on the other, emerges. 
Neuroscience is able to make an affirmative response to both these two questions for 
several reasons, most, if not all, of which are closely related. Firstly, neuroscience 
does not deal in autonomously discrete entities but in relations between groups, 
loosely and relationally defined assemblies, of organs of the brain that are 
considered in terms of their shared function and operational dynamics. Large 
assemblies of neurons that are semi-autonomous physically constitute these organs 
and also share in the overall activity of all regions of the brain. No neuron is fully 
autonomous from its thousands of neighbours or from the brain as a whole. 12' The 
lack of autonomy is not confined to the micro (neuronal) level or even to the meso 
(regional or organ level) but also extends to the macro (global states) of the brain 
considered as a whole. Moreover the brain is not autonomous from the body, and 
the brain and body together (the organism) is not autonomous from the world beyond 
the boundary of the skin. Everything is permeable, relational and without meaning 
other than in relation to "otherness". Neuroscience wholeheartedly embraces a co- 
operative and consensual rather than a dichotomous and oppositional relation 
between ipseity and alterity. The neurological model of the brain thus contains within 
itself a basis for the sensus communis, the consensual agreement, so important for 
the Kantian claims for the universality of his judgements. 
Such a grouping of (partially) seif-organising systems within systems is extremely 
complex and the traditional concepts of linear or circular causality fail to adequately 
explain it. For that reason, neuroscience uses a methodology based on statistical 
121 The number of neurons in each of our brains is roughly equal to the present population of the world. 
If we imagine each neuron as an individual person, in a family, a local society, a region and a nation 
state involved in international diplomacy and trade, we begin to see the situation of a single neuron in 
the brain. 
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correlation between elements of a large ensemble'22 rather than the (ultimately just 
as obscure) concept of a supposed causal connection between antecedent and 
consequent events involving a small number of discrete entities that informs most 
traditional Western philosophy. For similar reasons, neuroscience employs fairly 
sophisticated mathematics to describe the operations of the living brain; it uses 
chaos and network theory as well as group algebra and the non-Euclidean geometry 
of multiple spaces as its tools and has recourse to very complex machines that 
require massive computational facilities to observe the workings of the brain. 
All this may sound somewhat daunting, but the point that I wish to emphasise is a 
simple one: what this all boils down to is the use of (scientifically based) experience 
to limit speculation based in logical entailments from posited principles. That is the 
same ambition as Kant had for the project of his First Critique: to limit the speculative 
dogmatism of metaphysics, which he saw as resulting from the exercise of reason 
unsupported by experience. It is the same self-critical methodology at work here, 
only the subject matter and the available science (experience) has changed. It is the 
form of the enterprises that bridges the distance between neuroscience and Kant. 
This brings me to the question of form in Kant and its relation to form in 
neuroscience. In the remarks made above I claim that the form of Kant's motivation 
and his idea of limiting what we may claim as knowledge by experience is paralleled 
by neuroscience. That is not to claim that the detailed form of argumentation is the 
same for both paradigms because it clearly is not. Neuroscience proposes an 
interpretation of the brain in terms that are both recursive and reflexive, the basic 
details of which have already been described and are not repeated here. Kant 
proposes autonomous forms of judgement that are determinate, regulative, and 
reflective. It is the last of these that is of interest here because it may be regarded, I 
claim, as a reductive special case of the reflexive form of relationship that applies, as 
a first approximation, to the operations of the brain, its relation to the body and to the 
world. I am arguing, by analogy, that the Kantian reflective judgement is to the 
reflexive neuroscientific theories of brain as classical Newtonian physics is to 
relativistic quantum dynamics. '23 The former is a reduction of the latter and is only 
122 There are about ten to the power of eleven neurons in an adult human brain, each with up to ten 
thousand connections to other neurons. I once calculated, as a matter of interest, that the number of 
possible (as distinct from actual) different combinations of neuronal connections in one brain was of a 
similar order of magnitude to the number of molecules in the planet earth. 
123 The comparison is between physics at GCSE level and at post-graduate research level. 
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now discursively recognised as valid inasmuch as it is contingent on it. That is not 
intended to denigrate the innovative value of the Kantian reflective judgement for his 
times. It is simply to recognise that science and philosophical introspection have 
moved on a considerable distance since then. The reflexive and recursive dynamics 
that flow from the positivist-pragmatist model of neuroscience are extremely 
important. They form a bridge between the discipline and the phenomenological 
philosophy of the late 19th and 20th centuries as well as a link to Kant. More 
importantly they provide a link to those contemporary philosophies that are 
preoccupied with the fold that encompasses both ipseity and afterity. 
So far, I have only considered the support that is afforded to Kant by neuroscience 
and vice versa. There are also significant areas of difference and even contestation 
between the two discourses that have been discussed already, but which I think it is 
appropriate to summarise here because of their direct relevance to aesthetics. 
Affective neuroscience does not, as discussed in the previous chapter, consider 
pleasure and desire to be categorically distinct as Kant does. That obviously has 
wide-ranging implications for the Kantian taxonomy of beauty. The pleasure or 
delight that we take in the estimation of beauty cannot normally, in neuroscientific 
terms, be wholly apart from objective interest. The Kantian distinction between the 
good, the agreeable and the beautiful is rendered problematic, as is the distinction 
between free and dependent beauties. A similar conclusion must follow for the 
Kantian judgement of taste, that it cannot be entirely objectively disinterested. These 
conclusions have implicit consequences for Kantian morality and the judgements of 
practical reason because of the shared formal nature of both moral and aesthetical 
judgements within the Kantian paradigm. If, as claimed by affective neuroscience, 
pleasure is, to a degree, coupled with desire, and given that, for Kant, desire as a 
faculty of mind includes both its higher (moral) and lower (corporeal) forms, then it 
follows that the Kantian moral and practical judgements become constituted by an 
objective interest that may be of the higher or lower Kantian form, or both. 
Paradoxically, this result goes some way to re-inscribe Kantian moral theory so as to 
protect it from one of the charges often laid against it, that it is an entirely formal 
system that has no objective content to guide our actions in the world. 
The above argument operates in the opposite direction too, with consequences for 
artists and art. If the moral and the aesthetical judgements are both constituted by 
an amalgam of pleasure and desire neither is objectively (in the moral as well as the 
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cognitive sense) disinterested. It might be argued, as I do, that the unrestrained 
moral freedom accorded to artists (because of their free genius) by the response of 
romanticism to Kant looks inappropriate. Affective neuroscience resists, by 
implication, the view of artists as Zarathustra-like figures who are somehow above 
the moral restraints on society as a whole. Having said that, the partial confluence of 
the two judgements also provides artists with a possibility to influence moral ideas 
rather than merely analogically symbolising them. 
The above discussion is an example of how the challenge of neuroscience to the 
notion of autonomy undermines the dichotomous relation between ipseity and afterity 
that informs the arguments of Greenberg and Kant. The distinction between different 
forms of artistic practice and between art and non-art practices begins to crumble 
away, as do the distinctions within the Kantian taxonomy of beauty, between 
disinterested pleasure and interested desire, and between the different autonomous 
Kantian judgements. 
It is interesting to look at the loosening grip of autonomy on these discourses from 
the point of view of Cabanac's theory of pleasure as the common currency of 
evaluative decision-making discussed in the previous chapter. Cabanac's 
experiments are limited to sensory pleasures with clear physiological implications. 
As Cabanac (1997, p14) comments, 
One may question whether it is possible to extend the conclusions to other 
domains than biology ... McFartand and Sibly (1975) pointed out that 
behaviour is also a common path on which all motivations converge. This 
image incorporates all motivations into a unique category since behaviour 
must satisfy not only physiological needs but also social, moral, aesthetical 
and playful motivations. 
Because pleasure is, in Cabanac's theory the common currency for motivation, it 
follows that pleasure constitutes this common path on which all motivations 
converge. I am strongly in favour of the extension of pleasure to explain all 
motivations that Cabanac proposes. Such an extension is entirely consistent with the 
central role that I have established for beauty as pleasure, which is indispensable to 
all intentional action, including mental actions such as the different Kantian 
judgements. 
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I like the analogy of pleasure as a common pathway because pathways bring people 
and things together. I imagine this pathway as a river meandering across a flat plain 
(though not a Greenbergian plane) linking people, towns and villages together. In 
this image pleasure comes to be seen as an enabling and life enhancing experiential 
stream that nurtures and sustains not only the individuals living by its banks, but also 
the citadels of Kantian judgements through which it flows. Pleasure is not raised to a 
dominant position of authority in this image but remains an enabling rather than a 
controlling power. 124 In such an image, there is no need for unifying ideas such as a 
supersensible substrate floating high in the sky and out of sight above the landscape 
because the stream itself enables and rewards motivation and communication 
between people; it provides the means for the social construction of inter-subjective 
consensual agreement. 
Neuroscience neither supports nor contests the Kantian idea of a transcendental 
subject as part of the supersensible substrate of humanity and phenomena. It 
regards it as irrelevant, because it believes that the specificities of our embodiment 
provide sufficient inter-subjectivity for its discursive practices. 
What, then, are the implications of all these conclusions for art practice and 
discourse? As expected, neuroscience provides no proximate rules for the 
production of art since it does not, I claim, recognise any qualitative difference 
between the pleasures or anticipated displeasures that stimulate and reward all 
possible mental and physical actions. The streams of pleasure and displeasure 
spring from all mental and physical activities and flow around the brain, which 
automatically chooses actions that will maximise the former and minimise the latter. 
The body that includes the brain will drink from the river of displeasure if, and only if, 
it can thus avoid greater future displeasure, or if, in so doing, it anticipates larger 
draughts of pleasure in future as a result. That describes the only rule of affective 
neuroscience. 
The commonality of pleasures that motivate and reward different mental and physical 
actions does not signify a lack of subjective freedom or choice; rather it guarantees 
our ability to freely choose from amongst all possible actions very quickly. If our felt 
embodied pleasures were all different for each possible action in relation to either 
real objects or those of mind (which ultimately are based on real objects) then how 
124 Throughout this thesis I have wanted to construct a theory of beauty that does not simply reverse the 
Kantian hegemony of reason, replacing it by pleasure. 
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could we ever decide what to do? Moreover, all our actions would be objectively 
determined and pleasure would have no role as liking but would be identical with 
desire (which we already have anyway) as wanting or needing. This is important 
because art is ultimately not something we need for objective ends but something 
that we simply like. 
Additionally, I claim that it is precisely because the quality of pleasure, as embodied 
feelings, is not qualitatively determined by specific objects that we have the ability to 
learn; to re-predicate our feelings of pleasure onto new and different objects, 
including art objects, which have no objective use or direct relation to pleasure 
responses that have evolved in relation to stimuli that are useful for homeostatic 
needs. Affective neuroscience thus supports the concept of art as play, something 
that we do for its own sake because it is pleasurable. However, play is not without 
social purposes, and insofar as we regard people as phenomenal objects, 125 art has 
an objective purpose. If we also regard, as we must in Kantian moral terms, people 
as noumena, as ends in themselves, art is objectively without purpose. 
Contemporary affective neuroscience recognises this distinction, it values pleasure 
dirempted from ultimate physiological need. It values proximate pleasure for its own 
sake, and thus supports the social construction of art in culture. I claim that 
contemporary affective neuroscience therefore both explains and guarantees the 
possibility of art for us. 
Implications for painting practice 
From the above discussion and consequent claim that I make it follows that 
neuroscience is not going to provide specific objective rules for the production of a 
particular work of art. In this respect, affective neuroscience is thoroughly Kantian. 
Artists reading this thesis can relax at last; neuroscience is not going to destroy our 
artistic freedom! 
However, affective neuroscience does offer some insights that are useful for 
producing artworks that are effective as pleasure stimuli for us, for art that we call 
beautiful. Because we enjoy not only bodily, but also mental activity, we take 
pleasure in re-predicating our embodied feelings onto new stimuli. Some of us may 
take more pleasure than others in that activity, which may partially explain the 
125 As Kant thinks that we must insofar as we are of the world, though he does not, of course claim that 
we should only regard people phenomenally. 
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constant demand for new and different art and why some of us become artists and 
art theorists. The ultimate biological explanation for those choices may well lie in the 
frequency and intensity of the changes in our global brain states, described in 
Chapter Four. 
The most significant implication of affective neuroscience for practicing artists is, I 
believe, the importance of form relative to content of the art work, if we are to 
experience the work as beautiful. As already reviewed in the previous chapter, 
Tinbergen (1954), and Ramachandran & Hirstein (1999) have conducted studies on 
vertebrates that indicate'26 the importance of both spatial and colour form in 
intentional action stimulated by pleasure. Their experiments suggest that it is the 
formal quality of objects that enable these relatively simple (compared to human) 
animals to re-predicate their pleasure responses, learned on a prototype that does 
provide direct physiological sensory reward (food), onto objects of exaggerated form 
that do not provide such a reward. I would very much like to participate in studies 
designed to assess the importance of form in human aesthetic responses to objects 
in general and to "art"127 objects that exaggerate spatial or colour form. The 
advantage of human subjects is that they can give verbal reports on their feelings as 
well as execute simple behavioural tasks such as pushing buttons to indicate choice. 
But the crucial difference is that their brain activities can be simultaneously observed 
using EEG equipment designed for use on humans and which is readily available. 
Studies that directly monitor neurological brain states and transitions between these 
states are much more useful and reliable than studies which rely only on behavioural 
observation and/or individual reports on feelings. The technology exists for such 
studies and new techniques are presently in development that enables two subjects 
in conversation to be studied simultaneously. That development is potentially very 
useful because it opens the way to direct neurological studies of the social 
construction of the consensual agreement of aesthetic value as well as individual 
reports on pleasure. 
As the end of this thesis approaches, I want to say a few words about its implications 
for my understanding of my own practice. In Chapter One I briefly described my 
126 I have used this word instead of demonstrate because these experiments involve behavioural 
observations that are unsupported by direct neurological information about the animals' brain activities 
at the same time. 
127 1 believe that initial studies would have to use simple "art" arrangements of images of objects in 
various spatial relations to each other, rather than sophisticated abstract or even figurative paintings that 
might be used in later experiments. 
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long-term interest in beauty in painting, pictorial space, surface quality and form. At 
that time I recognised the need for restraint in painting, but I sensed this at a visual 
level, as result of my personal taste rather than understanding. 
As described in Chapter One, I developed a simple painting machine to apply 
industrial silicon to canvas. The machine could apply different repetitive waveforms 
but could not do anything else. The machine both enabled accurate application of 
the material and restrained freedom of composition. To make a new machine every 
time that I wanted to experiment with new ideas for painting was impractical, but my 
concerns went beyond technical problems; I became aware of the conflict between 
necessity and freedom and the problems within the idea of autonomy at the 
intellectual level as well as my experience of them within my practice that, at that 
time, revolved around a semi-autonomous machine. 
This intellectual interest led me to a detailed study of Clement Greenberg's work and 
from there to a prolonged period of reading and reflection on the critical work of 
Immanuel Kant. Yet the insistent problems of relation between subjective freedom 
as autonomy and the objective necessities of nature, though illustrated by my study 
of Kant's work, remained, for me, largely unresolved. An excursion into the 
aesthetics of Theodor Adorno was helpful but did not quite provide what I needed: a 
means of internalising within myself some of the restraint previously provided by my 
painting machine and at the same time also sustaining, to a degree, my artistic 
freedom. I decided to turn to neuroscience at that point. A different possibility was 
the phenomenological philosophy of the late 19th and the 20th centuries, an already 
well-trodden path. Another reason for my decision to take a neuroscientific route was 
my early career in research physics, which meant that I still retained some familiarity 
with the procedures of science. 
My principal interest in neuroscience has been in the extremely complex recursive 
and reflexive nature of the dynamical operations of that which it describes. My 
preoccupation is now with the form of these dynamics within the brain, between the 
brain and the body and between the organism and the world. The metaphor of the 
dance between the embodied brain and the world, described in Chapter Four, has 
lodged firmly in my mind and has taken hold of my imagination. I have come to see 
the world and my place in it within those reflexive, relational terms. That view differs 
substantially from the more linear and modernist world-view that I had at the 
beginning of this project. 
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That change is, I believe, what has begun, and will continue, to inform and influence 
my painting. That is a general point. Nevertheless, it is the central one that I wish to 
make because I believe that the construction of painting must relate to the change in 
the construction of the self of the painter. I do not believe that painting practice 
should be instrumental to aesthetic theory or the converse. These are quite different 
modalities and find relation only through the self that informs, and is formed by, both. 
The reflexive and recursive description provided by neuroscience of the dynamical 
form of embodied brain and its relational to the world in perception has brought this 
thesis dose to the current interest in philosophy that centres on ipseity and 
difference, but I have arrived there by different means. That opens up a possibility 
for a critical discourse of the relation between neuroscience and aesthetical writings 
that employ the idea of the fold. 
Finally, I want to outline the narrative that I currently construct to describe the relation 
between the reflexive form of the theory in which I am interested and the paintings 
that I make. The difficulty that I face is that the theory is dynamical and paintings are 
static. 128 Although I do not want to represent the theory in my paintings, I want them 
to allude to it in some way. The reflexive dynamics of perception are extraordinarily 
complex. One might allude to that complexity by making very complicated paintings. 
The result might be an image on the canvas so complex that it would be difficult to 
discern formal structures within it. My main reason for not following that strategy is 
that the complexity is in us and not in the objects of our perception. Moreover, this 
complexity is a dynamical process rather than a static one. Painting is well suited to 
the latter, but is a difficult medium in which to adequately allude to rapid time- 
dependent operations. For these reasons, and because of my personal taste, I have 
chosen to make very simple paintings. I usually use only two colours and simple 
shapes that are either symmetrical or arranged together in a symmetrical way, 
sometimes both. It is this formal simplicity that enables me to play with the 
perception of pictorial space. 
People often see the image in my paintings as a two-dimensional one and 
subsequently as three-dimensional, often followed by a reversion back to a two- 
dimensional interpretation of picture space. This indecision is repeated even when 
128 1 mean that painting is not a time-based medium in the way that say, music or film are. Our 
experience of paintings may well be a dynamic one but that dynamism is primarily given by us and not 
the object that is the painting. 
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they are familiar with the painting. Additionally, people find it difficult to decide 
whether, when perceiving the picture space as three-dimensional, it is recessive 
space away from them or intrusive space towards them. It is my hope that this 
ambiguity, this indecision and inability to reach a singular determination of the 
dimensionality of the pictorial space in what is basically a very simple arrangement of 
coloured marks on a flat surface, will give pleasure to people through playing with 
their intuitions of space and time, that they will experience the paintings as beautiful. 
I also hope that some people will realise that this dynamical play, this pleasure and 
beauty is within themselves and not in the static object before their eyes. Some may 
reflect on the difficulties of that simple conclusion; they may begin to question 
whether it is just in them or in the "other than them" too, and what do the concepts of 
self, sameness and otherness mean anyway? I am a very hopeful painter! But then 
artists are optimists about the power of art, its ability to stimulate the thoughts and 
feelings of people; they have to be. 
214 
REFERENCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Adorno TW 1970 Aesthetic Theory, translated by R Hullot-Kentor 
(1997). London: Athlone Press 
Adorno TW& 1944 Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by J Cumming 
Horkheimer M (1997). London: Verso Press 
Baumgarten AG 1735 Reflections on Poetry, translated by Aschenbrenner & 
Holther (1954). Berkeley: University of Los Angeles 
Press 
Bennett MR& 2003 Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience. Oxford: 
Hacker PMS Blackwell 
Bernstein JM 1992 The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to 
Derrida to Adorno. Oxford: Polity Press 
Berridge KC& 1998 What is the role of dopamine in reward: hedonic 
Robinson TE impact. reward learning or salience incentive? Brain 
Research Reviews 28: 309-369 
Berridge KC& 2003 Parsing Reward. Trends in Neuroscience 26 (9) 507- 
Robinson TE 513. 
Bowie A 1990 Aesthetics and Subjectivity. 2003 edition. 
Manchester: University Press 
Burnham D 1999 An Introduction to Kant's Critique of Judgement by 
Immanuel Kant. Oxford: OUP 
Cabanac M 1997 reprint with minor changes of paper first published in 
1991 and given at the Association for the Scientific 
Study of Consciousness at Pomona, Canada in June 
1997. Pleasure: the Common Currency, available on 
215 
Cabanac M, 
Massonet B& 
Belaiche R 
Caygill H 
Caygill H 
Churchland PS 
Damasio A 
Damasio A 
Damasio A 
DeLeuze G& 
Guattari F 
Della Rocca M 
Duve T de 
the web at 
http: //www. ceptualinstitute. com/aenre/cab91 work. htm 
1972 Preferred skin temperature as a function of internal 
and mean skin temperature. J Appl. Physiol. 33: 699- 
703 
1989 Art of Judgement. Oxford: Blackwell 
1995 A Kant Dictionary. Oxford: Blackwell 
2002 Brain-Wise. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press 
2000 The Feeling of What Happens: Body, Emotion and 
the making of Consciousness. London: Vintage 
2003a Looking for Spinoza: Joy. Sorrow and the Feeling 
Brain. London: Heinemann 
2003b Interview in New Scientist, 8/11/2003, pp 49-51. 
London: Reed Business Information Rd 
1988 A Thousand Plateaus. Translated by B Massumi. 
London: Athlone 
1996 Representation and the Mind-Body Problem in 
Spinoza. Oxford: OUP 
1999 Kant after Duchamp. Cambridge, Mass & London: 
October Books, MIT Press 
216 
Freeman WJ 1998 Emotion is Essential to all Intentional Behaviors. 
Ch 8 in Emotion, Development, and Self- 
Organisation: Dynamic Systems Approaches to 
Emotional Development. Edited by MD Lewis &I 
Granic, Cambridge University Press, 2000 
Freeman WJ 1992 Tutorial in Neurobiology: From Single Neurons to 
Brain Chaos. International Journal of Bifurcation and 
Chaos 2: 451 - 482 
Freeman WJ 1995 Societies of Brains: a Study in the Neuroscience of 
Love and Hate. Mahwah New Jersey: Lawrence 
Erlbaum 
Freeman WJ 1999a Consciousness. Intentionality and Causality. Journal 
of Consciousness Studies 6: 143 - 172 
Freeman WJ 1999b How Brains Make up their Minds. London, Orion 
Books 
Freud S 1915 The Unconscious. SE 14: 166-215 
Fried M 1966 Shape as Form: Frank Stella's New Paintings. Art 
Forum V (3) 18-27. New York 
Fried M 1967 Art and Obiecthood. Art Forum 5 (10). New York 
Garcia J 1990 Learning without memory. J Cognitive Neurosci. 2: 
287-305 
Garcia J, Lasiter P 1985 A general theory of aversive learning. Ann. N. Y. 
S, Bermudez- Acad. Sci. 433: 8-21 
Rattoni F& Deems 
DA 
217 
Gardner S 1999 Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason. London: 
Routledge 
Greenberg C 1940 Towards a Newer Laocoon. Partisan Review VII, (4) 
296-310. New York 
Greenberg C 1960 Modernist Painting. Forum Lectures (Washington 
D. C. Voice of America). Arts Yearbook 4,1961. A 
slightly revised and expanded version was published 
in Art and Literature 4, Spring 1965,193-200 
Hickey D 1999 The Invisible Dragon: Four Essaus on Beauty. Los 
Angeles: Art Issues Press 
Jarvis S 1998 Adorno, a Critical Introduction. Oxford: Polity Press / 
Blackwell 
Kant I 1781 Critique of Pure Reason. First edition edited and 
translated by V Politis (2000). London: Orion 
Kant I 1783 Proleaomona to any Future Metaphysics that will be 
able to come forward as Science. Translated by P 
Carus (1966). Chicago and La Salle: Open Court 
Publications 
Kant I 1785 Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. 
Translation and Introduction by M Gregor &C 
Korsgaard (1997). Cambridge: CUP 
Kant I 1787 Critique of Pure Reason. Second edition, edited and 
translated by V Politis (2000). London: Orion 
Kant I 1788 Critique of Practical Reason. Second edition. 
Edited by M Gregor (1997). Cambridge: CUP 
218 
Kant I 1790 The Critique of Judgement. Translated by JH 
Bernard (2000). Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books 
Kant I 1790 The Critique of Judgement. Translated by JC 
Meredith (1952). Oxford: OUP 
Kemp J 1920 The Philosophy of Kant. Reprinted in 1968, Oxford 
University Press 
Kitcher P 1990 Kant's Transcendental Psychology. Oxford University 
Press 
Krauss R 1981 The Originality of the Avant-Garde: a Postmodernist 
Repetition. Published originally in October, 18, 
Cambridge, Mass., and reprinted in R Krauss, The 
Originality of the Avant-Garde and other Modemist 
Myths. 1986, Cambridge, Mass & London: October 
Kringlebach M L, 2003 Taste-related activity in the human dorsolateral 
de Aranjo IET& prefrontal cortex. Elsevier Inc. Available on the web 
Rolls ET at http: //www. ens. ox. ac. uk/publications. html 
LeDoux J 1996 The Emotional Brain. New York: Touchstone 
Locke J 1690 An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
Edited by JW Yolton. London: Dent, 1976 
McFarland DJ& 1975 The behavioral final common path. Philos. Trans. 
Sibly RM Roy. Soc. (London) 270, Biol, 265-293 
Merleau-Ponty M 1962 Phenomenoloav of Perception. Translated by C 
Smith. London: Routledge 
Panksepp J 1998 Affective neuroscience: the foundations of human and 
animal emotions. Oxford: OUP 
219 
Pecina S& 2000 Opiod site in nucleus accumbens shell mediates 
Berridge KC eatin4 and hedonic 'likin4' for food: map based on 
microiniection Fos plumes. Brain Research 863: 71- 
86 
Pfaffman C 1982 Taste: a model of incentive motivation, pp61-97 in 
The Physiological Mechanisms of Motivation, edited 
by DW Pfaff. New York: Springer Verlag 
Ramachandran V 1999 The Science of Art. Journal of Consciousness Studies 
S& Hirstein W 6,6-7: 15-51 
Reath A 2001 Introduction to the Critique of Practical Reason by 
Kant. Cambridge University Press 
Rolls ET 2000 The Orbitofrontal Cortex and Reward. Cerebral 
Cortex 10: 284-294 
Scruton R 1981 A Short History of Modem Philosophy. London: 
Routledge 
Spinoza B 1660 The Principles of Cartesian Philosophy. Translated 
by S Shirley (1998). Indianapolis I Cambridge: 
Hackett 
Spinoza B 1674 The Ethics of Spinoza. Edited by DD Runes (1995). 
New York: Carol 
Tinbergen N 1954 Curious naturalist. New York: Basic Books 
220 
Varela F& Depraz 2000 At the source of time: valence and the constitutional 
N dynamics of affect. Arob se vol 4 (3) Electronic 
Journal, available at hftp: itwwwliane. net/arobase 
and forthcoming as Gallagher S& Watson S, eds, 
(in press) Ipseity and Alterity: Interdisciplinary 
Approaches to Intersubjectivity. Rouen: Presses 
Universitaires de Rouen 
Wilson MA& 1993 Dynamics of the hippocampal ensemble code for 
McNaughton BL space. Science 261: 1055 - 1058 
Wolff C 1735 Preliminary Discourses on Philosophy in General, 
translated by J Richard (1963) Blackwell, 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 
221 
APPENDIX ONE 
KANT 
The synthetic a priori iudaement and the iudaement of sensibility: time and space 
Kant's claim that space and time are pure a priori intuitions (formal structures of mind 
in the subject that are not derived from objects but which enable us to experience 
objects) is inconsistent with our natural view, which is that intuitions, being the 
representations whereby objects are given to us in experience, are a posteriori 
(derived from experience of objects). It is, therefore, important to see how intuitions 
can have an a priori (subjective) element. Kant justifies this claim firstly by reference 
to the idea of the synthetic a priori judgement. His argument goes as follows. 
Synthetic judgements are made true by objects, not concepts, and an intuition is the 
representation by which objects are given. Just as an a priori judgement requires an 
a priori ground so a synthetic a priori judgement is possible if there is not only a 
ground that contains an a priori part, (that is to do with us) but also a part that is 
synthetically grounded in (that is to do with, and is valid for) the object in the world. 
An intuition, being the representation whereby objects are given to us in experience, 
is capable of satisfying this second requirement. Thus an a priori intuition is possible, 
because the grounds for it can be satisfied. 
Kant also claims that experience cannot be all content, it must have form; that which 
orders sensation into a structure so that we may be cognitively conscious of it in 
experience. Whatever this relational structure of form may be, Kant claims, it must 
be supplied by us a priori, because whatever orders sensation cannot itself be given 
or derived from sensation. If an intuition contains only formal, a priori elements, it 
follows that we have a special kind of intuition that is independent of sensation, and 
consequently of affect also, because Kant claims affect to be a result of pure 
sensation. Kant calls such intuition pure a priori intuition. For Kant, there are only 
two intuitions that are pure a priori: space and time. 
Returning to my quotation from Kant on the title page of Chapter Two, it is now clear 
that Kants view of space and time is the third of the options outlined in the quotation. 
It is quite distinct from, and not reducible to, the first and second views: those of 
Newton and Leibniz respectively. As Gardner (1999, p88) points out, both Newton 
and Leibniz maintain that space and time are contained in the world, independently 
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of the subject's awareness, and that we have representations of space and time 
because we have knowledge of reality. Kant denies that. 
Kant's view of the spatio-temporal is based on the distinction between appearance 
and "thing in itself'. His transcendental idealism (that leads to his theory of space 
and time) is introduced in the preface to the First Critique (Kant, 1781/87). It is 
explained further in terms of his Copernican reversal (see Appendix Two below) of 
the pre-critical philosophies which all claim that our cognition must conform to things 
in themselves. The Transcendental Aesthetic re-examines the distinction between 
appearances and things in themselves in terms of Kant's theory of sensibility. It is 
spatio-temporality that is particular, Kant claims, to human sensibility rather than to 
objects. 
It is important to be clear about the difference between objects considered from the 
standpoint of Kant's transcendental idealism and objects considered from the 
everyday attitude/common sense standpoint. In the former case objects are 
considered as to their possibility in terms of their relation to our mode of cognition. In 
the latter case they are considered merely as how they appear to us through our 
cognition. 
Kant's transcendental idealism does not preclude empirical reality, but allows it in the 
conditional sense that though space, time and form are not absolutely real, they are 
necessary, a priori, for the constitution by us, of all objects of experience. The 
converse, that objects are necessary for the constitution, by us, of space and time, is 
most definitely not true for Kant - and this is central to my argument regarding 
Greenberg's conditions for painting's autonomy. 
We cannot have experience of objects without space or time, but we also need 
existent, though not absolutely existent, objects for experience - otherwise Kant's 
idealism would be unlimited, which it is not. But these non-absolutely existent 
objects are, for Kant, only possible for us through experience, which, in turn, is 
dependent on our formal and entirely subjective faculties of space and time - which 
strictly limits Kant's empiricism. It is in this sense that empirical reality is contingently 
possible for Kant; it is always ultimately limited by his transcendental idealism. 
So although the spatio-temporal is subjective from the transcendental point of view, it 
is objective from the common sense or human point of view. The purpose of 
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transcendental idealism is not to allow us to remove ourselves from the human 
standpoint, to step outside our own subjectivity, but rather to say something about 
that standpoint instead of about the world, which that standpoint presents to us. 
In the development of this explanation, the term a priori has acquired additional 
meaning. In the introduction to the First Critique it meant, "not arising out of 
experience" It was then developed further to also mean "presupposed for 
experience". By the time we get to the treatment of transcendental idealism, it has 
also come to mean "belonging only to the subjective, transcendental, object-enabling 
constitution of our mind. " (Gardner 1999, p 93) 
Kant is not so much about setting limits around ideas or things in themselves, but 
more to do with a sophisticated enquiry into the possibility of knowledge about 
objects and metaphysics, about knowledge for us. For me, Kant is about asking 
questions about how we can have knowledge rather than providing declamatory 
answers about what objects are. 
Greenberg's conception of space can only be inferred from certain passages in 
Modernist Painting. For example, Greenberg (1965, para 9) states, 
It is not in principle that Modemist painting in its latest phase has abandoned 
the representation of recognisable objects. What it has abandoned in 
principle is the representation of the kind of space that recognisable, three- 
dimensional objects can inhabit. 
In this passage, Greenberg is clearly conceptualising space in unequivocally 
Newtonian terms. Unlike Kant, Newton held that space exists absolutely and quite 
independently of objects that "inhabit" it. Kant (1781) insists that space is a pure a 
priori intuition, as we have already seen, but he also claims that its existence is non- 
absolute, a conclusion that results from the fact that, for Kant, space is no more than 
sensibility, that is to say, a subjective condition, in us, that precedes perception. 
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APPENDIX TWO 
KANT 
The Copernican Revolution 
In his Preface to the Second Edition of the First Critique, Kant (1787, Bxv) makes the 
central role of the subject within experience and knowledge explicit. 
We here propose to do just what COPERNICUS did in attempting to explain 
the celestial movements. When he found that he could make no progress by 
assuming that all the heavenly bodies revolved around the spectator, he 
reversed the process, and tried the experiment of assuming that the spectator 
revolved, while the stars remained at rest. We make the same experiment 
with regard to the intuition of objects. If the intuition must conform to the 
nature of the objects, I do not see how we can know anything about that 
nature a priori. If on the other hand, the object (qua subject of the senses) 
conforms to the nature of our faculty of intuition, I can then easily conceive of 
the possibility of such an a priori knowledge. Now as I cannot rest in the 
mere intuitions, but - if they are to become knowledge - must refer them, as 
representations to something as object, and must determine the latter by 
means of the former, here again there are two courses open to me. Either, 
first, I may assume that the concepts, by which I effect this determination, 
conform to the object - and in this case I am reduced to the same perplexity 
as before with regard to how I can know something a priori; or secondly, I 
may assume that the objects, or, which is the same thing, that experience. in 
which alone objects, as given, are known, conform to my conceptions - and 
then I am at no loss how to proceed. For experience itself is a mode of 
knowledge that requires understanding. Before objects are given to me, that 
is, a priori, I must presuppose in myself laws of understanding, which are 
expressed in concepts a priori. To these concepts, then, all the objects of 
experience must necessarily conform.......... we only know in things a priori 
that which we ourselves place in them. " 
The point that I want to make here is that Kant puts forward the idea of an epistemic 
reversal in our conformity with objects as an experimental procedure; no ontological 
claim is made here. The epistemic reversal therefore inheres in Kant's methodology 
before it appears in his philosophy. It is only later that Kant sets out to prove 
philosophically, rather than hypothetically, that objects conform to knowledge and not 
that knowledge conforms to objects. This he achieves by reference to the nature of 
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our representations of space and time and the concepts of understanding. If 
Greenberg is to claim that his own methodology is Kantian, I suggest that he must 
incorporate in it a similar epistemic reversal to that of Kant. 
Space and Time 
Kant (1781) claims in the introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic in The First 
Critique, that for something to be in space and time we must be capable of 
experiencing that thing. In other words, space and time have no meaning other than 
in terms of our experience of them. Things in time and space are what we call objects 
in the real world. It is counter-intuitive for us to suppose that the existence of objects 
depends on us, and Kant is not going nearly as far as Berkeley in that respect. All 
Kant is claiming is that for an object to be in time and space it must be experienced 
by us. Before Kant the problem of how we know about reality and objects 
(epistemology) was considered to be entirely separate from the problem of what is 
the constitution of reality (ontology/metaphysics). Kant refuses to address the 
constitution of reality directly; he does not posit a class of real things in general, but 
instead directs his attention to defining a more limited class of objects: those that are 
knowable to us. 
Objecthood and our knowledge of it are no longer separable, but are considered 
together, each in terms of the other. Kant (1781, p48-49) develops this idea further 
and defines his terms in part one of his Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic. 
The effect of an object upon the faculty of representation, so far as we are 
affected by the said object, is sensation. That sort of intuition, which relates 
to an object by means of sensation, is called an empirical intuition. The 
undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance. That to 
which in appearance corresponds to sensation, I term its matter, but that 
which effects that the manifold of appearance can be arranged under certain 
relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, 
and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot itself be 
sensation. It is, then, the matter of all appearances that is given to us a 
posteriori; the form must lie already a priori for them in the mind, and 
consequently can be regarded separately from sensation. 
I call all representations pure, in the transcendental meaning of the word, 
wherein nothing is met with that belongs to sensation. And accordingly we 
find existing in the mind a priori, the pure form of sensible intuitions in 
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general, in which all the manifold of appearances is arranged and viewed 
under certain relations. This pure form of sensibility I shall call pure intuition. 
Thus, if I take away from our representations of a body, all that the 
understanding thinks of as belonging to it, as substance, force, divisibility, 
etc., and also whatever belongs to sensation, as impenetrability, hardness 
colour etc.; yet there is still something left us from this empirical intuition, 
namely, extension and shape. These belong to pure intuition, which exists a 
priori in the mind, as a mere form of sensibility, and without any real objects of 
the senses or any sensation. 
The science of all the principles of sensibility a priori, I call Transcendental 
Aesthetic. 
(Al 9/B33) 
Kant goes on to describe how he is going to strip away from sensibility all that is 
annexed to it by understanding to arrive at empirical intuition, and then to take away 
from intuition all that belongs to sensation, leaving pure intuition and the mere form of 
appearances. From this investigation he claims that, 
... there will be found that there are two forms of sensible intuitions, as 
principles of knowledge a priori, namely, space and time. " (A21B35) 
I have reproduced this passage despite its length and difficulty because of its brilliant 
clarity in separating often conflated terms and because it is crucial to my argument 
regarding the role of space in Greenberg's analysis of the conditions for painting's 
autonomy. 
Kants epistemic reversal 
The concept of an object, as something that involves us in itt constitution, rather than 
leaving us as mere recipients, via our senses, of epistemes about it, is at the base of 
Kant's transcendental question, 
What is the ground of the relation of that in us which we call representation to 
the object? 
Kant's letter to Hertz, 21 °t February 1772. Quoted by Gardner (1999, p28). 
The question is about the conditions under which objects are possible for us. It is not 
reducible to the pre-Copernican questions of philosophy, which ask, what are the 
conditions for an object's being? And, what are the conditions for an object to be 
known? 
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This transcendental turn reverses the direction of the vector of knowledge. Instead of 
the traditional, pre-critical model of representation, 
If a subject S knows an object 0, then the explanation for S's representing 0 
lies ultimately in O's being the way that it is; had 0 not existed at all or been 
otherwise, S would not have represented 0 or would have represented 0 
differently. 
The direction of the flow of knowledge is reversed, so that, 
-the deepest, most abstract and encompassing explanation of the 
representation (of the object 0) now lies in how the subject S, is. 
(Gardner 1999, p41) 
From the epistemic reversal described above it is immediately apparent that Kant's 
philosophical method is entirely different to both the rationalist analysis of the clarity 
of ideas or their appeal to the principle of sufficient reason on the one hand and to 
the empiricist preoccupation with sense experience, for example Locke's Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1690), on the other. It is the difference between 
Kant and empiricism that is most relevant to the relationship between the ideas of 
Kant and Greenberg. Kant's methodology is characterised by his painstaking 
identification of the conditions of possibility for experience: Kant's transcendental 
conditions. These transcendental conditions must be satisfied before any 
epistemological relationship between subject and object is even possible, and in this 
sense, the transcendental conditions are necessary for any and all experience. 
Kant's detailed argumentation to identify these conditions amounts to a detailed 
analysis of the ways in which objects must conform to our mode of cognition in order 
that experience may be validated in Kantian terms. It is this prior examination 
(critique) of our cognitive powers, which enable us to experience objects, that is so 
distinctive of Kant's philosophical method and which makes his philosophy critical. 
By way of contrast, previous philosophies, which do not undertake a critical 
examination of the epistemic relationship between subject and object, in terms of the 
nature of the subject's cognition, are not critical. Such pre-critical philosophical 
method may lead to correct conclusions but such conclusions are merely dogmatic 
assertions because they are not premised on the nature of our cognitive powers; they 
are not, according to Kant, grounded in sound principles. In this essay I suggest that 
Greenberg's arguments to support his conditions for the autonomy of painting belong 
to this category; they are not critical in the Kantian sense because they are not 
grounded in a prior examination of the cognitive powers of the subject. Greenberg's 
conclusions in Modernist Painting may be correct, but through not being referred to 
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the nature of the subject's cognition, they are, in Kantian terms, no more than 
dogmatic assertion. 
If, as Kant claims, objects must conform to our mode of cognition then it follows that 
the cognising subject must take an active part in the constitution of its known objects. 
In all this discussion it is allowed that there may be objects existing whose 
constitution is independent of the subject, but it is claimed that we cannot know 
anything about them. For us to experience objects, according to Kant, not only 
empirical intuitions but also our pure intuitions of sensibility are required, and our 
sensibility is subjective because it involves our understanding. The danger now is 
that if this carrying over from subject to object is pushed too far the object's 
constitution may collapse back into the mind of the subject, a position identical with 
that of Berkeley. Kant avoids this problem, and establishes limits to his idealism, by 
claiming that we are only justified in regarding whatever it is about objects that make 
it possible for us to experience objects, as being the subject-dependent part of 
objects. Thus the subject-dependant constitution of objects is no more than that 
which we predicate on objects in order for it to be possible for us to know them. 
Therefore knowing and experiencing are subjective and not objective. 
The question remains as to what the link is between subject and object that brings 
part of the constitution of the subject within that of the object in experience of the 
latter. Kant's assumption is that there are a priori elements in cognition, which form 
the structure of our object-enabling experience, which are the conditions for us to 
experience objects. Likewise, the a priori features of objects are those that constitute 
our object-enabling structure of experience. Kant accepts realism only at the 
common sense level. We can accept empirical/a posteriori knowledge in everyday 
affairs, i. e. we can represent the object because of how it is. But we must remain 
aware, at the philosophical level, that what we are empirically/realistically accepting 
is only what is over and above the a priori features of objects and is always 
conditional on those features. 
As we have seen already the cognitive power within us that enables objects to be 
given to us in experience through our senses is called sensibility and the 
representations that result are called intuitions. These intuitions are immediate, sight 
as opposed to insight, and incorporate the phenomenological presentation of the 
object to the subject. By way of contrast, concepts are the means by which we think 
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about objects and the power within us that enables us to think about objects is called 
understanding. 
The Analytic makes it clear that the mutual dependence of intuitions and concepts is 
a fundamental proposition of Kantian epistemology because knowledge of an object 
requires an intuition and a concept. For, as Kant (1781, p68) puts it, 
Without sensibility no object would be given to us, without understanding no 
object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions 
without concepts are blind. It is, therefore, just as necessary to make our 
concepts sensible, that is, to add the object to them in intuition, as to make 
our intuitions intelligible, that is, to bring them under concepts. These two 
powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding can 
intuit nothing; the senses can think nothing. Only through their union can 
knowledge arise. (A511B75) 
The two representations of concept and intuition are irreducibly different and cannot, 
therefore, be collapsed into each other. 
As mentioned before, Kant claims that if something is in space and time then it is 
capable of being experienced by us, and the converse. This does not imply that we 
all experience a particular object in the same way, but simply that the power to 
experience spatio-temporal objects in some way is universal. For Kant then, space 
and time are involved in the link between the world of objects and ourselves in a 
crucially important way. 
The Introduction to the Transcendental Aesthetic focuses on the role of space and 
time in sensibility. In the Aesthetic Kant claims that space and time provide the 
sensible form of experience, thus making objects possible for us. This feature of 
space and time implies that they must differ, in some important way, from sensibility 
in general. Kant distinguishes space and time from all other sensible experience in 
two ways. Firstly he claims that space and time are pure a priori intuitions. Secondly 
he claims that that space and time are only forms of sensibility and are not features 
of absolute reality. That is to say space and time are part of us, as elements of our 
cognitive constitution. All the objects that we experience in space and time are 
simply appearances as opposed to things in themselves, for as Kant (1781, p61) 
says, 
What may be the nature of objects considered as things in themselves and 
without reference to the receptivity of our sensibility is quite unknown to us. 
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We know nothing more than our own mode of perceiving them, which is 
peculiar to us, and which, though not of necessity pertaining to every being, 
does so to human beings. With this alone we have to do. 
(A41 /B59) 
Kant's conclusions from The Metaphysical Exposition of the Concept of Space (Kant, 
1781, p49) are relevant here, and important later in Chapter Two in my discussion of 
Greenberg's conceptualisation of space. 
1. Space is not an empirical concept that has been derived from outward 
experiences. For, in order that certain sensations may relate to something 
outside me (that is, to something which occupies a different part of space 
from that in which I am); ... the representation must already exist as a 
foundation. Consequently the representation of space cannot be borrowed 
from the relations of external phenomena through experience; but, on the 
contrary, this external experience is itself only possible through the said 
antecedent representation. 
2. Space then is a necessary representation a priori, which serves as the 
foundation of all external intuition ....... 
3. Space is no discursive, or as we say, general concept of the relation of 
things...... it must therefore be considered as a condition for the possibility of 
appearances, and by no means as a determination dependent on them... 
4. Space is represented as to an infinite given quantity ...... but no concept, as 
such can be so conceived, as if it contained within itself an infinite multitude 
of representations. Nevertheless, space is so conceived, for all parts of 
space, even to infinity, exist at once. Consequently, the original 
representation of space is an intuition a priori, and not a concept. 
(A23B37) 
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APPENDIX THREE 
NEUROSCIENCE 
Neurons 
Estimates of the number of neurons in the adult human brain fall in the range of ten 
to a hundred billion, the same order of magnitude as the present population of the 
world. Each of these neurons is a largely autonomous single cell unit having its own 
internal "battery" of electrical energy that is re-supplied from the brain energy 
substrate and is its own on/off switch. Each neuron has a nucleus, which processes 
electrically encoded information received from its input channels called dendrites that 
form multiply branched connections - up to about 10,000 in number - to the output 
channels, called axons, of other neurons within its range of connections. A single 
neuron has about a million other neurons within range of its root-like system of 
dendrites but typically only links up with about one percent of all possible 
connections. The output from a typical neuron is a single axon that is also heavily 
branched and transmits the neuron's output to the thousands of dendrites of a small 
percentage of other neurons that are within its range. 
Although the output axon of a neuron is multi-branched, each branch carries the 
same output signal as very short electrical pulses (of only one millisecond rise-time) 
that gradually decay away. In contrast, the input from the dendrites of other neurons 
to the nucleus is a wave-form (though not a simple harmonic wave like a sine wave) 
that is made up of all the thousands of different signals arriving from its dendrites, the 
branches of which all connect to the axons of different neurons. The signals are 
received from different "within range" neurons at different times and at different 
frequencies and are all superposed on each other as they arrive. The integrated 
result is an ongoing and complex wave-form that can carry very large amounts of 
information. The output signal from an axon is in the form of a very rapid sequence 
of discrete pulses, sent one at a time; there is no integrative process in axonal 
signals. From even this simplified description it is apparent that neurons are not 
simply elements of a simple electric current conductor; they are not analogous to 
joined up pieces of copper wire carrying a simple harmonic electric current to a 
domestic appliance. Each neuron has an integrative function that mediates, 
compresses, and onwardly transmits the "chatter and gossip" from its 10,000 
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colleagues. 129 Because neural pathways are seldom purely linear, an individual 
neuron has a chance of receiving a tiny proportion of its own output back again from 
other neurons involved in the same loop; such output is never received in the same 
form that it was sent because it has been integrated with, and mediated by, the other 
neurons in the circular chain of neuronal events that constitutes the loop. This 
reflexivity is important; at the meso and macro levels of neuron activity it is extremely 
important. 
Each neuron is always active, but in a variety of states; these states include various 
degrees of excitation and inhibition and of rest. Even at rest, neurons emit a low 
intensity pulse lasting for a few milliseconds about once every second. A neuron that 
has been inactive for more than a few seconds is a dead one and is quickly 
scavenged by specialised cells to allow room for a new one to grow in its place. 
Neurons are also capable of "learning" preferred pathways of receiving and 
transmitting from and to other particular neurons within their range. Studies of the 
embryonic cortex show that the initial connections between neurons that are sparsely 
distributed in the neuropil (the grey matter substrate of the brain) are simply chance 
connections with near neighbours. As the brain grows, so does the complexity of the 
branched dendritic and axonal connections of the neurons within it, and new 
connections appear to be less random. The more frequently a particular pathway 
between neurons is used the stronger the signals transmitted by it. As a result of 
constant usage, particular pathways become habituated and persist over very long 
periods of time. Although the broad architecture of these pathways remains 
recognisably similar over time to experimental observers, changes in detail are also 
observed. A specific stimulus given to a pathway results in a particular observed 
pattern of electrical activity, but the same stimulus given a few weeks later results in 
a very similar but not identical pattern; the brain is constantly modifying its habitual 
pathways as a result of new experience, and in this sense, nothing is really "hard- 
wired" about inter neuron activity. 
The connections between axonal branches of one neuron and the dendrites of others 
are called synapses. When an axonal pulse reaches a synapse it releases a 
chemical, which diffuses into and activates, a "switch" in the cell wall of the receiving 
dendrite, thus allowing the train of pulsed signals to flow into the receiving dendrite, 
be converted to wave-form, and subsequently integrated with other dendrite signals. 
129 Whilst generally unenthusiastic about anthropomorphic attributions, I do not have a problem with 
them when applied to humansl - Or to the operations of the human mind/brain. 
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There are, in broad terms, two types of synapse. Inhibitory synapses either reduce 
the signal strength or reverse its direction of flow altogether. Excitatory synapses 
boost the signal strength to varying degrees. Both inhibition and excitation functions 
are essential to neural networks to prevent the system either running down to zero 
(death) or running completely out of control in ever increasing excitation (also death). 
The above sketch of how neurons interact with each other at the micro level is very 
much simplified. It is intended only to show the potential that even small numbers of 
neurons have for transmitting, integrating and, above all, mediating through their 
interdependency with each other, huge amounts of encoded information from the 
body and from the world. The functional dynamics of neurons viewed at the meso 
and macro levels are significantly different from the operations described above and 
are dealt with in the main text. The focus of this chapter is not on the detailed 
morphology, physiology and electro-chemical properties of neurons but on the 
reflexive dynamics of their relational inter-dependency (at the micro, meso and macro 
level) that is crucial to the functioning of a self-organising brain. 
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